Spain: December 1524 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement To Volumes 1 and 2, Documents From Archives in Vienna. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1947.

Citation:

'Spain: December 1524', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement To Volumes 1 and 2, Documents From Archives in Vienna, ed. Garrett Mattingly( London, 1947), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/further-supp/vols1-2/pp419-432 [accessed 27 November 2024].

December 1524



Dec. 1. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Ambassadors in England to Margaret Of Savoy. I, de Reux [de Roeulx], arrived late yesterday evening in London, and to-day after dinner went with me, de Praet, to see Wolsey and try to persuade him to accept one of the two proposals set forward by Bourbon. We had a long fruitless conversation. As to the first point, there is no hope of any English descent this year ; Wolsey said you knew this and it had appeared in your conversations with the English ambassadors that you were unable to furnish the required auxiliaries. As to the second point, Wolsey, after making his customary complaints, said that he would give us an answer after he had spoken to the king. We shall write you fully before I, de Roeulx, leave. If you wish to send any letters by me to the emperor, they should be sent at once to Plymouth, where I shall embark shortly. London, 29 November, 1524. Since writing the above we have seen Wolsey twice, but without accomplishing anything. He says that Henry will not contribute to the enterprise Bourbon suggests until he knows that the army of Italy can be kept together, can defeat the French, and can pursue them back into France. Even then, he says, it will be necessary to have special powers from the emperor, and to conclude a special treaty about the matter, as has been the invariable custom in the past. Seeing that Wolsey was merely making excuses for delay and had no intention of doing anything, we asked him what, in his opinion, the emperor and his king ought to do now. After much hesitation and circumlocution he finally said that the best thing would be to arrange a truce, which would at least safeguard those possessions of the emperor in Italy which the French had not yet conquered. If no good peace could be arranged during the truce, he said, the two princes could recruit their strength so as to resume the war in a fitting manner. If no truce could be arranged, he said, he thought the emperor should maintain the army of Italy this winter, and, at the time for the "Great Enterprise," both monarchs should invade France, each at the head of twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse. If the emperor found this impossible, he thought that, postponing the "Great Enterprise," a joint army should be formed in the Netherlands of thirty thousand foot and six thousand horse. Such an army, he thought, should be strong enough to take Paris, and march anywhere in France without meeting resistance. For the maintainance of this army he thought the two monarchs should pay into a common treasury 600,000 crowns in ready money, which would be enough for a successful campaign. Unless he saw that the emperor's money was ready, he said, he would never agree even to this plan, for there had been too many failures in the past for want of money. It seemed to Wolsey that you could aid the emperor from the Low Countries, and the archduke could assist him with some money, and he might dispense with the German troops now with him in Spain, and thus make up his share of the sum necessary for the enterprise. But he especially desires that the emperor shall promise nothing that he cannot perform, and he wants to be assured that the entire sum is ready before he concludes anything. He begged me, de Roeulx, to hasten to Spain and tell the emperor his opinion, and this I promised to do, although his proposal seems neither likely nor possible. I am leaving to-morrow to inform his majesty of this and of other things. I, de Roeulx, was to see the king, but I have put off doing so for the reasons which the bearer, Sieur de Boussu, will tell you. The Sieur de Boussu is going to the duke of Bourbon to encourage him in his loyalty to the emperor during my absence. It seems to us that it would be well if you took the opportunity to write Bourbon a gracious letter by Boussu, since this would be for the emperor's service as you know. We are writing a word to the viceroy by Boussu, and sending him a copy of this letter so that he may know how we have sped here, and, if he can find no money for the defence of Milan elsewhere than in England, know that it will be better to accept the least disadvantageous truce possible. 1 December. P.S.—Just as we were closing this we received your letter of November 27th, forwarding Lannoy's good news from Italy. Although we had already been given similar news by Wolsey, we thought we ought not to lose the opportunity of going to see him, and trying to obtain some part of our request in virtue of the viceroy's letter. We went to him after dinner. He said the news was good, and he hoped it would become still better, and since everyone in Italy was doing so well, he would have better grounds for trying to persuade the king, his master, to make some contribution. He said, however, that he could not promise anything, and he still thought a truce advisable. We still think that Wolsey prefers and expects a truce, and that no English contribution to the defence of Milan should be relied on. I, de Praet, still advise, however, that Pace and the English ambassador at Rome be strongly pressed to hand over the fifty thousand crowns, for it may be that they have secret instructions to do so if the need is very great. Nothing will be lost at least, by trying such means. Signed, Adrien de Reux and Loys de Praet. French, pp. 4.
Dec. 2. H. H. u. St. A. Belgien Abt. f. 8.	Louis De Praet to Charles V. By the two packets of letters which M. de Roeulx is bringing you, and by his oral report, your majesty will learn all that has occurred here since Fusil's departure. Wolsey's final decision is exactly the same as I have already written you. It seems to me designed merely to delay matters, and to cast the blame of failure and the burden of the war entirely on your shoulders. M. de Roeulx will tell you my opinions more at length. Should a truce or some other arrangement be concluded, I beg your majesty to recall me. My duties at Bruges, and my private affairs urgently require my attention. I shall always be ready to serve your majesty, but it would not be to your best interest for me to remain here longer. I have felt for some time that Wolsey distrusted me and bore me a grudge for what I have written to you and to Madame about his negotiations with Jockin, and in Scotland. I do not know how he found out, but I cannot regret having done my duty. London, 2 December, 1524. Signed, Loys de Praet. Copy. French.
Dec. 20. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 2.	Charles V to Louis De Praet. Since we last wrote you we have had reliable information from Lombardy. King Francis entered Lombardy suddenly with his army, hoping to find it unprovided and carry the whole of the duchy of Milan in his first rush, before our army had withdrawn from Provence. He was disappointed, as we suppose Lannoy has informed you. Bourbon moved so quickly that the greater part of his army, with Bourbon himself, the viceroy, the marquis of Pescara, and our other captains, entered the town of Milan ahead of the French. They held a council of war there, and decided that the town was too unprovided with able bodied men, on account of the great pestilence there, and was suffering too much from a scarcity of food stuffs to be defended as it had been last time. Therefore they garrisoned the citadel with six hundred men and an adequate supply of provisions, and likewise provided for the defence of the other important towns, Cremona, Pavia, Lodi, Alexandria, and Como. On the 26th of October, King Francis laid siege to Pavia, which was defended by Antonio de Leyva, with the count of Zorn and his five thousand troops, besides a considerable number of men-at-arms, and of Spanish and Italian infantry. They defended themselves stoutly, and repulsed several assaults of the enemy, inflicting great loss upon them. We have no certain news later than November 8th, although spies report that the French have raised the siege. If true, this will greatly increase our prestige, since it is no small achievement to have broken the enemy's first attack. Our captains report that the Venetians and other allies are bringing up their men-at-arms and advancing with such diligence that our captains hope to make a junction with them and take the offensive, winning more glory from King Francis than they did from his admiral. Loquinghien, whom, as we wrote you, we sent to Italy with letters of exchange for fifty thousand ducats and thirteen thousand in cash, arrived safely, and the money has been a great help. Although the enemy's campaign has seemed at first to prosper, it is clear, now that Francis is meeting resistance, that he is in greater danger than he ever was in his own kingdom, since he has come in person to Italy with all his gendarmerie and all the great nobles and gentlemen of his kingdom, and is in a bad position to receive reinforcements, or to sustain a prolonged campaign. Even if he is not entirely destroyed, it is likely that we can bring him to make terms. For this purpose France should be attacked from all sides, and if this is done, Francis will be obliged to return from Italy with greater loss and less honour than did his admiral, or, if he remains, he will lose a great part of his kingdom since it is now defenceless. We ought, therefore, to be able to conquer more French territory with a few troops than would have been possible before with a great army. Point out this opportunity to Wolsey and to the king, and say to them that, although we are quite determined to carry out the "Great Enterprise" if no better opportunity offers, we ask Henry to consider whether under the circumstances it would not be better to anticipate the time and invade France at once. For this purpose we promise him such aid from Flanders as the treaty prescribes. For our part, you may tell him, we have at Perpignan and elsewhere on the frontiers of Languedoc, four thousand German infantry and three hundred men-at-arms, besides the local levies. With this force, or a larger one if necessary, we are prepared to invade the enemy at once, and at the same time we shall attack them from Navarre and Fuenterrabia. Such attacks now should be more effective than the "Great Enterprise," about which we have replied to the English ambassadors as you know, without assuring them that we can execute it, but without refusing to do so. Our present proposal seems to offer much greater hope of success, particularly as the issue in Italy is still doubtful, and we are determined to make the greatest exertions there and cannot promise what forces we will have available for the "Great Enterprise" without knowing what the result of the Italian campaign will be, since King Francis' presence there in person obliges us to regard that theatre of the war as the most important. If they agree to invade France, you may tell Henry and Wolsey that we are writing to Madame to furnish the troops agreed on by treaty, and, on hearing of their agreement, we will send letters of exchange for fifty thousand ducats to pay the men-at-arms. There will be no failure in this ; the money is at hand. If they ask you for your powers to treat about this matter, say that such formalities are unnecessary and a waste of time. There will be no failure on our part in anything ; we shall invade Languedoc at once, and by means of the letters of exchange the payment of the gens d'armes of Flanders is assured. You will say further to the king and the cardinal that we are reinforcing the army of Italy with six thousand Spaniards, and the troops at sea will be landed if necessary. We are also raising at once two hundred thousand ducats for Italian affairs. Assure them that we shall spare nothing to teach King Francis that the king of England and we are strong enough to make head against him, and, now that he has stripped his kingdom of troops, it seems as if God has sent us the opportunity of bringing low the pride of France. If we fail to take advantage of it, we shall never cease to regret it. This is the time to conquer an honourable and glorious peace. They can see that we are doing our part by maintaining a great army in Italy, and a fleet at sea, and invading Languedoc, and offering to aid them in Flanders. If they speak to you of our lack of money, you may say that it is true we have been put to great expense, but thank God we have so many good realms and powerful and opulent subjects that it will be seen we are able not only to defend ourselves, but to strike back at our enemies. You may inform Henry and Wolsey that the archbishop of Capua arrived here recently. What he said to us and what we replied they may learn from the enclosed copies. Capua is coming to England. Show him all honour and confidence. Let us know at once what you have been able to accomplish in virtue of these present instructions without waiting, as you usually do, for Wolsey to write. Madrid, 17 Dec., 1524. Since writing the above, Fusil has arrived with your letters of November 11th. We are satisfied with your conduct of the negotiations. We are writing in our own hand letters of credence for you for the above negotiations. As for delaying the "Great Enterprise," as you say Henry and Wolsey are willing to do, we agree, provided they will make the immediate invasion which we ask for, by means of which greater harm may be done to the enemy than by the "Great Enterprise" and at less cost. You have replied very well to Wolsey's proposal for a truce until May, 1526, and we have no further instructions for you on this point. You may see by the enclosed copy what we said to Capua. It is not our intention, however, to trust in a truce, but to make war as vigourously as possible in order to win better terms. Inform us by special courier of the result of Capua's negotiations in England. Madrid, 20 December, 1524. Signed, Charles ; countersigned, Lalemand. Copy. French pp. 8.
Dec. 18-20. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. Eight or ten days ago I received your letter of December 3rd and communicated its contents, your reply about the exchange rates, and about the two complaints which he said he had against you, to Wolsey. Wolsey replied that King Henry would soon be sending envoys to you who would be completely instructed about his views on the monetary question. These envoys, Wolsey hopes, will be able to arrange some satisfactory agreement. If not, it is his opinion, and the king's, and that of all persons in this kingdom that it will be necessary to suspend commercial intercourse between England and the Low Countries. Wolsey listened to your apologies about the other two points of complaint and replied briefly that these matters were bygones and not worth further discussion, but he was sure, whatever you said, that you understood well enough what he meant. He refused to explain his reply further. Although I was sure that it was useless to press Wolsey further for the 50,000 crowns which the English have in Italy, I did so, and again received the same reply as before, which was that he had no interest in Milan, but had nevertheless instructed his ambassador at Rome as to the terms on which he might turn over the 50,000 crowns, and this would have to satisfy me. I did not therefore give him your reply about your contribution to the defence of Milan, since it seemed useless to do so when he had not mentioned that aspect of the question. The pope's ambassador here recently received letters from his master dated November 19th. The pope said he was very surprised to hear that the imperial ambassadors at Rome had been beseeching the English ambassador to let them have the 50,000 crowns, even as a loan. He ordered his ambassador here to speak frankly to Wolsey on the subject, and to find out from him whether he intended to behave openly toward the emperor or not. The ambassador is ordered to say that the pope was informed by King Francis that he knew that whatever efforts the imperialists made they would get no money from the English. His Holiness said he finds such language very strange, as indeed it is. The pope also said that the French king has demanded passage through the papal states for a part of his army which was being sent against Naples, and that the pope had explicitly refused on the ground that the emperor had received the investiture of Naples both from him and from his predecessors. The ambassador's letters also say that the pope, seeing that neither King Francis nor the viceroy will discuss a truce which yields any part of Milan to the other, has recalled the datary who is daily expected at Rome. The archbishop of Capua is said to have gone to the emperor and he will come here from Spain by sea. This seems to me strange, for the passage is uncertain at this season. We are expecting him whenever weather permits. Wolsey's reply to the above seemed to me very feeble. It was that His Holiness ought not to believe the French who constantly took refuge in lies, and that the king, his master, had as complete an understanding with the emperor as ever. This, he said, would be seen next summer if the emperor was willing to do his part. As for the money, Wolsey said, he would write at once to the English ambassador at Rome and His Holiness would be completely satisfied with the result. When I heard of this reply of Wolsey's I went to see him to see what he would have to say to me on the subject. Although I raised the question, Wolsey gave no sign of having heard anything from the pope about the money, but only said that he was astonished to hear that the viceroy was behaving so foolishly about the truce, and that it would be much better to leave a part of the duchy of Milan in French hands than to risk the whole of it by risking a truce. He also said that he had heard that in an attack on Pavia, four thousand gentlemen had been killed, among them the prince of Navarre, and La Palice had been mortally wounded. At the end of our conversation he told me of the departure of Capua for Spain and said he was very vexed by it, since it would have been better for Capua to remain in Milan, than for the datary, who is by no means so good an imperialist, to be there. A great embassy from Scotland is arriving here to-morrow to treat, as it is said, of matters of the first importance. It is very strange that Wolsey has said nothing of this embassy to me or to de Roeulx. I suspect that this is another of Jehan Jockin's plots and that King Francis is helping these people deal with the Scots in return for their promise not to impede his attack on Milan. I am sorry that so many of my former predictions seem to be coming true. The papal ambassador and I have done our best to find out the truth of these negotiations with Scotland, but all we have learned so far was from a papal official who had been in Scotland and who travelled part of the way with the ambassadors. He says that it is common talk in Scotland that the ambassadors have been sent to arrange a marriage between the young king and the princess Mary and that they will not come home again until it is concluded, and their king declared a prince of this kingdom and the Scottish border castles returned to him. In return for this, the king of Scots will come here to visit his uncle and may remain here some time. This is important information if true, though the part about the return of the border fortresses at least, is hardly credible. Time will show. I can send you no other news at present, for Wolsey has been at Hampton Court all week and has not yet returned, and it is impossible for me to go there without being summoned. I am surprised that I have had no letter from you since that of the third of this month, for I suppose that both M. de Boussu and the gentleman from the archduke must now be at your court. London, Dec. 18, 1524. P.S.—I had just written this when Brian Tuke brought me letters from you dated the 7th and 14th of this month, enclosing letters from the viceroy to whom I am replying at once as you may see. After you have had my enclosure to the viceroy deciphered I beg you to forward it to him safely. I would willingly have gone to see Wolsey this afternoon but he is receiving the Spanish ambassadors and I could not get an audience. He put me off until Thursday and went immediately to the king at Greenwich. The Scottish ambassadors, who have been received with the highest honours, are to present themselves there tomorrow. M. de Denchier, the bishop of London, and lord St. John, three of the greatest nobles in the kingdom, have been sent to escort them through London. I shall do my best to find out more about their mission and shall advise you and the emperor promptly. As to what you wrote me in cipher about Wolsey's efforts to arrange a marriage between the king of France and the princess Mary, it seems to me more likely that the marriage of which you have heard would be between the king of Scots and the princess, as I have written you. The cardinal and many others in this kingdom wish for such a match. I do not know how it may seem to others, but from what I know of the nature of this people it seems to me that it would be unfortunate, both for the emperor and for this kingdom, should the emperor's marriage with the princess Mary take place (dautant que cuyde cognoistre la nature de ce peuple je trouve pour plusieurs respects que ce ne seroit le cas de lempereur ny de ceulx de ce royaulme que le marriage dentre sa majeste et ladite dame princesse sortise effect). Dated as above. French. Original, except for the last page which is a contemporary decipher. pp. 5.
Dec. 25. H. H. u. St. A. England. f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. I wrote you last on Tuesday, December 20th. The day before yesterday (Thursday the 22nd), the king and the cardinal summoned me to Greenwich to hear, in company with the ambassadors of the pope and the duke of Milan, the public declarations of the Scottish ambassadors. As soon as I arrived at Greenwich yesterday morning Wolsey approached me in the presence of the Milanese and papal ambassadors, and gave me certain news, which, however, he protested he did not believe in so far as it concerned the pope. Wolsey said he had heard from Pace that Pace and the duke of Bourbon had met at Brescia on November 29th to discuss Italian affairs so that Pace might send his master accurate information. Pace reports that Giovanni de Medici, with two thousand foot, two hundred lances, and some light cavalry, has gone over to the French. On account of this, and because the governor of Parma and Piacenza had allowed the duke of Albany and seven thousand French troops a free passage on their way south to attack Naples, people were saying that the pope had come to an agreement with the king of France. Furthermore, many affirmed that the pope had agreed to a marriage between one of the French king's daughters and his own nephew and had undertaken to help King Francis conquer the kingdom of Naples, which is afterwards to be given to this couple. Wolsey said he could not believe that the pope would thus abandon the emperor and involve Christendom in still further wars instead of bringing peace to it as he should. Pace also wrote that the Venetians had been much cooled in their ardour for the emperor by seeing the pope's behaviour, and that the duke of Milan and the viceroy had sent the abbott of Najera to Rome and another ambassador to Venice to find out definitely how matters stood. When Pace wrote, replies from these ambassadors were expected daily. Pace wrote that Bourbon said the king of France was still encamped, in a strongly fortified position before Pavia. He is determined to reduce the town and is daily expecting strong reinforcements of Swiss and Grisons. The emperor's army is at Soncino and is only waiting for the Germans and Venetians to join it before taking the field. The viceroy has decided to establish himself at Marignano, where he thinks he will be able to cut off the supplies of the French army and force them to raise the siege. Pace wrote that there was enough money to supply the entire army until the middle of February. If the viceroy cannot raise the siege of Pavia, and if the town is surrendered, he is still determined to defend the other towns, particularly Lodi and Cremona, and he hopes if worst comes to worst, these towns will keep King Francis occupied until summer, by which time the emperor and the king of England will be in a better position to attack him. In closing, Pace said that unless the king of England invaded France soon, with your assistance, the viceroy would be obliged to agree to a truce very disadvantageous to the emperor. This is all that Wolsey told us of what Pace learned from Bourbon. It is said that Pace complained bitterly because the viceroy refused to give battle to the French, but Wolsey did not say anything about this, and I cannot affirm it as certain. After giving us this news Wolsey drew me apart and began to speak bitterly of the pope. He said that if it was true that the governor of Parma and Piacenza had let Albany pass through papal territory, it seemed certain to him and to Henry that the pope was in agreement with the French. To encourage him, I said I could not believe the news was correct since neither you nor the viceroy had written me anything about it. At the same time I pressed him to make some contribution, but without success. I tried at the same time to discover whether he had any suspicion of the truce and defensive league about which you had written me, but so far as I could see he had no news of it. He said that if no truce could be concluded, and if the emperor did not feel strong enough to execute the "Great Enterprise" this summer, his majesty should at least agree to the proposal which he, Wolsey, recently made to de Roeulx for a great army to be maintained at common expense, the emperor and the king of England each to contribute six hundred thousand ducats in ready money, according to the plan which de Roeulx and I described to you in the letters brought to you by M. de Boussu. Wolsey now advises that supreme command of this army be given to the duke of Bourbon, who should come to Flanders early this spring and wait there for favourable weather for campaigning. I cannot assure you that, should Bourbon do so, Wolsey will still be of the same opinion. As to Jehan Jockin, Wolsey said (and to hear him one would say that he had nothing to conceal) that Jockin had recently asked for a safe-conduct which would enable Queen Louise to send here the chancellor of Alençon and president of Rouen to make further and more ample proposals. Wolsey said the queen appeared anxious to treat at once and in good faith, for she was willing that the safe-conduct should be for only two months. This leads Wolsey to believe that King Francis' affairs are not going too well, and his belief is strengthened by the fact that Jockin has given him no news recently either of any agreement with the pope or of the duke of Albany's expedition. I did not reply at length, but merely gave Wolsey to understand that it seemed clear to me that King Francis was using this story of the chancellor of Alençon's mission to keep him and his master amused while the French completed their conquest of Milan, after which they could laugh at all their enemies. Moreover, such a mission, I said, would gravely impair the emperor's prestige, for the arrival of so important a negotiator here would lead everyone to believe that the differences between France and England were practically settled. After this conversation the king of England received the Scottish ambassadors with great ceremony. The king entered the appointed hall in company with Wolsey and the ambassadors, and escorted by a great number of the nobility. He then summoned the three Scottish ambassadors, a bishop (fn. 1), an earl (fn. 2), and an abbot (fn. 3), who presented their credentials and asked for public audience. This was granted and the bishop began a long, rambling speech in Latin. In general, the speech was in three parts : first, a panegyric of Henry's virtues ; second, an oration on the great love which the young king of Scots bore King Henry and his desire for Henry's assistance in his affairs and a request that Henry advise him about the most important duty of the king, the safeguarding of his inheritance through a proper marriage and the assurance of peace to their respective countries ; third, general praise of justice and liberality, intended to recommend by implication the restitution of certain Scottish castles now in the hands of the English. The bishop of London replied for the king, saying that the king knew well that he could not claim such virtues as the Scottish ambassador praised in him, and that for such as he had the praise belonged to God. He thanked the king of Scots for his good-will and promised to reciprocate with no less love than he had already shown, pointing out that the recent wars had been entirely in the interest of the king of Scots, and that he had not devastated Scottish territory although he had been given great occasion to do so. He promised to advise his nephew about a suitable marriage and to aid and favour him with all his power. Of the third point the bishop of London said that the king hoped he had ruled in the past with justice and would continue so to rule that his friends would have cause to praise him and his enemies to fear him. After this each of the ambassadors handed Henry separate credentials and talked with him for a few minutes apart. I do not know what they said. The king then spoke for a few minutes with Wolsey before he called us, the papal and Milanese ambassadors and myself, and asked us what we thought of the Scottish ambassador's harangue. As the person most concerned, I undertook to reply and said that as far as I could understand it the first part of the Scottish bishop's speech was quite true, and the second seemed to me entirely reasonable, although I hoped that if the Scots tried to arrange a marriage between their king and the princess Mary, King Henry would not abandon the emperor. On the third part of the bishop's speech I did not wish to comment, though I said it seemed to me that he had spoken rather sharply. Henry and Wolsey replied that I was not to be alarmed by what the Scots said about a marriage, since Henry had no intention of breaking the treaty, and the Scottish allusion had no reference to an offer for the Princess Mary, but was merely intended to substitute Henry's influence for that of the duke of Albany who had been trying to arrange a marriage between the king of Scots and the younger daughter of the French king. Henry added that each of the ambassadors had said to him privately that the king of Scots would not marry in France or elsewhere without his express command. They also said that the Scots had spoken much more gently in private than in public, and had assured Henry that they desired nothing more than a peace, and were authorized to offer such advantageous terms that it would be within his power to conclude a perpetual peace between the two kingdoms. This was what Henry told me. I do not know whether the cardinal had put these words into his mouth in order to mislead me. I shall be on my guard, but I behaved as if I were perfectly satisfied and thanked Henry heartily for his show of love to the emperor. I took the occasion to press him to make some contribution to Italian affairs, but he refused, saying that Bourbon had told Pace that the viceroy had enough money to last until the middle of February, and he was astonished that Lannoy should complain to me of lacking money when it appeared from other sources that he was well supplied. It was certain, Henry said, that before the middle of February the emperor, who had ten or twelve kingdoms, would be able to find the necessary funds. Henry began to get a little angry at this point, and said, in the presence of the papal and Milanese ambassadors, that he with his one kingdom seemed to be able to do more than the emperor with all his realms, and that the late king Ferdinand, whose possessions had been much smaller than the emperor's, had been able to make war on the French all alone, and to conquer all Italy without anyone's aid, and, in addition, to safeguard the goods and merchandise of his subjects and of the strangers trading with his lands. In those days, he said, the French rarely took prizes, while now news came every day of ships captured on the Biscayan and Galician coasts and in the Mediterranean. This showed, Henry said, how ill advised the emperor was to interest himself only in the safety of a single place, neglecting all his other lands. Seeing that Henry was growing warm, and not wishing to irritate him further, I merely replied that it was true the emperor had many realms, but he also had many responsibilities, and had been obliged to spend more than sixteen hundred thousand ducats in the Italian wars. As to King Ferdinand, I said, it was true he had done many fine things, but he had never even attempted the conquest of Milan, and when he had recovered Naples from the French they were not so powerful nor so well obeyed in Milan as they were later. In this Wolsey seemed inclined to agree with me, but seeing that the king was beginning to take the conversation too much to heart, we dropped the subject. So much for my conversation yesterday with the king and the cardinal. Whatever anyone says, it seems to me impossible that the pope should wish to take Naples from the emperor. Not only would he display great iniquity in doing so, but he has every reason to avoid angering the emperor at present, on account of Luther and other matters. As for his believing that he could be safe by marrying his nephew to a French princess, everyone knows that neither His Holiness nor all his family could hold Naples long, for even if the French did not take it from him, as they certainly would, the subjects of that kingdom would not obey him. Even the emperor, who is so powerful, has trouble in defending Naples, and as for His Holiness, he can hardly control the Florentines, among whom he was born and who have served his family, and if it was not for their fear of the emperor, His Holiness could not rule them a single day. It is credible, however, that the pope may be planning to help the French conquer Milan, thinking thus to keep the emperor in fear of losing Naples and the French king in fear of losing Milan, and thus making both of them dependent on him, and desirous of his alliance. It is true that in taking such a course the pope would be doing the emperor a great wrong and making an ill return for all the favour which his majesty has shown him. As for these lords here they seem more tired of the war than ever, and we cannot hope for a penny of their money for Italy. If one can believe men on oath, they will never break their treaties with the emperor, but I have learned that Jehan Jockin said to one of his friends that Wolsey was sincerely determined on an arrangement with the king of France, abandoning the emperor and all his allies. It is clear as daylight that in spite of the great danger in which the emperor's affairs are at present for lack of money, and the probability of great success if the English would help, they will do nothing. On the other hand they have kept Jockin here six months and are now giving another safe-conduct to revive the negotiations. It is difficult to know what to advise his majesty, but it seems to me that the best thing would be to accept a truce at the hands of the pope, with the consent of the king of England and with as little loss as can be managed. During the truce we could take breath and see whether we could make a peace, retaining the friendship of these lords. If we cannot, rather than leave everything in such a hazardous position, it will be better to forestall them than to be forestalled. London, 24 December, 1524. Since writing the above I have been to-day, Christmas Day, to dine with Wolsey. Because it seemed to me more than ever unfortunate for the emperor's affairs that the president of Rouen should come here at this time, I asked Wolsey whether he had decided to grant the safe-conduct which Queen Louise had asked for. He said he had, and that only good could come from hearing what the French had to say, and added assurances that he would inform me of everything the envoy said, and that Henry would never come to terms with the French without the emperor's consent, even if they were to offer him the whole kingdom of France. He then asked my opinion. I replied that I had no instructions on this matter, but that I did not doubt that the emperor had entire confidence in him and in King Henry. Nevertheless, I said, it seemed to me that it was unwise to receive the president of Rouen because it might arouse the suspicions of the pope and the other Italian princes and thus injure his majesty's affairs. I hoped thus to persuade Wolsey to change his mind without showing my suspicions, but in vain. Wolsey said again that it could do no harm to hear the envoy. Wolsey said again that Henry would never conclude anything with the Scots which would prejudice the marriage alliance with the emperor, but that, leaving this point aside, if the Scots would make a reasonable peace, recognizing Henry as their sovereign lord, as Wolsey maintains they should do, he (Wolsey) would be very glad to arrange a peace between the two kingdoms, thus weakening the king of France. Wolsey showed clearly that he would be pleased if the emperor would abandon the "Great Enterprise" and accept the proposal made to M. de Roeulx. He begged me to exert myself to maintain the firm friendship and alliance of the emperor with the king, his master, and promised to do as much on his side, saying that if this alliance remained firm King Francis would not long be able to hold out against both sovereigns. These are fine words, and I would believe them if they would show some of this love, which they say they have for the emperor, by contributing to the defence of Milan. But there is no hope of this, and consequently it seems to me that the best course would be to instruct the duke of Sessa and his majesty's other ambassadors at Rome to find out how the English ambassador feels about a truce, and if the English ambassador consents without demanding unreasonable conditions and without insisting on sending here, it will appear that these lords do not, after all, have a solid understanding with the French, but if the English ambassador takes any other course, in spite of what the king of England and the cardinal have so often sworn, I shall hold myself convinced that these people mean us ill. Nevertheless I cannot see how they expect to make a profitable treaty with the king of France otherwise than with the assistance of the emperor, unless they intend to join the French in an attack on the Low Countries, and if they do so they will, in the long run, be the greatest losers, as I have already written. I am writing the viceroy only a short note, enclosing a copy of this letter. I beg you to forward it to him as expeditiously as possible. December 25. Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 9.