Venice: November 1628, 2-10 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 21, 1628-1629. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1916.

Citation:

'Venice: November 1628, 2-10', in Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 21, 1628-1629, ed. Allen B Hinds( London, 1916), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol21/pp368-386 [accessed 29 November 2024].

November 1628



Nov. 2. Senato, Secreta. Deliberazioni, Venetian Archives.	525. To the Ambassador in England and the like to the Hague.
	Advices about Mantua and Monferrat. The Spaniards are setting aside everything else for the sake of making conquests in Italy.
	To the Hague add:
	It is said that Carlisle went to the States first to assure them that England would never do anything prejudicial to their friendship, or without communicating with them. We hear from Spain that the Marquis Spinola is progressing with the negotiations for a truce and the Spaniards are more and more disposed to embrace it. The imperial ambassador in Spain adds that whereas the Duke of Buckingham was already greatly inclined thereto, so the Dutch were making larger offers at present. We also hear of the arrival in Spain of Porter and Rubens, who have met Olivares in secret, the former for peace with England and the latter presumably for a truce with the Dutch. A gentleman of the Lorraine ambassador also frequented Olivares' apartments, that prince being very confidential with England. This will all serve to help you to discover the truth about these proposals.
	If anything is said at the Hague about the negotiations for reconciling France and England, you will seize the opportunity to say how readily we engaged in a work which may benefit the common cause.
	To England add:
	Spinola is busy about the truce and the Dutch are reported to be making large offers. Porter arrived in Spain on the 24th September, presumably about peace, and Rubens was also there. Both frequented Olivares' apartments and so did a gentleman of the Lorraine ambassador. You will try and discover if there is any foundation of truth in these advices.
	We hear that your negotiations between the two crowns are referred to at the Hague with satisfaction and approval, but they seem very jealous and anxious about them in Savoy. We have already expressed our satisfaction with your labours and the manner in which you have conducted the whole affair. We repeat this in respect of your last letters, of the 8th October, which reached us to-day, and which leave nothing to be desired.
	We will inform you of the views of the state about the offer of Colonel Chnipausen as soon as possible.
	Ayes, 79.	Noes, 0.	Neutral, 0.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 2. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Francia. Venetian Archives.	526. ZORZI ZORZI, Venetian Ambassador in France, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	After I had gone away from my audience the king sent for me at once and asked if the Earl of Carlisle was at Venice. I replied that he had been, but I could not say if he was still there, as it was several days since I had any letters. My audience only confirmed my conviction that to bring this much desired confection to the light it is necessary to hammer away the more at the cardinal, as with the applause of the recent victory he alone can do everything, and no one else.
	Particulars of the capitulation of La Rochelle.
	Niort, the 2nd November, 1628.
	[Italian; the part in italics deciphered.]
Nov. 2. Cl, vii. Cod. 1927. Bibl. S. Marco.	527. ZORZI ZORZI, Venetian Ambassador in France, to ALVISE CONTARINI, his colleague in England.
	A gentleman (fn. 1) who was sent by Buckingham to the Count of Olivares about the peace has been taken on the Garonne, when returning from Spain with letters, but before they could take them from him he had torn them all to pieces, so that they could not find out the contents.
	Niort, the 2nd November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 3. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Inghilterra. Venetian Archives.	528. ALVISE CONTARINI, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The four enclosed letters to France will give particulars of the negotiations, according to the advices inserted for Zorzi's information. I cannot say that the hopes of peace recede, because at the outset I stated that these very difficulties had been distinctly laid before me, namely, that they would listen to nothing about the queen's household until after the relief of Rochelle or the return of the fleet. I may say that the return of Montagu with the fresh proposals from France has brought too much fuel to the furnace, and it has made them stiffer here, on the supposition that the French are very anxious to make terms and are very jealous of the negotiations with Spain. This leads to delay, but I hope that in a few days we shall see some result. Meanwhile you must warn me on two points. One is if I am to interfere if they come to some mutual arrangement about the employment of arms or counsel, as I shall never do unless ordered, indeed I am intent on diverting these humours by procrastination, because the wish to do too much often ends in doing nothing. What shall I do if asked about the wishes and opinions of your Excellencies? although the reasons for your present suspicions and your employment in Italy will enable me to evade without prejudicing your maxims in favour of the common weal. The other is that I profit greatly by the excellent advices sent me by his Excellency Corner, I beg you to acquaint him with such of the present negotiations as you may think fit, and with your will, as I foresee that they will trade on the peace at that Court, on war and on the common weal. I will not fail to point out the dangers of delay and will have something said to the Danish ambassador, to whom it matters more than to anyone else, for the preservation of the best part of his king's territories.
	I do not know if the Earl of Carlisle has departed. I believe he has, because his private interests require his presence at the Court, and I do not know what answer to make to your commands of the 29th September about his movements, except what I have always stated: some months' absence from the Court for his private affairs, and to give way to the duke's dislike for him; curiosity to see Italy; the idea to make the French uneasy, and a show of discussing what to do for the cause, although with no intention of doing anything. I hoped he would make some show at Venice, by alluding to the interests of Denmark and the North, by some proposal for a league, as he did at the Hague, but not that he should undergo such toil and give you so much trouble merely to ask quid agendum. This alone will suffice to prove what I have always said about the character of the government here.
	The king returned to London, but two days later returned to the chase a short distance away. (fn. 2) As the ministers, both native and foreign, remain in this city, I do the same, the more willingly as it relieves the state of the munificent subsidy granted to me.
	London, the 3rd November, 1628.
	[Italian; the part in italics deciphered.]
Enclosure.	529. ALVISE CONTARINI, Ambassador in England, to ZORZI ZORZI, Ambassador in France.
	The courier Ribonetto, despatched on the 16th, arrived here on the night of the 23rd. No sooner had I deciphered the letters and begun to negotiate than yesterday at noon Montagu arrived with Colonel Kniphausen, who had leave from the king. They came overland, crossing the sea at St. Malo, Guernsey and Portsmouth. They left the English fleet two days after the despatch of your last letters. I had the good fortune to hear all that Montagu brought. Colonel Kniphausen was despatched immediately from the fleet on the pretext of treating about some prisoners, but really to examine the defences of the moles. M. Lisle, serjeant major of the French army, spoke to him, he believes, in the cardinal's name, saying that some overtures for peace had already been made, and these are ours, for they correspond in time and persons. He mentioned many particulars contained in my letters. He demonstrated the impossibility of introducing the relief, and asked if the English general had powers to treat. He said that Montagu was well known from having been in the Bastille, because the cardinal liked him and he had encouraged the good understanding between him and Buckingham. This being reported to the English general, he sent Montagu also to spy. They arrived in a little boat and were well received, especially Montagu, who sat in congress with the cardinal, Schomberg and Bassompierre. They began to question him about La Rochelle, saying that it was folly to attempt the impossible; they saw the king's preparations, it was vain for England to claim what did not belong to her and never could be her's. They would grant the Rochellese liberty of government and religion, with security of life and property, and all the liberty they have hitherto enjoyed to the other Huguenots, as this was not a war of religion, but simply to punish a few rebels. They went on to speak about Europe, and the great advantage to the Spaniards; of the opportunity afforded to one Crown to help Germany and for the other to help Italy. They put down the several points on paper, many being the same as ours. They said that if England did not now embrace the peace offered, with so many advantages for the common weal, that paper would remain an eternal memorial of the fact, and all the blame would rest with England and not on France. They retouched Bassompierre's treaty about the queen's household, but Montagu stated that this was not one of the causes of the war, and it might be omitted in the negotiations for the present peace. I think the French demand the restitution of the St. Esprit, taken in the port of the Texel. They add verbally that this effected, war will be made with the Spaniards, and the Duke of Savoy will be replaced in his former possessions. for which they ask the good offices of England, and promise to make Mantua give up Trino to him, with 12,000 crowns rental, according to the old agreement, and the two crowns will bind themselves to maintain him in possession.
	On Montagu's arrival with these proposals and still more from his account of the impossibility of relieving Rochelle, and showing the king that he had been deceived by the plans on which the relief expedition had been formed, with other particulars of differences between Soubise and the English commanders, his Majesty decided to come to London and assemble some members of the Council. They have been in consultation all last evening and this morning, as a gentleman of Richelieu is waiting for Montagu at St. Malo, so he must return forthwith.
	To say the truth, I have expressed surprise that when the business was very near adjustment in your hands the cardinal should transfer it to others, especially on points we had already digested. I have also complained because from this ill-timed haste the English have taken it into their heads either that France wishes to deceive this young Montagu, or that she is excessively anxious for peace. He has also touched a chord which I avoided, namely, that the French wish for a speedy decision lest the peace with Spain might progress, which has greatly opened the eyes of the ministers here. I do not know what they will decide, although aware of the bad trick played us by the French and the hurt done to the affair itself; yet I send even these fresh proposals, making use of the difficulty of relieving Rochelle and of the honour done to this Crown, as the French send them the invitations, in order to speed this necessary benefit in which we must have no ambition but a happy conclusion.
	I think it strange that as Montagu is returning with acceptance or rejection you should not have been warned in time, and in the next place my succeeding despatches become ridiculous, as Montagu takes the shorter road, and my courier cannot arrive before him. I therefore send back Ribonetto immediately, as Montagu may leave to-night, and although I am to have audience of the king to-day I will not delay him; indeed, I have promised him 25 crowns if he arrives before Montagu. I should be glad, if you approve, for you to tell the cardinal of Montagu being here, immediately the courier arrives, what he has brought and the hurt the affair may receive from such haste, telling him also of my offices and that I shall continue them, as his proposals ought to meet with a better reception. I also want them to know that though they can play us a trick, we know all about it. You may add that under any circumstances they may rely on the republic's ministers for the peace. Meanwhile I shall proceed with my negotiations, either seconding Montagu or working at my own, or combining the two. I have already told the ministers that this is the best time for choosing the best proposals and giving authority to Montagu or the commander of the fleet to conclude, instead of sending some one especially to France. Montagu is doing his utmost to have the honour, demonstrating the impossibility of relieving Rochelle. So far the ministers do not meet him as they suspect the French of deceiving him, and that by taking up fresh proposals they invalidate those already agreed to. I shall give these letters to Kniphausen, who is returning with Montagu, with whatever else may be necessary.
	In this negotiation I find that provided the cardinal gains his object he has no regard for anyone. He wants to take Rochelle and prevent the peace with Spain, but with characteristic French haste, and this immoderate speed is harmful. The matter was already in your hands and he might well have proceeded in concert with you. We shall obtain due repute by preventive offices of this kind, and if greater difficulties arise the French themselves will certainly regret having shown too much inquisitiveness and anxiety. I must not forget an important particular, that the French told Montagu that to lull the Spaniards to sleep about this treaty, it would not be amiss for some slight engagement to take place between the two fleets now and then, with some burning of ships and other acts of hostility. This is very subtle and we must keep on the alert.
	London, the 25th October, 1628.
	[Italian; deciphered; copy.]
Enclosure.	530. ALVISE CONTARINI, Ambassador in England, to ZORZI ZORZI, Ambassador in France.
	I sent back the courier as soon as I heard of Montagu's arrival, so that you might be forewarned. The courier left at noon. The Secretary Agostini remained at Court until after midnight, to learn the whole of the consultations about Montagu's despatch, of which he sent word to you. On that same day I had audience of the king. I thought it best to second Montagu, persuading the king that as the proposals came direct from France they ought to be embraced. I suggested that choice might be made of the most advantageous. The moment was opportune, as La Rochelle could not be relieved. He gained honour by treating while his forces were in the enemy's country. It was advantageous for the cause, as the entire fleet might be employed to succour Denmark before the winter, and the French forces would not be diverted from supporting Italy, and so forth, in order to induce him to come to a speedy decision, and that Montagu might take back the peace.
	The king said it was true that Montagu had brought some proposals which were practically my own, but they did not facilitate any decision, as his forces were not to accept terms which would place La Rochelle under subjection, causing him obloquy rather than repute. For the rest, the French ministers told Montagu that the proposals were more a historical disquisition than anything else. They insisted on making terms about the queen's household, to which he was absolutely averse, with other conditions requiring time, alluding I suppose to the terms about Savoy. The king further said to me: Through Montagu I shall give the French such a reply about the peace that the road will remain open, without accepting or rejecting the proposals, provided we first see the result of La Rochelle. I desire my forces to attempt its relief at any risk; they are for fighting and not for treating. My honour will then be safe, at least as far as possible. I shall not further investigate the grounds of the injuries. The king certainly spoke to me most resolutely, Montagu's coming having rather disgusted him than not, from suspicion that the French have deceived him and that the surrender of La Rochelle may be effected under cover of the negotiations, as every one says the place is reduced to the last extremity.
	Accordingly Montagu left with replies to the effect that peace might be negotiated after the result of La Rochelle and not before. His Majesty inclined to it, but neither accepted nor rejected the overtures. He also takes orders to the commander to attempt the relief, as they have decided to send provisions for another ten or fifteen days, and I understand that three or four ships have already left Plymouth with part of them. I may tell you, however, that not only the general, but all the captains and sailors of the fleet know that success is impossible. They may make some attempt to obey the king, but without heart or hope, I know not what to promise. Montagu has left very dissatisfied, as he was ambitious of the honour of this adjustment. He spoke haughtily and is determined to continue the negotiation, to find pretexts for landing and perhaps for bringing hither fresh difficulties. As Kniphausen told me that you are with the army, you might greatly favour this business, as it is in our hands, and if he does not land you might find means to see him, so as to know everything.
	This is the whole of what Montagu brought, and what I had from the king about his coming. You will be able to use this information as you think best. I may add that the movements of this young man have caused three great inconveniences here, although his motives are excellent and deserve to be seconded, as well as those made by the French, with a view to terminate the affair speedily and get possession of La Rochelle. The first is that this government believes the French excessively anxious for the peace, and that they can therefore obtain better terms, and as the proposals have been brought from France to England, the latter will make more trouble about sending anyone thither. The second is that Montagu's mission has opened the eyes of the ministers to the fact that the Spanish negotiations cause uneasiness, and by encouraging this they may obtain greater advantages. The third and most important is that as the French have entered into particulars with Montagu about gaining the Duke of Savoy, they have aroused the desire here to make sure of the intentions of the duke, to whom they have given notice, as you will hear, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity, so much the worse for him. They also inform the allies of this Crown of these overtures, and as the French intend to bind England about Italy, so France ought to be bound about Germany, so that before settling the peace, we practically begin to form a league against the House of Austria, in which I do not think we ought to meddle, and I certainly will not do so without orders, and very precise ones, because a thousand accidents may arise to prevent it from taking place, while we shall bear all the credit. But it is the nature of the French to pass without a mean from nothing to much and from much to nothing. This will serve for your information.
	London, the 3rd November, 1628.
	[Italian; deciphered; copy.]
Enclosure.	531. ALVISE CONTARINI, Ambassador in England, to ZORZI ZORZI, Ambassador in France.
	This is in reply to yours of the 16th October. I find that the ministers will scarcely listen to me about accepting Bassompierre's treaty for the queen's household. The king is so determined about this that he would let all the rest go to ruin first. Owing to the tenacity of his nature I see that the point is insuperable, and I knew this from Carleton and wrote as much as far back as the 26th September. The ministers who are my confidants and well affected say that as this was not the cause of the war, it ought not to affect the peace, and when that is concluded all asperity will be laid aside, and with the queen's authority increasing every satisfaction will be given. If the French come they will cause a fresh rupture, because they are naturally antipathetic to the English. The king has more regard for his domestic peace, which he pretends the French have always disturbed, than for anything else. He has repeated this several times. In the draft I sent there is a clause including all the other treaties between the two kingdoms, so it may be supposed to comprise that of the marriage also, with perhaps greater advantages for the French than Bassompierre's treaty or any other, so if they like they might take advantage of that. The English, who already find the queen's service profitable, confirm the king in his tenacity. The others, who would agree to some modification, dare not speak to the contrary, lest they offend his Majesty, and render that party hostile to them. The queen, to preserve the love of the nation with whom she has to pass her life, dare not open her lips without rendering herself odious. The king would have to indemnify from his privy purse those whom he displaced and does not care to do so. I proposed that this point should be referred to the queen mother of France and the queen regnant of England, as I thought the two kings could hardly refuse this. Some of the ministers approved half heartedly. The queen tried hard to bring the king to this, promising that nothing should be done distasteful to him. But the king obstinately insisted on this satisfaction; the ministers and Council have little to do with it, and he does not ask their opinion. Accordingly I asked the queen to write to her mother to give up the point at present, lest such a trifle should prevent the peace. She promised to do this.
	My belief is that the French will not make any difficulty, as at present the queen is waited on with the greatest possible state, and she has nothing to desire with regard to the faith. French views are so well directed towards great ends that they will pass over this stumbling-block without perceiving it. The peace will give them more authority in the queen's household than the most stringent treaty, and so long as nothing is said about this the claim always remains alive to be urged when they please. A discreet ambassador will bring things forward by degrees according to circumstances. To gain the point of Rochelle the French can easily concede this one. You might ascertain French opinion about the reference to the queens, because it might have greater force if they do not disapprove. One of those who desires peace told me so, though I confess I am not hopeful. It seems to me a great honour for the French not to speak about it than to obtain little or nothing. To save time I have tried to prevail on them to give the general of the fleet authority to ratify, hoping that the French, in their desire to make sure of La Rochelle, will not bargain too hard about the rest. The king remains firm about having the La Rochelle result first, and then, whatever that may be, he vows he will have peace. To make way for this and to second the proposals of France, he says he will give notice of it to the Duke of Savoy and his other allies. So he sent me the enclosed written declaration, and a similar one to the ambassadors of Denmark and Holland. I fancy some of them are offended at not having had a hand in the negotiations. He told me that in the Valtelline the French had treated without their allies, but he would not follow that bad example. I see clearly that Savoy for his own interest has bound England not to make peace without him. I suspect the delay is to give time for these offices, which by no means please me, because in Savoy they will bargain with France and Spain, and the duke will see that he does not lose thereby. I therefore told the king that he ought to go forward with the peace without losing so much time. Savoy would always follow the union of these two crowns, and in such a negotiation many difficulties may suggest themselves which are not even mentioned when it is brought to maturity. I do not think that letters or persons have as yet been sent for this purpose. I still believe in haste, and the French, warned by you, will be able to gain that prince, as they have always caused England to consider this point with Montagu's proposals, or else to determine speedily on the peace, according to what you hear.
	An important piece of news served to cut short delay, and you also can make use of it for the same purpose. It is that the Danish commissioners have come to terms with the emperor, and that the King of Denmark, in despair after the last rout, (fn. 3) gave full powers to his nobility about this business. As they did not assent to the war, they desire peace to escape the taxes, and will make it at any price. To avoid this disaster I see no way but peace between France and England. I said that as the king's forces were in France the peace would be the more honourable for England; the Rochellese and Huguenots would obtain better terms under her shadow, and after the return of the fleet nothing more would be said about England in France. I pressed his Majesty so hard that he took off his hat and said warmly: It is all true, but my honour matters to me even more. My forces are to succour La Rochelle, not to treat. It is said to be impossible, but I do not believe it. Our peace will be no good unless it begins a brisk war, which cannot be waged without friends. I have no confirmation of the news about Denmark.
	My conclusion is as follows: On the arrival of this despatch La Rochelle will be lost and the fleet on its way home. So let peace be given to the Huguenots, as then the peace with England will be put forward and take place immediately, provided they leave out about the queen's household. The king and certain members of the Council think it a greater honour for the fleet to return and that the Huguenots should arrange peace for themselves than receive disadvantageous terms under the shadow of this Crown. They might complain about this, whereas if they arrange peace themselves they either will or will not inform England. If they do they will be told that they should accept it if it is satisfactory. If not, England will say that she had no share in the treaty and if it had been made in concert with her it would have been more satisfactory. They think to save their reputation thus, and so they will not order the general to accept the peace, though the Council is not unanimous about this. However, it is the king's view, and I think it very advantageous to France, as with peace arranged without the interference of England the pretext of being tied by the Huguenots is removed for ever, and whenever they stirred, France ran the risk of a war with England. I argued much about this, pointing out how it caused delay, but the king remains firm, and those who are in favour of giving orders to the general think that on the arrival of these letters he will have departed or La Rochelle will be parleying, so that it would be indecorous for the fleet, which went to fight, to remain off the French coast to treat. I also believe they are short of provisions. If the French wish to prevent the disorders which might arise from Savoy or from delay or the return of Soubise with the fleet, they should not insist on the point of the queen's household, because it will certainly protract the negotiations and perhaps break it off.
	To divert England from thinking about a league let an addition be made to the seventh clause. This will prove the disposition of France, the particulars being referred to the ambassadors. Meanwhile peace will take place. This is the chief thing, and to do this speedily is the wish of France herself, although many declare that on the fall of Rochelle the French will no longer care about anything, and so great is the distrust of the English that the greatest difficulty consists in removing these suspicions. Hence also, unless they first see peace with the Huguenots, they will not believe that France intends to give it, but rather to trick England.
	I send this off so that you may advance the affair, while I try to smooth difficulties and prevent delay. I think the business now depends entirely on France.
	London, the 3rd November, 1628.
	Postscript.—At this moment the queen, instead of the promised letter for the queen mother, sends me word very confidentially that she does not want to displease the king by interesting herself too far in this matter, and asking me to supply her place by attesting that she is perfectly satisfied with the service and the Court in its present state, and she is very anxious that this shall not disturb the principal matter. When that is settled it will resolve everything else. She informed me that she wrote last time in such a way that whatever the republic's ministers represent will receive entire credence and be favoured by the queen mother. This confirms my belief that nothing will be gained on this point, that the king remains firm and to speak of it prejudices the queen herself, and so she is unwilling to move backward from the post of authority to which she is advancing. It is also possible that she does not care to put anything to paper, to avoid compromising herself, so that after the peace is made the French may not reproach her with being satisfied with the present state of things. But this is only a speculation of my own, and you may use the information as you think best, especially to let it be known in France that if they want the peace they must not insist on what is quite impossible.
	[Italian; deciphered; copy.]
Enclosure.	532. ALVISE CONTARINI, Ambassador in England, to ZORZI ZORZI, Ambassador in France.
	The Governor of Calais has written to me that some 200 French boats, while fishing for herrings, were surprised by the English, eight of them being taken into Dover. He asked me to intercede for their release and to obtain mitigation of the rigour against fishermen, as this herring fishery yields more than 200,000 francs profit to the town of Calais and the environs. I readily undertook the task, always with the help of the queen, and you will see the result from my reply to the governor. You can make use of this. On the other hand a fresh proclamation has appeared forbidding the English and all other nations from having any commerce with France. (fn. 4) They say that this resolve is due to similar decrees over there, but I believe it is much more due to the seizure of fourteen Dutch ships, which were bound for England with cordage, lead, pitch and such things for the fleet. As the ambassadors said there was prohibition, the shipment was made, and for this once the vessels were restored, but they are so strict that no intercourse can take place without coming to open hostilities with all the friendly powers.
	Public report says the Duke of Chevreuse is coming hither. The Warden of Dover writes that part of his equipage has arrived at Calais and he wishes to know how to treat him. It is supposed to be a chimera, though they wrote back that he was to receive him with honour. The queen was very glad, and the Court in great bustle.
	Letters have come from Porter. Those to his wife have no date. He tells her he is well and prays her to intercede for his return. From this some infer that he has already arrived at Madrid; but suspicion prevails because the king keeps his advices secret, and does not communicate them to his Council or his secretaries. He told those who spoke to him about this that he had not yet received letters. This seems very wrong, and the delays of the matter in Spain deserve consideration, though I cannot say that the progress of that affair is corroborated.
	Colonel Ferenz has come from Denmark. He is sent by the king to bring the troops who are being raised here to join those of Morgan and Carpenson, who are already in the Netherlands, to attempt the relief of Crempe. The many things wanting here, especially money, make me fear that this relief cannot arrive before the ice, and I see no remedy except the return of the fleet, otherwise Crempe is lost. The fleet will not return until the Rochellese negotiate, which they will not do so long as the fleet remains in sight, provided they have the means of subsistence. It is possible that the fleet may have departed by this time, and there is reason to believe it from what everybody says. Even if this is not so, a little speculation, the hopelessness and the ideas of the general may adjust the whole and speedily.
	They do not believe here in the possibility of the peace in negotiation with Rohan, by means of 200,000 crowns, without their participation. There is certainly some secret promise between this Crown and the Huguenots. To break this the French ought to offer them the most ample compact, and if this was accepted it would utterly annihilate this tie. If rejected there would attach to it the odium due to an unmistakable act of felony.
	London, the 3rd November, 1628.
	[Italian; the part in italics deciphered; copy.]
Enclosure.	533. MANIFEST of the KING OF GREAT BRITAIN to the AMBASSADORS.
	His Majesty, taking into consideration the proposals made for the peace with France, assures you of his good affection to embrace that peace whenever the Most Christian will give him the opportunity and possibility of doing so with honour, and shows a desire for it. His Majesty has not kept this resolve concealed from the other ambassadors here, who act in this cause. From the particular respect he bears you he now notifies you that he has heard through a minister that the Most Christian is disposed to come to an adjustment, but as yet matters are not so far advanced as to enable his Majesty to come to a formal treaty, to which he is fully inclined and resolved whenever the Most Christian gives him cause. Meanwhile he prays you not to give way to any jealousy, as he assures you that when all is ready, as the chief object is the common cause, you will always have equal esteem, time and opportunity for the exercise of your industry, and he will refer himself to your mediation, as he has very great confidence in your affection and interest, while he is full of love and respect for you.
	[Italian; deciphered; copy translated from the French.]
	534. Seventh Article of the Peace, with an Addition.
	That the two kings, being at one in blood and interest, having got rid of their quarrels, which keep their forces occupied, will employ them in assisting their colleagues and friends.
	Addition.
	As the ambassadors of both will be more amply charged with regard to details, to treat and propose for the advantage of the common cause.
	[Italian; deciphered; copy.]
Enclosure.	535. ALVISE CONTARINI, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the CHEVALIER DE VALENCAI, Governor of Calais.
	Your letter about the fishing boats gave me very great pleasure. Immediately on receiving it I communicated the contents to the queen and to some of the ministers, by whom they were imparted to the king. He said that if the seizure was made by the royal ships he would grant the queen this favour at once. He was well aware of the courtesies you have shown to the inhabitants of Dover, and the friendly attitude you have observed during the war, and his obligation to make a return. Meanwhile information arrived from Dover that of the eight captured vessels one only was from Calais, which had been sent back free, and the prize had been made by ships with letters of marque, and it could not be legally denied to the parties, who had armed at their own cost. However, the queen renewed her entreaties, and I also added a few words. At length we obtained the suspension of the order for the despatch of a royal ship and some others against the fishermen, and that the governor of Dover was not to molest that fishery with his cruisers. But it is not possible to give notice of this to the ships with letters of marque already at sea, or to promise for them. Ships taken will be restored with the nets, and the Lieutenant of Dover, to whom the plunder belongs, is warned by some of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be satisfied with some present, as the king does not wish to infringe the law. The nature of the case and its consequences have compelled me to delay my reply longer than I intended, for the sole purpose of obtaining for you as much satisfaction as possible. All the credit is due to the queen, who exerted herself with much warmth. I have given your messenger letters from the queen's chamberlain, the Earl of Dorset, for the Lieutenant of Dover, together with the notices of what is desired of him.
	London, the 2nd November, 1628.
	[Italian; copy.]
Nov. 3. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Inghilterra. Venetian Archives.	536. ALVISE CONTARINI, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	Secretary Conway has complained to me on the king's behalf of what happened between the galeasses and Digby. He told me that he had letters from him by way of Constantinople to the effect that he went to that port for the purpose of taking water and ships. Wishing to send letters to some English ships there, he sent word to that effect to the captain of the galeasses, to avoid giving suspicion of any other evil intention. Instead of civilities, he received shot, so that in self defence he was compelled to give battle. He wished to show that the disasters which befell the English afterwards arose from sheer necessity for defence under provocation. The secretary said that this seemed the true account, but he would send me Digby's letters. He added that if he was responsible in the first place, his Majesty would punish him, but otherwise he expected the same justice from your Excellencies. I replied that when I spoke to his Majesty about Digby, I asked him to give more credit to your Serenity's statements than to those of a pirate, who had sold all his property for the sake of robbing. I was convinced of this from the nature of his account of what took place at Alexandretta, owing to the detailed accounts received from your Serenity many days ago, as if you foresaw these mendacious vaunts of Digby. They rendered him quite unworthy of his Majesty's protection and favour. I remarked on the improbability of his pretexts, and of his showing so much deference for the galeasses as to ask leave solely to write a letter. I grew warm in narrating what had really taken place, showing the proper course taken by the Signory's ministers. I hoped that instead of complaining, his Majesty would have thanked me, because the republic's ships, by preventing the Frenchmen from being plundered in the harbours of the Grand Turk, had also prevented a general seizure of all the goods of English subjects in Syria, Constantinople and elsewhere, because even an unsuccessful attempt had led to the imprisonment of the Consul and the expenditure of several thousand piastres. I said that if Digby persisted in his insolence and remained in those waters, something unexampled would happen, and I referred to the maxims of Queen Elizabeth, who would never permit privateering in the Mediterranean, out of respect for her friends and of the Turks in particular. By correcting Digby for past offences and recalling him, his Majesty would give satisfaction to his friends and secure his subjects from mischance.
	The secretary replied that he had executed his orders, and would report my reply to the king. He thought he had told me all the letters contained. It was thus evident that I had not read them well or that their contents were very improbable. He said he would have them read to me, but I let him see that I attached little importance to that, as the statement was untruthful, and by an interested person, unworthy of credit from his profession. He could not be put on an equality with the ministers of the republic, persons of quality, who exert themselves to maintain a good understanding with the republic's friends, and not to destroy it for the sake of plunder.
	This is all that took place, and I think I did well. Several days have passed since then, during which I have had two audiences of the king, who never opened his lips to me about this business, nor has the Secretary Conway sent to show me other letters. However, I leave it to the public wisdom to enlighten me about the progress of the fight, of which I only have the first advices, either for information or to enable me to make some reply.
	London, the 3rd November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 3. Collegio, Secreta. Lettere. Venetian Archives.	537. To the Ambassadors in England and at the Hague.
	We have heard to-day from Turin that the Earl of Carlisle is leaving at once and that on the following day Gerbier, the dependant of Buckingham, is returning post to England, although he says he is going alone on his private affairs. We inform you so that you may try and find out the reasons for this hasty journey. We also hear that the Abbot Scaglia is shortly to cross to the infanta in Flanders, and possibly to England also. Some think this may be so, that if La Rochelle falls and the French attempt anything against Savoy, the French may be rendered uneasy by the union of England and the duke with the Crown of Spain; or perhaps the Duke of Savoy foresees peace between France and England and wants to show that he had some share in it.
	This will serve for information and that you may be on the watch.
	Ayes, 18.	Noes, 0.	Neutral, 0.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 4. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Roma. Venetian Archives.	538. ANZOLO CONTARINI, Venetian Ambassador at Rome, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	Leading men here say that in France they do not believe that the English fleet has sailed with the idea of relieving La Rochelle, as they realise the difficulty, but rather with the purpose of assisting the negotiations carried on by Rohan and the Huguenot party with the king, so as to obtain pardon from his Majesty, the best terms they can and their permanence in France.
	Rome, the 4th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 4. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Savoia. Venetian Archives.	539. FRANCESCO CORNARO, Venetian Ambassador in Savoy, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	So early as last Tuesday I knew that letters had come reporting the withdrawal of the English fleet from La Rochelle, but I did not write, in order to make more sure. I am now assured that the English landed Montagu, who spoke with the king and told him that the English fleet did not mean to succour La Rochelle as they knew it was too thoroughly surrounded and it would be impossible to break through, but their only object was to obtain better terms for the Rochellese for whom he had come to intercede. I believe the Most Christian replied that this could not be so long as the fleet remained in those waters, but that when it withdrew he would show all his clemency, though he would not pardon his French subjects, such as Soubise. They also say that he took Montagu to the mole and round the works, showing the impossibility of succour, and that Montagu left with some capitulations. The news comes from a good source, which is not at all suspect, although the English ambassadors who have heard the same told me that if Montagu negotiated he would have done so contrary to the king's commissions, because they knew that there were no such orders. However, they may want to make this pretence to save their credit with the Duke of Savoy, having promised him that they would not negotiate this peace without his consent.
	Turin, the 4th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 4. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Spagna. Venetian Archives.	540. ALVISE MOCENIGO, Venetian Ambassador in Spain, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The Spanish fleet to the number of forty ships is cruising from Lisbon to the Strait and from the Canary Islands to Le Terzere, as they are in constant anxiety about the fleet; and orders have been issued for a good watch to be kept along the whole coast from fear of what the English fleet may do after they have attempted the relief of La Rochelle.
	Madrid, the 4th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 4. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Germania. Venetian Archives.	541. PIETRO VICO, Venetian Secretary in Germany, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The emperor is advised by way of Lorraine that the English fleet has appeared off La Rochelle and actions have taken place to the disadvantage of the English, who showed their determination to lose all or introduce succour at the next spring tides. This news has relieved the imperialists of the misgiving that the English fleet might go to help Denmark and Sweden. So now they are certain that the former monarch cannot have help from England in time, they will try to gain more advantage in the articles of peace.
	Vienna, the 4th November, 1628.
	[Italian; copy.]
Nov. 6. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Signori Stati. Venetian Archives.	542. GIOVANNI SORANZO, Venetian Ambassador in the Netherlands, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	There are many reports about the accommodation between France and England, but not much credited for lack of proper confirmation. It is considered certain that Montagu went back to England after conferring with Cardinal Richelieu, but that he achieved little. Nevertheless the praise for all the good remains with your Serenity. Although these States desire the result they do not seem to approve of the manner, because their ambassadors were left out and not summoned to the discussion of the proposals. They consider this a slight and also fear some prejudice.
	The Hague, the 6th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 6. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Savoia. Venetian Archives.	543. FRANCESCO CORNER, Venetian Ambassador in Savoy, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The English ambassadors are rather fed up (stuff) with this Court. Wake told me in confidence that Carlisle cannot put up with the artifices he detects in the princes here, who tell him one thing one day and another the next. The Abbot Scaglia goes to see him twice every day, but always with some different statement, in conformity with the way things proceed.
	Wake also told me that he had letters from M. d'Aubigni from Geneva, who wrote that the Duke of Rohan informed him that he was taking some places in Languedoc without resistance. Montmorency and Condé were indeed following him, but he considered himself stronger than they. But this news is anterior to the withdrawal of the English fleet, the force that supplied all the spirit to the body of the Huguenots.
	These English ambassadors are expecting with great anxiety a packet from England, brought by one of their people. When he arrived on the Swiss frontiers he was stopped by the Board of Health. They sent for the packet, but found that the man had left to go by way of Savoy. I fancy Carlisle may be waiting to know if he has leave to return to England, as he is very anxious to do. They have sent to tell me that as soon as this despatch arrives they will send to tell me the news. I will anticipate their courtesies, though this is difficult, as Carlisle waxes even more enthusiastic in this expressions of his desire to show his gratitude to the republic for having treated him so royally.
	Wake sent to ask if I had any information about the disposition of your Excellencies with respect to the favour he asked for Provaglio. As there was nothing in my letters I told him that they had arrived so late that I had hardly time to read them. He said he feared he importuned the Senate. This was the first favour he had asked and it was because he could not refuse some Brescian gentlemen who had favoured him with lodging and horses for the Earl of Carlisle, before he knew that the state would entertain him. He offered a thousand excuses. I told him that the republic would always be disposed to gratify him; I had written, and if the strict rules of the Council of Ten permitted I hoped this grant would be made.
	It seems that after the withdrawal of the English fleet his Highness has suspended his decision to send the Abbot Scaglia on the journey reported, but they say that the Infanta Isabella by a courier from Brussels advises him to send the abbot to Spain. This house maintains very confidential relations with that princess, and I think that Scaglia did a great deal to promote it.
	Turin, the 6th November, 1628.
	[Italian; the part in italics deciphered.]
Nov. 6. Senato, Secreta. Dispacci, Candia, Proveditore. Venetian Archives.	544. FRANCESCO MOLIN, Venetian Proveditore in Crete, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The archbishop called soon after my arrival here and told me he had heard on good authority that some Greek books, contrary to religion, written and printed by the Patriarch Cyril of Constantinople, in concert with the English ambassador resident there, had been sent by the patriarch to one Geronimo Geremia Zancarol, Abbot of Santa Trinita, ten miles from Canea, to be distributed in the kingdom, and the abbot had sent a good sum to a grocer in the town to dispose of them.
	I found the books in the hands of the grocer and had him arrested. I am informed that one of the books deals with matters of slight importance; the other two contain matters of great importance, upon the primacy of the pope, ecclesiastical differences, Purgatory and such things. I have directed the Rector of Canea to make Geronimo give up the books and promise to recover any he has distributed. I have also written to the Bailo at Constantinople to try and prevent any more being sent.
	Candia, the 6th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 8. Senato, Secreta. Capitanio delle Galeazze. Venetian Archives.	545. LORENZO TIEPOLO, Proveditore of the Fleet, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	The English captain, Lesbi, after taking accommodation in the port of Pantalon, proceeded to the Gulf of Lepanto. From the people of Patrasso he obtained provision for one half. He has sailed from there and they say he is hanging about off Sapienza and Cerigo.
	Corfu, the 8th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 8. Senato, Secreta. Capitanio delle Galeazze. Venetian Archives.	546. ANTONIO CAPELLO, Captain of the Galeasses, to the DOGE and SENATE.
	To my infinite regret and astonishment I learn from my brothers and others that my letters about the incident with the five English ships at Alexandretta did not reach your Serenity until five days after those of the Consul Pesaro, and that consequently you were anxious about the result, and were proposing to send me Captain Cornaro and his consort with munitions and arms, while blaming me for negligence and carelessness, not due to my neglect, but to the fault of others. I must therefore report the true facts. The fight took place on the 21st of June. As I was occupied in fighting I could not report it to your Serenity, but I took especial pains to send an account to the consul at Aleppo, so that he might be warned in time and know how to act. I asked him to send a messenger to Constantinople and direct him to touch at the coast and take my letters for your Serenity and the Bailo, so that his Excellency might also be informed in time, and I felt sure he would do it of his own accord in a matter of so much importance, especially as it would not take the messenger out of his way. Sig. Marco Moresini and Bernardo Salamon also recommended the same thing to him. But he wanted to send the news first, without sending the messenger to me, and as I had no trustworthy messengers here, I sent to Pesaro at Aleppo to send on some one on purpose, as he writes by his letter of the 4th July, which I have by me, he has already done. But I was deceived, as after waiting several days he sent me a messenger who was robbed near Bagiasso. But having recovered the letters by a miracle, I sent him across in a caique to l'Agiazza, so that he should travel by a safer route, and also shorten his journey, as I reported to your Serenity on the 11th July. Pesaro might easily have sent my letters after he had received them and thus have gained four or five days, and as he had already sent off his own, he would have attained his object without injuring the interests of the state and causing me this mortification.
	From the galeasses at sea off the kingdom of Crete, the 8th November, 1628.
	[Italian.]
Nov. 10. Senato, Secreta. Deliberazioni. Venetian Archives.	547. To the Ambassador in England and the like to the Ambassador at the Hague.
	The decision of the Duke of Mantua to agree to a deposit has not changed in the least the determination of the Imperial Court about Casale, or about the Spaniards and Savoy keeping all they have taken. The stay of the Ambassador Monterei at Genoa serves to confirm the reports that the Catholic King aspires to the dominion of that city, in which it is suspected he has an agreement with Savoy to divide the Genoese. The Governor of Milan has the worst disposition towards Italy, and the expected visit of the Catholic to Barcelona may serve to incite him further. Thus besides Monferrat, the Spanish ministers lay claim to the Mantuan territory and have recently attacked Caneto, not above two miles from our frontier, though they had to beat a retreat.
	The courier of England, sent to Carlisle with the news of the duke's death, met Scaglia, Porter and Rubens at Basel. They received the news with exclamations and tears, concluding that the loss of the duke meant the end of the negotiations already begun. It is confirmed that this was all directed towards an accommodation with Spain. For this reason the Duke of Olivares greatly laments Buckingham's death, thinking thereby he has lost a firm foundation for such ideas.
	In the last council in the Valtelline Azzo Besta read very friendly letters from the Catholic with promises to supply 3,000 loads of wheat a year from the Milanese for ten years, and to relieve the people there of the tax of 25,000 crowns yearly. They, on their side, swore to close the pass against every one, and to open it to 4,000 coming from Germany to Italy to serve Spain. Thus the number of troops in this province is being increased from every quarter.
	To England add:
	We have as yet heard no word from France of your letters reaching the Ambassador Zorzi, or anything else from him on the subject; so we have nothing to add to the above, which will be for your information.
	Ayes, 117.	Noes, 1.	Neutral, 1.
	[Italian.]