Spain: December 1527, 21-31

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 2, 1527-1529. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1877.

This free content was digitised by double rekeying. All rights reserved.

Citation:

'Spain: December 1527, 21-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 2, 1527-1529, ed. Pascual de Gayangos( London, 1877), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol3/no2/pp508-525 [accessed 28 November 2024].

'Spain: December 1527, 21-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 2, 1527-1529. Edited by Pascual de Gayangos( London, 1877), British History Online, accessed November 28, 2024, https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol3/no2/pp508-525.

"Spain: December 1527, 21-31". Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 2, 1527-1529. Ed. Pascual de Gayangos(London, 1877), , British History Online. Web. 28 November 2024. https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol3/no2/pp508-525.

December 1527, 21-31

23 Dec.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 41,
f. 362.
278. Alonso Sanchez, Imperial Ambassador in Venice, to the Emperor.
After his despatch of the 14th inst. the Signory stopped a courier from Trent, who was bringing letters of the 2nd from Madame [Marguerite] of Flanders. The courier was brought here [to Venice] from a place eight leagues distant, and kept in confinement during three days, alter which he was released with one letter of Madame to him (Sanchez), and 35 ducats he had spent by her order. In the letter, which was open, Madame had enclosed two other letters of Don Iñigo de Mendoza, one for himself (Sanchez), the other for the General of the Franciscans, or to whoever should represent the Emperor at Home, which he was desired to forward as speedily as possible to its destination, These letters were not in the packet, and are most likely in we hands of a man who is very clever at reading ail sorts or cipher. Has not asked for them, because he considers au application of this sort as entirely useless, as the Signory are in the habit of intercepting and deciphering all letters that fall into their hands. Some time ago they stopped a post of the King of Hungary, who is not actually at war with them, and when his resident ambassador in this city called for them, they impudently confessed that they had taken them, and that they were being deciphered by their order. Has written both to Madame and to Don Iñgo, informing them of the event, and telling them how to direct their correspondence in future. Trusts that if the instructions he (Sanchez) has sent to the Bishop of Trent are complied with, no more letters will be intercepted, as he has taken every precaution to prevent it.
On the 18th the ratification of France was received at Ferrara, together with a very loving letter from the French King to the Duke, approving of the marriage of his son (Ercole d'Este) to his sister-in-law (Madame Renee of France). On the same day this Signory ratified and signed the aforesaid treaty.
The Pope is still at Orvietto, and has sent for the cardinals who were at Parma, as likewise for Cavalier Casale, the English ambassador. What he purposes doing he (Sanchez) cannot guess, not being acquainted with the details of the treaty made with him, but he has a strong suspicion that Iris intention is to devise means for not fulfilling that part of it which has reference to the delivery of the cities and fortresses, &c, the more so that one of the articles of the treaty between the Duke and the League stipulates that the Pope, on recovering his freedom, was to ratify the same. We shall soon see what he is about, and the Emperor will then be justified before God and the world for any act of his, as he has already been on every previous occasion before. (Cipher:) Is the more inclined to believe this, that Lautrech has gone to Bologna, and intends, as they say, going to Rome, which is hardly credible, unless he has some secret object in view, for in the first place he has not an army sufficiently strong to meet ours, and secondly he knows very well that we are daily expecting reinforcements from Germany. The worst is that the Imperial army, according to the last news, has not yet evacuated Rome, a thing greatly to be wondered at, considering that each of the Germans has received nine crowns in gold.
The fleet of the confederates has anchored at Genoa, very much shattered by the late storms, and having lost six galleys.
Codigniola has been restored to the Duke of Ferrara, but not the palace he had here [at Venice], as the Papal Nuncio says that now the Pope is free he wishes to hear what his pleasure is.—Venice, 23rd December 1527.
Signed: "Alonso Sanchez."
Addressed: "To the most Sacred, Imperial, and Catholic Majesty."
Indorsed: "To the King. 1527. From Venice. Sanchez, 23rd December. No. 631."
Spanish. Original partly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering between the lines and on the margins, pp. 3.
26 Dec. 279. The Emperor to Don Iñigo.
K. u. K. Haus-
Hof-u. Staats Arch.
Wien. Rep. P. C.
Fasc. 22.
All your letters have been duly received, those by land, as well as those sea, including that of the 16th of November addressed to our secretary [Jean Lallemand]. Thank you very much for the zeal displayed in our service We shall in a few days send Miçer Miguel May, regent of our chancery in Aragon, who is to go [to England] on the plea of assisting you in your work, and allowing you some repose during your infirmities, but whose real mission will be to attend to the case of the Queen, our aunt The said regent is a good lawyer and canonist, and shall take with him attested copies of Pope Julius' brief of dispensation, which is as ample as can be desired. Another transcript in cipher shall also be sent to you according to the Queen's desire and your own advice, the said May being instructed by us to follow in every respect the Queen's orders and your own directions.
We also send you copies of all the papers that have passed between us and the French on the subject of peace, whereby you will be convinced that they do not wish for it, since their King demands to have his two sons back before he gives proper security for them, if the peace is to be good and lasting. We will take care that such answer be made to their ambassadors at this our court as shall vindicate us in the future and that the King and Cardinal [of England] may know that it is no fault of ours if peace be not concluded.
As the said May, who is going soon, will explain our intentions, We shall not say more in this letter, which goes by a land route.—Burgos, 26th December 1527.
Spanish. Original draft. pp. 2.
280. Instructions to Cardinal Farnese.
S. E. L. 2,005,
f. 179.
B. M. Add. 28,577,
f. 114.
Cardinal Farnese, now going to the Emperor as Papal Legate a latere, ought to be well acquainted with the circumstances and bearings of his mission. The Emperor is the Pope's friend, and as such has received from His Holiness more good services than from any other Prince. The Pope, on the other hand, has never ceased to love the Emperor, and if he opposed him last year, it was because he (the Pope) did not like to be oppressed.
The Pope has always and in all matters earnestly taken up the Emperor's cause ever since the accession of Leo X. "suo fratello" to the Pontificate. He was the author of the league made against France in the second or third year of that Pope's (Leo X.) pontificate.
When King Ferdinand [of Spain] died, the King of France [Francis I.] made great efforts with Pope Leo [the Tenth] to deprive the Emperor of his Spanish inheritance. Pope Clement, at that time Cardinal de Medici, successfully opposed the plans of the French King, as could be proved by the Emperor's own letters, had not the Imperialists destroyed or carried them away during the last sack of Rome.
At the time of Emperor Maximilian's death. Pope Leo was the friend of France. As soon, however, as the election [for the Empire] began, Cardinal de Medici prevailed upon the Pope "suo fratello" to act in the matter against his own inclinations, and afterwards to approve of the election without delay. Pope Leo was afraid lest Charles' growing power should entail much misery on Christendom, whilst he (the Cardinal) was desirous of increasing the forces of Spain so that the Emperor might become a match for France and prevent that country from declaring war, or if it did, that the Emperor might be victorious. This the Cardinal managed to do at a time when Spain was in open rebellion, and Charles himself away from his kingdom; when the deliberations of the Diet of Worms remained without effect; when Flanders was invaded by Robert de la Mark; Navarre entirely lost to Spain; and the Switzers closely leagued with France; when, last, not least, the King of England, in whom the Emperor perhaps trusted, owing to his close relationship and natural aversion of the French, was wavering which side to turn, and by no means inclined, as he has afterwards shown by deed, to lend the Emperor his assistance, or help him in his difficulties, notwithstanding the many applications for help made before and after Leo's death.
Meanwhile the King of France, besides his "potenza unita," had closely allied himself with the Signory of Venice and with the Switzers. He was considerably stronger than Charles at the time; his offers [to Rome] were also more advantageous than any Charles had hitherto made. He offered, among other things, to restore Ferrara to the Church. With regard to Naples, he offered so many advantages and facilities that its conquest might have been considered as exceedingly easy. His overtures, however, were rejected, as he (Francis) would not consent to place an Italian on the ducal throne [of Milan], and restore Parma and Piacenza to the Church.
In spite of the great disproportion between the advantages and the dangers, and regardless of the opinion of many friends and the solicitations of the Florentines, the Cardinal made Pope Leo espouse the cause of Charles, not indeed from any worldly motives, but because he had confidence in the Emperor's Christian sentiments.
Many were the disappointments and actual losses to which the Cardinal was exposed in consequence of his friendship for the Emperor. Helped as much as he could the election of Adrian VI. This election was not unanimous, and yet he (the Cardinal) was not vain enough to hope that his great services might have been rewarded on the occasion. True it is that, as a return for so many services as the house of Medici has rendered the Emperor, there exists a letter of his, written in his own hand, promising to a nephew of Pope Leo and of Cardinal Medici an estate in Naples worth an income of 6,000 ducats, besides a wife with a dower of 10,000 ducats a year. This promise, though often made, was never fulfilled and yet the Cardinal went on serving the Emperor as if his services had been munificently rewarded. The French, meanwhile had so reinforced their Italian army, that it was in his (the Cardinal's) power to decide which side victory should lean Sacrificed his family and his country to pay the Emperor a large subsidy. As a proof that his services were estimated at their due, the Emperor granted him a pension of 10,000 ducats a year, and instructed his ambassador [Don Juan Manuel] after the death of Pope Adrian to work for his election.
Helped the Imperial army of Lombardy with money. Instead of being grateful, the Emperor favoured Ferrara. On the retreat of the Imperialists from Marseilles, the French King again invaded Italy, and took possession of Milan. Had the French then marched on Lodi, instead of laying siege to Pavia, all might have been lost, and Rome would have remained at the victor's mercy. No blame can be attached to the present Pope, if seeing the Emperor's affairs in so bad a plight, and his own estate menaced, he tried to come to terms with the enemy. The King of France sent to request the Pope to remain neutral; the Pope replied that he would be peaceful (amorevole) to all. Despatched a messenger to him from Marseilles, or from Aix, offering through Alberto di Carpi "carta blanca" in all matters except Milan. Unable to resist the French, the Pope concluded a treaty with them, but in so doing he was not so much influenced by considerations of his own private advantage—the offers being exceedingly large, both as concerns public and private matters—as by the wish of preserving the Emperor from harm. So true is this that he left the French two whole months before Pavia without bestowing on them one single mark of favour, whilst he was doing all he could for the Imperialists.
Could not refuse giving the French passage through the estates of the Church, and provisions also. The King of France, far from deriving any advantage from this, sustained thereby great injury, as he was obliged to divide his forces. The Emperor, therefore, is not justified in accusing the Pope "per la fictitia concordia fata co el Re."
After his victory at Pavia, the Emperor, instead of renewing his old and amicable relations with Rome and the Pope, sends a whole army to feed on his territory "in dorso." His generals must have seen the clauses of the treaty which the Pope then made with France, for the Papal papers and correspondence at the time of the sack were seized and scattered by the Imperial soldiers. If so, they must know that the Pope never offended the Emperor. If, moreover, they nave not seen the treaty, they can allege no proofs to the contrary.
The Imperialists invaded the estates of the Church. The Pope, to save himself from still greater vexations, was obliged to pay 100,000 ducats and conclude a league with the Emperor. Though made with the Emperor's sanction, and by people sufficiently empowered to that effect, it was rejected in Spain, on the plea that it contained several clauses favouring the Pope and the Church, such as the sale of salt at Milan and the restitution of Reggio.
Seeing everything turn out contrary to his expectations and wishes, the Pope listened to the advice of some who maintained that the Emperor was intent upon oppressing Italy and becoming absolute master of it; and so it came to pass, for in order to seize Milan the Emperor picked a quarrel with its Duke (Francesco Sforza). The Italians then decided to act towards him as he wished to act towards them. A league was concluded between France, Venice, and the rest of Italy. The Pope joined the League; he could not exclude himself if he chose.
He candidly confesses that having listened to certain overtures made in the name and on the part of the Marquis of Pescara, who was at that time dissatisfied with the Emperor, and who, as an Italian by birth, offered to join the Italian League [against him] whenever it should be time to proceed to action, he not only accepted his services, but tried to retain him by making all manner of advantageous offers, thinking himself justified for the preservation of his own estate and person to employ all and every means in his power to secure the services of those who might help to assist him in his troubles. One of the parties [the Marquis] is now dead, and God only knows in what sense and for what purpose the overtures were made, and how the negotiations were conducted. All he (the Pope) can say is that he was spoken to in the Marquis' name, and that having despatched a messenger to ascertain whether the propositions really came from him, he not only answered in the affirmative, but assured him (the Pope) that everything which had been said in his name was perfectly true. As to him (the Pope), God, who reads men's hearts, knows that in entertaining such overtures he acted from sheer necessity, not indeed from choice. He may adduce, as proof of this, that he still continued to beg and entreat the Emperor to make peace on equitable conditions.
Then came the arrest of Morono, and the rebellion of the Duke of Milan. The Pope still persevered in his friendship towards the Emperor, although, like the rest of the confederated Princes, he wished Milan to be retained by the Duke Francesco Sforza.
The treaty which the Emperor concluded with him (the Pope) was designed only with a view to obtaining better conditions from Francis, and therefore no sooner was the treaty signed than the Emperor refused to ratify that which he had made with the Pope.
The good-will of the Pope is further evident from the fact of his having granted about this time dispensation for the Emperor's marriage, which marriage brought him money and ensured his succession.
When the Pope was again on the point of making an alliance with the King of France and with the Venetians, the Emperor made overtures for peace, and instructed Don Hugo de Moncada to offer not only what he (the Pope) asked, but a good deal more than he had ever dared to expect.
The Emperor can never exculpate himself in this particular, nor reproach the Pope if he rejected the offers made by Don Ugo de Moncada. As long as he (the Pope) was at liberty to accept such offers he was ready to content himself with much less, but when they came a league had already been concluded with the other Italian Princes. As this league was intended for the promotion of general peace a most honourable place (luogo honestissimo) in it was reserved for the Emperor. The Pope besides invited the Emperor to join it. What was the Emperor's answer? The Duke of Milan was attacked de facto. Had the Duke been guilty of all the crimes he was accused of, judgment should have preceded execution.
It was in the Pope's power to invade Naples. Did not do so, although in the treaty of the League that and other enterprises were expressly mentioned. It was, however, stipulated that that and other like expeditions should not be undertaken before the Emperor had absolutely refused to enter the League. Many months were thus spent in inactivity, waiting for an answer from Spain.
Meanwhile a treacherous attack was made on the Pope, of which it is best Dot to say anything True, the Emperor had not ordered or approved of it; on the contrary, he disapproved of it openly and at heart, and yet from that tame the Imperial army seems to have had no other mission than that of assisting the Colonnese, whom the Pope partially punished by destroying four of their castles.
Does not wish to argue whether the truce made here [at Sanct Angelo] in September (fn. n1) was considered by Don Ugo de Moncada as valid or not, but in neither case could we absolution of the Colonnese hold good, and His Holiness was bound to chastise his rebellious subjects.
Had that truce been concluded in good faith, it would have lasted longer. At any rate it was not the Pope who broke it first. The Emperor broke it both in Lombardy and in the Papal estates. Twelve thousand more lansquenets entered the Duchy of Milan, and the lands of the Church were invaded by troops (bande), who did their worst there, whilst the Viceroy (Lannoy), as appears from his own letters intercepted at the time, solicited the Council of Naples to send him reinforcements, with which he might achieve what in the first instance (colpo) had not been thoroughly accomplished, .... the sack of Rome. The Pope thus owed it to his own dignity to order his army from Lombardy and send it to the frontiers of Naples. It arrived there in time to make some good enterprise against that kingdom. The Pope, notwithstanding, gave orders not to attack, but merely to be on the defensive and watch the frontiers. If several castles and towns in the territory of the Colonnese were taken and razed to the ground it was from no other motive than the refusal of their inhabitants to quarter the Papal troops.
All this time the Pope persevered in his affection towards the Emperor. Things were in the worst possible plight when the general of the Observant Friars of St. Francis (il Patre Generate de' Minori) returned [to Rome] from Spain. He had gone thither with a message from the Pope to the Emperor, purporting that he was as desirous as ever of general peace. The Emperor, accordingly, sent him back with fair words and ample powers, but the conditions imposed were found to be so hard as to be almost insupportable. The Pope, however, did Dot reject them, as he wished to clear up this question between him and the Emperor. He granted the Emperor's demands, and accepted in return the offers made in his name.
About the time when the articles of the agreement were being drawn up, the Viceroy arrived at Gaeta with words as sweet and loving as those brought by the general of the Minorites. The conditions, however, grew every day harder and harder, and yet the Pope did not ask for more than he had asked on a former occasion; he only begged and entreated not to be forced to sign the peace alone, without consulting first his Italian allies, as he aimed at re-establishing general peace throughout Italy. A truce of eight days was signed, to give the Pope leisure to consult the Venetians, his allies. The Viceroy was then encamped at Frusolone (Frosinone). When Cesaro Ferramosca left Rome for the Imperial camp, he found the two armies engaged in fighting and Frosinone relieved, so that nothing could be done. (fn. n2) The Pope certainly was sincere in these negotiations, as was also his Legate (Triulzio). The armies being in sight of each other it was impossible to bring about an agreement.
The Pope needs scarcely remind Cardinal Farnese, for he is well aware of the fact, that the three Papal armies, .... that on board his fleet, that of Lombardy, and that on the frontiers of Naples, had made good progress, and were strong enough to continue their victorious march. All those who are not aware of the Pope's benevolence and love of peace will no doubt accuse him of weakness for thus allowing the opportunity to pass, and not taking advantage of the superiority of his forces at this conjuncture. But the Pope principally aimed at the peace of Christendom, and wished to turn his forces against the Turks. The Pope thought that no worldly consideration, however weighty, should divert him from his policy of peace.
At this juncture the Pope received through Cesare Ferramosca and Paolo di Arezzo the Emperor's holograph letter, conceived in such terms as to admit of only one construction. Either the Emperor's offers were in earnest, and the felicity of the world was to be the natural consequence of this agreement, or else they were false and deceitful, and only intended to work the Pope's ruin, which could only be the act of the vilest of men (indignissimo di ogni vilissimo), not of the most powerful among the Christian rulers.
The Imperial soldiers, having destroyed all the papers (tutte le scritture), took away the draft of a new treaty (nuova capitalatione?), made five or, at the utmost, six days before the loss of Rome, by which he (the Pope) entered the League. This treaty contained, it is true, several articles to the Emperor's prejudice, but the Imperialists will not be able to make use of it, as it is not likely they will divulge their own dishonour. Even if it had been impossible for Bourbon to enforce obedience and discipline among his soldiers, he might still have turned away from his purpose of ruining the Pope. There were so many officers and people of quality (persone principali) at the Imperial camp, among the infantry and men-at-arms, ready to obey the Emperor's orders if they had been given "de buona sorte," that Bourbon, deprived of their services, would have found it impossible to carry out his design. He (Farnese) knows this well, and that the Pope fulfilled faithfully all conditions of his agreement with the Viceroy. It is, therefore, not easy to understand how any one can reproach the Pope because he concluded a treaty with the League at the very last moment, and from sheer necessity.
When the news of the death of the King of Hungary arrived, the Pope decided to leave Rome, go to Spam and see the Emperor. No one can calumniate him on the account. That measure was decided in consistory two or three days before the invasion of the Colonnese. He intend to do so in the interest of Christendom, "ne credo alcuno sia cosi grosso che pensi si volesse far quell letto di gratia all' Imperatore, precedendo forsi quella tempesta, The enterprise of the Colonnese was not known three hours before they entered Rome.
"Le conditioni que (sic) il Padre Generate di San Francesco, portò a N. Sigre. furon queste: 1o. Si vole pure con la Santità sua, et se per caso alia venuta sua trovasse le cose di Sua Santità et della Chiesa minate, che era contento si reducesse tutto al pristino stato. 2o. Che si Italia dovia pare ad ognuno, non essendo di animo ne per se ne per suo fratello un merlo, anzi lassas' ogn' uno in possesso di quello si trovava tanto tempo fà. 3o. La differenza del Duca di Milano si vedesse de jure da giudici deputati per Sua Santità et Maiestà; et venendo ad assolvere si restituisse; dovendo esser condemnato, si desse à Borbone. 4o. Con Francia saria contento far l'accordo, et dando cosa che non havea voluto fare sin qui, et la summa nominava la medesma che il Christianissimo havea mandato, cio è due milion d' oro. Li quali conditioni N. Sanc, accoltò subbito, com' il Generale ne puo far testimonio, et le sottoscrisse di sua mano, ma non furon già approvate; li quali scie (sic)V. S. quante insupportabili et gravi petitioni li adgiunsero. Hora non essendo da presumere se non che la Mta. Cesarea dicesse da dovero, et con quella sincerità che conviene a tanto Principe, et vedendosi per quante oppositioni et ambasciade sue cosi moderato animo et molto benigno verso N. Sre., in tempo che la Mta. sua non sapeva qual fusse quello della Santità sua verso se, et che estimaua l'armi sue esser si potente in Italia per li lanzichinetti discesi et per l'armeta (sic) mandata che ogni cosa havesse veduto (sic voluto?), non è da stimare, se non quando si era informato che si la Mta. sua mandó a mostrar buon animo, non fu trovato inferiore quello di N. Sre. et che alle forze sue vi era tal resistenza che N. Sre. più presto fu benefitio a Sua Mta. in deponer l' armi, che lo ricevesse, como ho detto di sopra; et e chiarissimo tutta la ruina seguita sta sopra la fede efc nome di Sua Mta. nel qual N. Sre. si è confidato, vorrà non solamente esser simile a se, quando andava a desiderar bene et essibirsi parato a fame a N. Sre. et alia Chiesa, ma ancora aggiungendo tanto più a quella natural disposition sua quanto ricerca, il voler evitar questo carico, et de ignominioso che saria, per essere passandosene di liggiero, voltarla in gloria perpetua facendola tanto piu chiara et stabile per se medesmo quanto altri ha [no] cercato, quanto suoi ministri, deprimerla etosservarla (sic). Li effetti che bisognaria far per questo, tanto privatamente verso la Chiesa et restauration di essa et note de benefitii che scancellassero le ruine, quanto in Italia eb tutta la Christianta, essistimando piu esser auttore di pacificarla che qualsivogli altro emolumento, serà molto facile a trovarli purche la disposition et giuditio di voler et conosser il vero bene dove consisti vi sia."
The Pope has not taken arms against the Emperor out of hatred, or from any selfish motive touching himself or any of his family, but in just defence of himself and Christendom. The general of the Franciscan Minor friars is his witness how-much he (the Pope) rejoiced when there seemed to be a chance of war ceasing on both sides. The Pope spoke to him on the subject when about to leave for Spain, and requested him to inform the Emperor of the many complaints which he (the Pope), the rest of the Italian potentates, and all the Princes of Christendom thought they had a right to bring forth against the Emperor. When after several months the general came back [to Rome], announcing that the Emperor would set at liberty the sods of the King of France, and did not require one inch of territory (una pabma) more than the crown of Spain had owned in Italy for a long time, and that he (the Emperor) would put to shame all his calumniators when he should come to be known and understood, and that every point at discussion might be settled with Don Ugo and the Viceroy, then the Pope and all his ministers rejoiced at the message. The joy-was much increased when the Viceroy landed at St. Stephano, and sent on Peñalosa to repeat the very same words, or even more favourable ones than those brought by the general. The Pope praised God for it. The Viceroy had said that he had kept the best things for the last, that they might be most welcome. But no good things were kept back; on the contrary, the conditions proposed were as hard as ever. First of all, the mistrust shown by the Emperor was not flattering to the Pope, nor likely to produce confidence. Secondly, the best portion of the Pontifical and Florentine estates was demanded as security. Thirdly, there was required an exorbitant sum of money, which those in possession of "mountains of gold " would have been unable to pay, much less the Pope, who does not own a single "carlino" after the treacherous assault made [by the Colonnese], and the sack of St. Peter and of the Papal Palace. Besides these conditions the Emperor asked another equally hard, namely, that the Pope alone should make peace with him, a condition which the Emperor well knew to be impossible, since the Pope's wish was to restore universal peace to the Christian world. As these terms were really inadmissible the Pope rejected them; upon which the Viceroy invaded the territory of the Church, notwithstanding that he (the Pope) had always respected those of the Emperor.
On the arrival of Ferramosca the Viceroy was with in the territory of the Church. The Pope thought that the mandate of which he was bearer, if executed, would have spared great calamities. But the Pope wishing to do two things quite incompatible one with the other, that is to say, to show he had not done wrong in acting as he had done, and at the same time not to lose the advantages he had gained, could not possibly obey the Emperor's commands and make peace. He neither did the one nor the other. When Cesaro Ferramosca returned to the camp, hostilities had already commenced. Has the consolation of having acted from the best motives, and shown the Emperor both good-will and confidence. The Emperor's letters were of a kind that he (the Pope) would have staked on them not only the entire world, but also the salvation of his soul.
The Emperor had two commanders (capi) in Italy, Bourbon and the Viceroy. With whom was the Pope to treat? Has exhausted all means of negotiation. Has been betrayed when he most confided in the Emperor. He had frequently been told that Bourbon was to obey implicitely the Viceroy's commands, and such were the instructions sent to him [from Spain], and yet when he [the Pope] agreed with the General of the Franciscans to a suspension of hostilities no notice whatever was taken by Bourbon, "che non sapimo gia che modo si potra piu trovare al modo di credere ad una simplice fede di un privato gentilhuomo." Bourbon would never have been able to advance on Rome had not the army of the League, knowing the state of the negotiations, relented "reffredata" in the pursuit. They might easily have conquered Naples, but, alas! he (the Pope) has been too confident.
God has punished him (the Pope), but no man has a right to reproach him. Were things to be sifted, judgment would not be favourable to those who try to cover themselves under the faults of others. But enough of this.
Has no remarks to make on the treaty which both Bourbon and the Viceroy concluded with Florence, and which they openly violated, (fn. n3) . . . "li quail Dio giudichi con il suo giusto giuditio, doppo la misericordia del quale verso Noi et la sua Chiesa non speramo altro che in la Religione, fede e virtù dell' Impre. che essendoci condotto dove siamo per la opinione che havevamo di esso, con il frutto che si spetta [ba] a tal parte, ci ritraghi et ponghi tan to piu alto quanto siamo in basso, dalla cui Mta. aspettando dell' ignominia et danni patiti infinimente quella satisfactione che Sua Mta. ne puo dare quale alia grandezza sua et al debito . . . . alcuna se potesse . . . . . . trovar al mondo et bastasse ad una menima parte non . . . . raremo exprimendo i particolari a to [Her?] la gratia delli concetti che dovemo sperare, et che haver à et che si muderà. Dicemo que mettendosi il piu basso grado diquello che si posse demandare, et che è per esser più presto vergogna a Sua Mta. non conceder più, et a Noi non diniandare, che par duro a farlo, che da Sua Mta. doverano venire queste provisioni, che la persona nostra, dell Sacro Collegio, della Corte, dell Stato tutto temporale et spiritualesiano restituti in quel grado que era [no] quando furono fatte le inducie con il Sigre. Vicerè, et non ci gravare a pagare un denaro delli obligati. Se alcuno sentendo questo si burlerà de Noi, respondemo che se le cose di sopra sono vere, et si maraviglia che ci acquitassimo di questo ha grande ragioni, ma si le parecesse da dovero stranno consideri con che bontade lo giudica o verso Cesare o verso Noi, verso Cesare che ogni volta che non si promete di Sua Mta.—et queeto et molto piu lo fa gia partecipe di tutto quel male, che qui e passato verso di noi, que iniquamente ci vuol detrahere quello che mai nissuno ardiria di fare bonamente, ne se deve guar dare che siamo qui, ma come ci siatno, et che e pur meglio far con virtu et giudicio quello che il tempo ad ogni modo ba da portar', se non in vita nofstra in quella delli altri."
Italian. Original. Pp.30.
31 Dec. 281. Secretary Perez to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 4,
f. 364.
Wrote on the 29th of November and 11th inst. by Captain Gayoso, who went to Naples for the purpose of taking the hats to the three newly-created cardinals. Since then Don Ugo has written to say that the Bishop of Turpia (Tropia) will not accept his, but that the Archbishop of Monreale will gladly receive the offer of one, and has in readiness the 20,000 ducats required. Immediately on the receipt of this intelligence Alarcon despatched a messenger to Orbieto to solicit a Papal brief to that effect; but as the roads are very insecure for messengers travelling without a cavalry escort, the answer has not yet come. Alarcon and the rest of the Imperial ministers are anxiously awaiting the messenger's return, for every day that passes, our situation becomes more difficult. The army grumbles, the citizens get exasperated, and when the Germans come to be paid, according to agreement, another month's pay will be due to them, and consequently they will have a very good excuse not to move from Rome, which is what they want. The Prince of Orange and the rest of their captains are well aware of this danger.
Up to this hour the Pope has not written to Cardinal Campeggio, or to anyone else at Rome officially, to annouce his arrival at Orvieto, which took place on Monday, the 8th inst., at two hours of night. The people of the place did not hear of His Holiness' coming until Monday, when great rejoicings were made. The Pope, they say, was somewhat indisposed, suffering from fever and a swelling of the legs.
No steps have yet been taken for the surrender of Civittà Castellana and delivery of the six hostages.
Cardinals Monte and Sanctiquatuor, who left this for Orvieto, were taken prisoners at Bracciano by one Mario Orsini, who, in the absence of the Abbot of Farfa, his colleague, who has gone to see Lautrech, is doing all the harm he can in those parts. The Bishop of Salamanca (Bovadilla), who was travelling with the cardinals, was robbsd of all his plate, and it is added that Sanctiquatuor was stabbed by one of the assailants, though the sword went only through his cloak. All three, however, were set free after 24 hours' detention.
It is believed that the ambassadors of the League have already made their appearance at Orbieto. promising the Pope "maria ct montes." As the General [of the Franciscans] refuses to go thither, and as it is doubtful whether Don Ugo will like to send De Vere, Alarcon thinks that he (Perez) must needs go and represent the Emperor at the Papal Court Should he be appointed, he can do no possible good, as he has been strongly suspected, and hated ever since he presented to the College of Cardinals the letters about the Council, and it is not likely that the Pope or his courtiers will trust him with their secrets. Has written to Don Ugo to say that were it of any use he would not hesitate to go to Orbieto on his knees (de rodillas), but that for the reasons above mentioned he cannot go alone.
There is a report current that the army of the League is approaching to Orbieto, and that this movement has been undertaken in concert with Lautrech, who is then to march upon Sienna, and oblige that city to make common cause with the confederates.
Don Ugo has been written to for some money on account of the tithes (decimas), even if the Court should suffer (á daño de la Corte) that this Imperial army may be paid and sent out of Rome.
Letters from Orbieto, in date of the 18th, state that the Pope was in much better health than when he arrived, and that there was no foundation at all for the rumours spread about his death. He showed much good-will in all matters concerning the execution of the last treaty, and had already sent orders for the delivery of Civittà Castellana. But the Duke of Urbino, the Marquis of Saluzzo, Count Guido Rangone, Federico de Bozano, besides a proveditor and an ambassador from Venice, were also at Orbieto, holding frequent conferences with him; whereat, as maybe presumed, the Emperor's interests were not specially considered. His Holiness (our informer says) had warmly requested them to quit his court, and used very violent language to the Abbot of Farfa, who had gone there in company with the Marquis of Saluzzo, telling him that, had it not been for the sake of the latter, he would have had him arrested and beheaded.
The Marquis del Guasto is hourly expected from Naples with the proceeds of the cardinals' hats, but up to this day (the 23rd) no answer has come from the Pope respecting the refusal of the Bishop of Turpia (Tropia), and the transfer of his hat to the Archbishop of Monreale.
Miçer Andrea del Burgo, who is at Ferrara, has sent us the particulars of the agreement entered into by the Duke, from which it would appear that the latter will always side with the stronger party, so as to be the winner on every occasion. Encloses copy of a letter which the ambassador, Lope de Soria, has written to Don Ugo on the subject of that Duke, and of his dealings with the League. The friar who brought the letter and others with news from Lombardy asserts that when he left Hungary His Highness the King had besieged a castle where the Vayvod [of Transylvania] was, and that he could not possibly escape. His Highness had been crowned King. The same friar asserts that Leyva had provisions enough at Milan to last him six or seven months.
A man has come who left Sienna four days ago, and says that Lautrech is actually in the territory of Bologna, and has sent commissaries to Florence to prepare provisions and quarters for his men. The news must be true, for we know for certain that an ambassador from that republic has been for some time soliciting Lautrech to march in that direction and threatening, if he does not, to complain to the King of France that no opportunity has been given to that city to declare in favour of the League.
Alarcon was at Ostia three days since, for the purpose of escorting to Salmoneta the cardinals who are to remain as hostages for the Pope. At Salmoneta another escort will take them up and conduct them to Naples. They were to start on the 23rd, accompanied by Alarcon.
Cardinal Colonna is doing everything in his power, with the Pope's permission, to raise money here (at Rome) for the pay of the Imperial troops.
Alarcon travelled with the hostages one day's march, and is now at Belitre (Velletri), where the men-at-arms who did not go to Naples are quartered at present. It appears, however, that Alarcon's entrance into the town was not easily accomplished, for he had to send for upwards of 1,500 infantry and two pieces of heavy ordnance, when the people of Velletri, perceiving that he was in earnest, admitted him and the men-at-arms inside the town. The infantry then returned to Rome, though not empty handed (manvacios), for on their way back they sacked two villages of the Colonnese, at which Vespasiano and Ascanio are much disgusted.
Up to this day (the 28th) the brief in favour of the Archbishop of Monreale has not been received, although we know that it has been signed and published. We expect to receive it every hour, as with the 20,000 which that archbishop is to give, and 20,000 more from the hat granted to the brother of Luigi Gonzaga, very little will be wanted to complete the sum required for the evacuation of Rome by the Imperial army, which the Pope desires as much as anyone, not only for the sake of his capital, but for his own, for he is losing both authority and fortune as long as he remains out of it.
It is asserted that the Bishop of Verona (Gianmatheo Giberto) has asked the Pope's permission to retire to his see, and that he does not intend coming back here.
The news of Lautrech's designs upon Sienna is confirmed, When we know it for certain, a portion of this Imperial army will go to their aid, and the rest march against Florence. To effect this it is requisite to have in hand the whole of the money to be distributed to the soldiers. The Marquis [del Guasto] has arrived from Naples with most of it, but for fear of jealousies, &c. it will not be distributed either to the Germans or to the Spaniards until the whole of it has been collected.
Cardinal Campeggio has promised that Civittà Castellana shall be delivered the very moment that the inhabitants are secured from sack. The Prince of Orange and the Marquis del Guasto have accordingly granted a safe-conduct for certain townsmen to come to Rome and treat of the securities to be offered, &c.
It seems as if the Prince of Orange stood on ceremony (anda en cortesias) with Guasto, pretending that he is not really the commander-in-chief of the Imperial army, but only one of its minor captains, and refusing to sign orders and patents, except as general of the Germans and councillor of war. This is no small evil in all military matters, and His Imperial Majesty had better remedy it, for the command of this army must needs be in the hands of a general of much experience and authority.
Shots are wanted for the ordnance which we took out of Sanct Angelo: The Pope has ordered them to be given to us, but he wants one crown (escudo) for each, which is an excessive price. We shall, however, take 500 of them.
To-day, the 27th, a, council was held to take into consideration the proposal of Alarcon of going to Gaeta, for reasons stated in his last despatch. The affair was discussed between Colonna, the Prince of Orange, Guasto, and Urbina, when it was resolved to write to him to return as soon as possible to Home, to attend the deliberations of the Council, and assist the generals in all military business. At this meeting the Marquis [del Guasto] requested the Prince to take charge of the army without scruple of any sort, since he was ready to obey him in every respect. The Prince's answer was that, though His Imperial Majesty had graciously given him the command of his [Italian] armies, he would on no account use it, but, on the contrary, would be as obedient to his orders and those of Alarcon, Urbina, and the rest of the Spanish captains, as if he were a common foot soldier; because whenever the Emperor's service was concerned he did not stand upon his rank, &c. Though the Cardinal and the rest tried every reason to convince him, they entirely could, and he persisted in his former declaration. He (Perez) mentions this, because, in his opinion, the Imperial army will be utterly ruined, unless it has a fit and experienced commander at its head. The Marquis has no objection whatever to the Prince of Orange, or any other of less rank, being captain- general; he is not actuated by selfish motives, though he knows his own merit and worth. What he most wishes for at present is leave to kiss the Emperor's feet and hands. His Imperial Majesty will be glad to know him personally. Though still young, he has as much experience as most generals.
29th.—Last night the bull and brief came for the Archbishop of Monreale, and immediately after a messenger was despatched to Naples for the 20,000 ducats. They are sadly wanted, for the Germans, besides the 110,000 ducats promised, want now 24,000 more, on the plea that the account sheet drawn at the time was mistaken. Apprehends that they will not leave Rome unless this additional sum is distributed among them and that perhaps they will also demand payment of the 50,000 which the Pope promised to give the captains, with double pay to the soldiers.
Cardinal Colonna is trying to gain over to the Emperors party the Abbot of Farfa and Mario Ursino, and is on the eve of coming to terms with them. Should he succeed, Perez will not fail to inform His Majesty.
Civittà Castellana has not yet been delivered; but the Legate (Campeggio) says he is daily expecting in Rome some of the townsmen for the purpose of making terms and obtaining securities, &c. May it be so, for the general belief is that it will not be delivered.
The League is making great offers to the Pope if he will desert the Emperor and go over to them. They will give him the kingdom of Naples, restore to him everything he had before this war, and reimburse him his expenses. The Legate (Campeggio), however, protests that he (the Pope) will not fail to fulfil his engagements to the Emperor and to the army.
On the 29th Alarcon and Guasto reviewed the army. Though there are outside of Rome 16 companies of infantry, they mustered 30; a very fine set of men indeed. The Spaniards are about 8,000. As soon as the money comes from Naples, one month's pay will be issued to them, and they will quit Rome.
The Papal Legate (Campeggio) complains bitterly of the outrages which the soldiers of this army are daily committing in this city and in the rest of the estates of the Church. They are no doubt very great, but we see no remedy to the evil, unless the men are prevailed upon to leave Rome, which they will not do until they are paid. Similar outrages, or more still, is the army of the League committing, and the Pope is very anxious for them to evacuate his territory, which they do not seem inclined to do.
Alarcon is gone to Gaeta, and will thence pass on to Naples to procure money for the men-at-arms stationed at Velletri. As the country is exhausted, and can no longer furnish them provisions, most are deserting and going to the kingdom [of Naples].
It is a positive fact that Lautrech is marching this way. He comes by the road of the Marches, and will then take the road to Sienna or to Naples. Which of the two roads he will take is not yet known; but whatever his plans may be, this army must leave Rome and meet him. Don Ugo has been written to, &c.
The French fleet has sailed for Sardinia for the sake of collecting provisions. That of the Venetians and Dona's galleys remain at Porto Ercole, but hitherto they have made no attempt on that coast.—Rome, the last day of December 1527.
Signed: "Perez."
Addressed: "To His Sacred, Imperial, and Catholic Majesty."
Indorsed: "To the King. 1527. Rome. Perez. 31st December.
Spanish. Original, pp. 5.

Footnotes

  • n1. "Non voglio disputar della tregua fatta qui in Castello questo Settembre per il Sre. Don Hugo, se teneva o non teneva, ma 1'assolutione de Colonnesi non teneva già, in modo che Nostro Signore, cssendo suoi subditi, non li potesse et dovesse castigare."
  • n2. "Andando con essi Cesaro Ferramosca non fù primo arrivato là che già essendosi alle mani, et liberato Frusolone da obsidione, non si potesse far niente."
  • n3. The copy of these instructions to Cardinal Farnese was probably made by sonic Spaniard unacquainted with the Italian language, and is, therefore, full of mistakes. It has besides many of lacuna, owing to the paper having been spoilt by damp.