Spain: December 1544 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

Citation:

'Spain: December 1544', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544, ed. Pascual de Gayangos, Martin A S Hume( London, 1899), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol7/pp463-496 [accessed 27 November 2024].

December 1544



2 Dec.	258. The Emperor to Juan de Vega, his Ambassador at Rome.
S. E. Flandres, 500.	Besides the contents of the other letter (fn. 1) that goes along with this one, We have considered it fit and opportune to inform you separately of many particulars closely connected with the business in question. His Holiness' Nuncio (fn. 2) did lately give Us to understand the great pleasure and joy which His Holiness the Pope has felt at the conclusion of Our peace with France, and his determination and will to come (fn. 3) and be present at the celebration of the General Council [of the Church]; to strive equally for the reduction of the Lutherans, and resistance against the Turk. Towards attaining those two objects (said the Nuncio) His Holiness is fully disposed to contribute largely and efficiently.
	Such was the substance of His Holiness' message to Us, though conceived in rather general terms, as delivered by his Nuncio, who, among other things, stated that Pope Paul and his family (the Farnesi), knowing, as they do, that they could not find elsewhere the help and protection they wanted, were fully prepared to do efficient work, not only in regard to the public affairs of Christendom at large, but likewise in Our own private concerns. This and other like asseverations the Nuncio afterwards repeated to Monsr. de Granvelle in conversation with him, adding that no better opportunity than the present could offer itself for the attainment of the two above-mentioned objects. If We only could forget past events, continue on friendly and affectionate terms with His Holiness, grant him and his family (fn. 4) the same favour and protection We have hitherto granted to them, he (Poggio) had not the least doubt, nay firmly believed, that His Holiness would be easily persuaded to contribute with a considerable sum of money both towards the expenses of the war against the Turk, and the reduction of the Separatists from the Faith.
	To the above statements the Nuncio added that His Holiness was disposed to grant that which We for some time have been asking for on behalf of Our various kingdoms, namely, the annexation of certain religious orders and monasteries. “I am sure (continued the Nuncio) that there will be no difficulty now as to that, and that I myself can co-operate efficiently towards the settlement of that and other ecclesiastical affairs in favour of the Spanish kingdoms, for I know that he (the Pope) is well disposed, and has no serious objection to it.”
	All things considered, (fn. 5) and in view of the profit to be made by His Holiness' offers, We are of opinion that there would be no harm in dissembling and appearing as if We had forgotten past events, and were likely to accept His Holiness' offers as conveyed to Us by his Nuncio. You will therefore speak to His Holiness, as well as to cardinal Farnese, in the terms you consider most convenient, on the subject of the promised help and subvention, as well as on the annexation of monasteries and other ecclesiastical affairs of these realms.
	But in doing so, you (Vega) are to give His Holiness and the Cardinal to understand how meritorious their work would be in the eyes of God, and what amount of worldly praise both of them (the Pope and the Cardinal) would deserve by accomplishing the good We are speaking of. It is generally known that the Holy See is in possession of considerable treasure, procured and obtained for the avowed and express purpose of employing the same against the Turk. (fn. 6) Its employment against the Protestants would be equally acceptable to all people, especially if the undertaking against the Turk had ceased to be a pressing necessity. But His Holiness should be told clearly and distinctly, and be made to understand, that those two undertakings, when discussed or treated in common by His Holiness and Ourselves, no longer admit of vague words, but must be treated particularly, separately, and in detail, so that We Ourselves should know in a resolute, determined, and specific manner what sum of money His Holiness intends devoting to the purpose; and you will ask Him to declare the sum to you confidently, so that We may at the next Diet [in Germany] see what can be done for the present respecting either point, that of the Turk or that of the Protestants, and perhaps also in both, with the help of God; because should war be declared against the Turk, it is quite evident that We must dissemble with the Lutherans, unless His Holiness assist Us with a large sum of money. Even if the war against the Turk should come to an end one way or other, We could not, without substantial help from Pope Paul, compel the Lutherans to return to the Catholic Faith, Our means being completely exhausted in consequence of the late wars. But should His Holiness help us with a good sum of money, (fn. 7) such as 600,000, or at least 500,000 ducats, We think that so meritorious an enterprise as the reduction to the Faith of the Lutherans, might be easily and without much labour carried out, especially if the Council of the Church should on its side co-operate towards it. Should, therefore, His Holiness consent to do this, and at the same time will despatch the pending ecclesiastical business We have at Rome, as is due, in consideration of Our own war labours and the expenses We have undergone in resisting Turks, Moors, and infidels of every description, so as to prevent the utter ruin of Christian religion, Pope Paul may be sure that We will forget the past, and be His dutiful son and true friend, continuing, as We have hitherto done, to be the protector of His family.
	But it is highly important and desirable that the above two points be treated and discussed by you with the utmost care and dexterity, so as not to give Frenchmen any cause or motive to suspect that We intend to work separately from them especially in matters relating to the Council and the reduction of the Lutherans.
	The Papal Nuncio (Poggio) also gave Us to understand that if We chose to apply to Rome for cardinals' hats for prelates of Our dominions, he (Poggio) had every reason to think (fn. 8) that we might obtain three additional hats besides the two which His Holiness reserved “in pectore,” and which We always fully expected to have for the prelates We chose to recommend, whilst he would only give two hats to the French. He would also grant others to Spaniards or Germans devoted to Our person, especially to the bishop of Augusta (Augsburg) (fn. 9).
	Such was the Nuncio's verbal declaration to Us of His Holiness' intentions in this matter of the cardinalate, but as such a long time has elapsed since His Holiness promised Us three hats, one for the archbishop of Santiago [de Compostela] in Spain, (fn. 10) another for the bishop who was once of Pamplona, (fn. 11) and a third for the bishop of Jaen, now deceased, (fn. 12) We own that We had almost forgotten the circumstances and occasion of the aforesaid promise, and consequently took little or no heed of the Nuncio's formal declaration in that respect Yet, lest it should be said after the death of the present Pope that the Sacred College of Cardinals had not at the time a sufficient number of good members to ensure a fitting Papal election, (fn. 13) or else that We, Ourselves, out of enmity and ill-will to the French, had brought about the conflict, We think that if you perceive that His Holiness is in earnest, and well inclined in this and other matters personally relating to Us and to Our various kingdoms, and that besides the four hats, which, as you know, We asked Him for, and which We still affirm and maintain were granted to Us without difficulty, His Holiness be pleased to give Us the other two reserved “in pectore,” and not grant to the French more than two—one of which, as We are given to understand, is destined to the brother of the admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault)—then, in that case, you (Vega) will pass on to the topic of the future creation, and will treat with the Pope, or His minister, in the manner and on the terms above specified, at the same time taking care that the choice of the other new cardinals falls on deserving prelates entirely devoted to Us and to Our person. If possible, one of them should be archbishop Colonna, (fn. 14) brother of Camillo [Colonna], whom We cannot fail to recommend most highly, since there has always been a number of cardinals of his family.
	As to the four hats, they should be given to the archbishop of Santiago (Avalos), to the bishop of Pamplona, now of Jaen, who succeeded to that see on the death of the latter. Since His Holiness objects to promote Dr. Mohedano, (fn. 15) another hat might be bestowed either on the bishop of Coria (fn. 16) or on Don Bartholomé de la Cueva. (fn. 17)
	With regard to the other two hats, by His Holiness reserved “in pectore,” it would be desirable that time should be given Us to look out for well-deserving prelates of Our kingdoms and dominions, and recommend them to His Holiness as ecclesiastics well fitted for the purple.
	After the above was written, archbishop Sfondrato (fn. 18) arrived here (fn. 19) with the commission and charge, about which Marquina (fn. 20) wrote to Us some days ago, namely, of congratulating Us on Our recent peace, and assuring Us of His Holiness' absolute will and determination to hold the Council, persuaded, as He (Pope Paul) is, that it will be the only sure remedy on matters of religion, however amply they might be discussed at the next Diet. Archbishop Sfondrato also promised that His Holiness would help and assist against the Turk, though this was said in general terms; and on these points, of religion, the holding of the Council and the resistance against the Turk, he pledged His Holiness to contribute his good offices to the extent of his power.
	The above will inform you of the substance of the declarations of Sfondrato and the Nuncio to us, and of their various conferences with M. de Granvelle.
	Our answer has been that no doubt the Council would be very useful for the purpose, but that other measures would also be requisite, such as the observance of the rules and acts of former Councils, and the reformation [of the Clergy], so as to prevent the growth and spreading of the evil, which is so deeply rooted that there is danger of its becoming ultimately the ruin of Christendom. It is for His Holiness, as Head of the Church —to whom, as He himself says, belongs the right as well as the duty of attending to religious matters—to discover the best way of attaining those two objects, the meeting of the General Council and the settling of all differences in matters of Faith. To that end He (the Pope) should devote all His energies and power. His Holiness knows very well how much We, Ourselves, have done, and the enormous sums of money We have already spent. We are therefore unable to do as much as we should like now in the reduction of the Lutherans or the resistance to the Turk. (fn. 21) Indeed one of Our chief objects in concluding peace with France was to set Ourselves free, so as to be able to plan and carry out successfully the two above-mentioned undertakings, following in this respect the line of conduct We have traced for Ourselves since the beginning of Our reign; that is to say, to procure by all means the welfare of Christendom at large. But in doing so, We do not wish to put pressure on His Holiness in the least, or oblige Him to do in this affair more than what He himself feels disposed and is willing to undertake. We only wish to signify to Him that, even if He should help and contribute largely towards the expenses of both undertakings, and sends Us a detailed and specific account of the means He intends to employ for the success of both enterprises, We shall not be able to work personally in this as efficiently as the quality and importance of these matters and the state of European politics require, and We Ourselves should wish. Still less could We, in the present state of opinion in Germany as far as religion is concerned, refer the religious question to the Council, for such is the obstinate resistance of the Lutherans and others, that whenever there has been occasion for applying to them for help and assistance against the Turk, they have never failed to answer that if they do help against the Infidel, they must needs be first ensured in matters of their own Faith, and allowed to live in peace and freedom. The stronger Our arguments to persuade them of the necessity for offering resistance to the Turk, and preventing him from again invading Christendom, the greater has been the obstinacy of the Lutheran princes of Germany in refusing their help and assistance against him, and if in moments of urgency, and having other weighty affairs to attend to, We have at times relaxed in the prosecution of Our hostile plans against the Infidel, the more strongly have they insisted in their religious dissents, all with a view to making proselytes in Germany, and gaining all Germans to their cause, and perhaps, too, going still further and forming fresh pernicious confederations. Indeed, should the necessity for making war against the Turk become more urgent than it is at present, there are superabundant reasons to believe that the Germans will become more firm in their resistance, and still more tenacious if pressed to attend the Council of the Church [at Trent], and will do everything in their power to stop armaments against the Turk, endeavouring to pervert and corrupt other countries of Christendom, as they have now and then attempted to do, boasting that they would carry their Lutheranism into Italy.
	For the remedy of all this, (fn. 22) it would be convenient that His Holiness should have a good sum of money placed in Germany, and spread the rumour that it is to be spent in war against the Turk, as in reality it will be in the end. If the money could come to these parts in such a way, and at a time when the Protestants are less disinclined to assist against the Turk and submit their differences to the Council, much might be gained by it, as in the meantime, and whilst the war against the Turk lasted, they might relent in their opposition, and not attempt movements of greater importance. And who can tell, after all, whether under such circumstances, by persuasion or otherwise, they might not, without waiting for the provision of the Council, return to the Catholic Faith?
	There is still another argument to be brought forward in favour of the proposed measure, which is that the war against the Turk, and the bringing back of the Separatists to Faith, are two undertakings which could not be successfully carried out at the same time except by sheer force.
	Both the Papal nuncios took in good part all that was said to them respecting the Council and the Germans; but they have never failed to suggest, (fn. 23) when that assembly and the reformation to be made therein have been alluded to in their presence, that it would be desirable, nay necessary, that the latter comprised equally the ecclesiastics and the laymen (seglares).
	This last suggestion of the two Nuncios We would not contradict; on the contrary, We told them that it seemed to Us excellent, and We praised it beyond measure. They, on their own part, seemed to understand well and appreciate Our remark that His Holiness the Pope should help and assist, as well as declare the particular means He intended making use of against the Lutherans, though they declared to Us that such had been His Holiness' expenses in preparing and carrying out the meeting of the General Council of the Church [at Trent], that He (Pope Paul) could not contribute towards the two objects in question with anything like the sum of money which He was, perhaps, supposed to have at His command. It would be (they said) proper and convenient to make use now of such means as had usually been employed on similar previous occasions, with the consent and authority of the Holy See, and also to know beforehand what other princes and lords in Christendom were prepared to do in the matter, and how much they intended to contribute.
	Our ministers' reply to such suggestions was that His Holiness had notoriously large sums of money at his disposal, and that if He had, as they said, spent much of it, it could only be very little in proportion to the sum He had received under colour of helping with it against the Turk. (fn. 24)
	As to Our employing the means proposed by the Nuncio and by the Legate, (fn. 25) as likely to be instituted by His Holiness, that would be a measure not only vague and uncertain, but of very difficult and almost impossible execution, for even if His Holiness thinks that Our kingdoms and dominions will contribute with large sums of money for this purpose, the idea could not be carried out, certainly at the present moment, inasmuch as Our kingdoms and dominions are so exhausted, owing to the last wars, that scarcely a trifling benevolence or gift could now be obtained from them. Other Christian princes, if applied to for help, will bring forward similar excuses, having naturally suffered by the said wars in which they were engaged. With regard to the suggestion that enquiry should be made as to what the other Christian powers of Europe would do in this emergency, and how far they would respond to His appeal, you may tell Him that it is quite notorious that as regards Ourselves, if We saw that preparations were being made in earnest, We should not be found wanting, but would employ Our person in the undertaking. No less would the Prince-Electors of the Empire do as it was settled in the last Diet. As to the king of France, it was stipulated in the treaty of peace that in the event of a war against the Turk, he will help with 600 lances (cavalry), and the pay of 10,000 infantry, so that in point of fact there was no need for His Holiness to make the enquiry, since He and every one else knows what the Christian powers of Europe are prepared to do. (fn. 26)
	After this the two nuncios, Poggio and Sfondrato hinted of their own accord, and as if the idea had sprung exclusively from them, that cardinal Farnese wished very much to be of service to Us in all matters touching the armed resistance against the Turk and the reduction of the Lutherans to the Faith, and that he (Farnese) would do his best towards the accomplishment of those two objects. This (they said) the Cardinal desired most ardently, both on account of the affectionate regard he entertains for Our person, and his most ardent wish to recommend and promote Our ideas on the subject, thus giving Us to understand that perhaps His Holiness might appoint him to come personally to Our court and discuss the subject.
	No reply was made by Our ministers to the above declaration of cardinal Farnese's sentiments, ideas, and offers of service; they neither approved nor rejected them, but when the opportunity here came to hand, and conversation fell on the next Diet, Our Privy Seal (Granvelle) told them in plain words that it would be requisite and necessary that one or two persons, well qualified for the purpose, should go thither, and transmit any communications that might confidentially and under reserve be made to them respecting the two important points to be discussed thereat. (fn. 27) By the appointment of such a person, or persons, the disagreeable results experienced in former Diets, in which private intrigue had ruined the business, might be avoided. Our ministers' idea was well received by the two Papal nuncios, who promised to speak to His Holiness about it.
	Another question did Sfodrato put to Us. How, he inquired, is His Holiness to understand the matter of the king of England? because (said he) being actually at war with king Francis, and also being one of the chief Separatists from Faith, the French are sure to solicit and request help against him, (fn. 28) and that should His Holiness give it him, He (the Pope) could not contribute so efficiently as He would otherwise have done towards resisting the Turk, and putting down Lutheran dissent? Our answer was that the differences between the two kings did not proceed from divergency of opinion in matters of Faith. At present the chief points to be decided are the resistance against the Turk, and the remedy to be applied to the state of things in Germany. To both of these We will carefully attend, as it is Our duty to do, and at the same time We are bound by treaty to assist the king of France. There is, therefore, no need for asking the question. (fn. 29)
	The nuncios then replied that they would write to His Holiness the result of their conference with Us, as well as of their joint communications with Mons. de Granvelle before and after. In short, they have promised to report faithfully to His Holiness the whole of the above, which We have ordered to be put into cipher.
	Our final answer to the Nuncio and Legate has been that, although it be true that the Council would undoubtedly be very convenient and fit for the purpose of dealing with the Protestants, yet many other points should be discussed and settled thereat, such as the full observance and execution of the measures proposed and adopted in former Councils of the Church, thereby preventing the evil, which is already very deeply rooted, from spreading elsewhere, and causing altogether the ruin of Religion. It would indeed be requisite that His Holiness, being the head of the Church, and the judge to whom all religious matters must needs be submitted, should carefully attend at once to both points, that of the Turk and that of Religion, principally to the latter, and devote all His energy and power for the remedy of the said evils, the more so that His Holiness was fully prepared to do what was wanted. (fn. 30)
	Putting together and comparing what archbishop Sfondrato said to Us, and what Poggio, the Nuncio, had formerly stated, with what they, themselves, had said to the Sieur de Granvelle, We find that, in substance, His Holiness' offers come to this: That He will assist and help Us against the Turk, though without specifying how, or with what sum of money, and that He will immediately summon the Council, which, in His opinion, will be the only sure remedy in matters of Religion.
	You shall try, above all things, to ascertain what His Holiness' particular intentions are respecting the help in money He has promised to give Us. That must be done mildly, without constraining or obliging Him to do more than what He himself is willing to do. (fn. 31) According to what His Holiness will promise to do in that way, and how He proposes to deal with the Protestants, We shall act as best We can towards the accomplishment of both objects. The proposals about the Protestants, however, must be treated by you with the utmost care and dexterity, not giving them cause or occasion to be more displeased, or get afraid of Us, than they actually are, watching closely how His Holiness will proceed with respect to them, lest by His not choosing to follow the right and convenient path in affairs of this kind, We Ourselves should be harmed or placed on bad terms with them. Indeed, as Don Diego de Mendoza, (fn. 32) Our ambassador in Venice, writes [from Trent], and you perhaps may have heard from him, the bad offices which His Holiness has already done, and is still doing, to prevent the Council from deliberating, and consequently delaying any remedy of Faith, His wish to see the Turk in Europe rather than try to resist him, is evident. You are, however, not to show to His Holiness that We are aware of, or suspect that, but only tell Him that, according as He may proceed and act in these two important matters, so will He find Us ready to act and execute His wishes.
	Should you see that His Holiness shares these Our sentiments, and agrees with Us, you will add that the whole agreement must be kept secret, because, as has been seen, there is not in the whole of Germany one single prelate, or private individual, even among those who show most desire for the remedy of Religion, who knows how to keep a secret.
	You will also bear in mind that should His Holiness feel inclined to send to Us cardinal Farnese, and you should think that We might then obtain more money from the Pope, and oblige Him to make greater efforts to carry out both undertakings, then in that case you will offer no objection as to his coming here, (fn. 33) because, after all, his youth will be an objection to His Holiness rather than to Us. If the Cardinal comes, it would be very desirable that he should be accompanied by some other person of good sense, prudence, and experience, with whom one can plainly and confidentially negotiate, such as the archbishop Šfondrato, who is still here. Of this you shall take care to make the suggestion, and, at any rate, take care that some such person should be sent to the Diet.—Brussels, 2 December l544. (fn. 34)
	Spanish. Original minute ciphered.
— Dec.	259. The Emperor's Declaration on the Alternative of the Duke of Orleans' Marriage.
S. E. L, 67, f. 12.	The following is the declaration made by the Emperor at the time of his treaty of peace with France respecting the alternative of the duke of Orleans' marriage:—
	At Crêpy, on the 18th of September 1544, a marriage was agreed upon between the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois) king Francis' third son, and the princess of Spain, eldest daughter of His Imperial Majesty, or else with His niece, the second daughter of His brother Ferdinand, the king of the Romans. It was, moreover, agreed that should the Duke marry the Emperor's daughter; (fn. 35) the latter would have as a dower the State or duchy of Milan, or else Flanders and Burgundy with king Ferdinand's second daughter. (fn. 36) Owing, however, to His very long illness, and to His still longer convalescence, His Imperial Majesty could not then take His departure for Germany (fn. 37) and consult His brother Ferdinand on the matter of that alternative marriage as He had deliberated to do. Yet, in order to proceed with the treaty, and fulfil all and every one of its conditions, He did then, and does now again, declare that however much He might wish that the duke of Orleans should marry at once His daughter, the Infanta Doña Maria, princess of Spain, in order to show the great affection he professes for the Most Christian king of France and his family, and render the last peace more complete, and if possible everlasting, He found that the said marriage could not take effect without the Duke's position and estate being considerably improved with relation to, and in proportion to the dominions of the other contracting party and the circumstances and possessions of the Emperor. (fn. 38) By the treaty, therefore, the marriage of the Duke with the second daughter of the King of the Romans is reverted to. Should the King of France approve of the proposed marriage, means might be found to make it equally acceptable to the Duke. His Imperial Majesty does by no means intend putting any stress on king Francis and his family in matters so grave and serious, and yet cannot help telling him, in token of the most sincere friendship, that in either case, whether the duke of Orleans marries his daughter, the princess of Spain, or his niece (Catharine), second daughter of the king of the Romans, his marriage portion might be better than it is.
	As by one of the clauses of the said treaty of peace it is stipulated that the fortified town of Hesdin and its appurtenances, shall be restored to its legitimate lord, or else the latter to be compensated for it, His Imperial Majesty requests and prays king Francis will see to it, and confidently trusts that this restitution of Hesdin (Hêdin) (fn. 39) will be speedily accomplished in conformity with the article of the treaty referring to it, especially as His Imperial Majesty is now doing, on behalf of king Francis' sons, a good deal more.
	His Imperial Majesty trusts, also, that there will be no difficulty either in the restitution of [the county of] Charolois, and that the delivery of the same will take place in perfect good faith, and according to the text of the said treaty, and the letters patent which the king of France, himself, has issued and caused to be proclaimed on the subject.
	As His Imperial Majesty wishes and intends to proceed in this as well as in other matters specified in the said treaty plainly, and with perfect good faith towards all parties, and more especially towards the king of France and his people, and also observe and loyally fulfil all and every one of the stipulations contained in the treaty, he most affectionately requests and begs the king of France to consider and bear in mind the very great delay experienced in the delivery of the strong places and castles on the other side of the Alps, which delay has been exceedingly injurious to His Imperial Majesty, since Cahours has not yet been restored, when it is just that it should be.
	The same may be said respecting the strange means employed by the ministers of king Francis to delay, and, if possible, to avoid altogether the restitution of Astenay (Stenay), against the express article of the treaty of peace, which they, themselves, have completely disregarded, excusing themselves, and throwing all the blame on the duke of Lorraine (François), who, they pretend, dislikes the said restitution, when on the contrary, it is notorious that he (the Duke) wishes for it.
	Besides the above facts, the Royal Commissioners who attended the meetings at Cambray (fn. 40) were so unreasonable and absolute, that even in matters of no difficulty whatever, and in which all right, reason, and justice was evidently on His Imperial Majesty's side, they offered uncommon and wilful opposition, a very strange mode of proceeding, if the good friendship now existing between His Imperial Majesty and the King, their master, is taken into consideration.
	Indeed, the Most Christian king of France should take care that these and all differences still existing between His Imperial Majesty and him should be quickly settled, and made to disappear altogether. For instance, all the Emperor's vassals or subjects in his various kingdoms and dominions are continually complaining of the many robberies and violences committed upon them by the French by land and sea, and that when they do complain against the said violences, they are referred to a tribunal or court of law, under plea that their respective cases are to be investigated and tried by ordinary judges, which judicial proceeding, as is notorious, entails considerable expense upon the claimants, and is subject to much delay and inconvenience. Besides which, though right and justice be evidently on the side of the claimants, the judges generally disregard, alleging particular ordinances, of which the Emperor's subjects are ignorant, and which cannot in any way be applied to them, the Spaniards especially. The judges, moreover, deny the claims, so much so, that in one way or another there has been no one single case since the peace in which the robbers by land or at sea have been punished, and the property restored to its owners; and although they allege that similar robberies and violences have been practised against them by the Emperor's subjects, certain it is that no case has been reported, and no culprit named. And yet, as all the world knows, this sort of evil, too often recurring, must be quickly remedied, or else peace cannot last so long as it is desired.
	To this must be added that His Imperial Majesty's subjects have not yet obtained restitution of the property taken from them during the preceding wars with France, and that the goods and chattels sequestered from them without any form of justice still remain in the hands of the royal officers, though in every one of the treaties of peace between His Imperial Majesty and king Francis it is stipulated that prisoners and sequestered property shall be mutually restored.
	The king of France knows very well the sort of obligation under which His Imperial Majesty stands towards the king of Portugal (Dom João), who, having been comprised in the treaty of Crêpy, should naturally partake of this present peace. The King was also included in former treaties by which all letters of mark are annulled and forbidden, and yet the said letters of mark still continue, and the King's subjects are still assailed under them, (fn. 41) His Imperial Majesty begs the Most Christian king of France to favour the king of Portugal in that very just demand of his, as His Imperial Majesty has lately done in mightier affairs of the French nation, by no means so clear and justifiable as this present one of the king of Portugal.
	In conclusion, His Imperial Majesty again begs the Most Christian king of France, his good brother, to be pleased to consider the above stated reasons, and take such care at present and for the future as the observance of the said peace and of the perfect amity now existing between the two monarchs demands. His Imperial Majesty trusts that the Most Christian king of France will readily do this, and that his intentions are that the last treaty of peace between the two monarchies (France and Spain) take effect, and continue not only as regards the above-stated points and other private concerns of their two Majesties (Imperial and Royal), but likewise in the public affairs [of Christendom], respecting which His Imperial Majesty will behave and act in such a manner that he never will be found to have failed in his own obligations.
	Indorsed: “Copy of the Emperor's Declaration on the alternative of the Duke of Orleans' marriage.” (fn. 42)
	Spanish. 4 pp.
14 Dec.	260. Prince Philip of Spain to the Emperor, his Father.
S. Estado, B.M., Add. 28,594, f. 41.	On the 1st of last month Idiaquez arrived here (fn. 43) and brought me news of Your Majesty's good health, as well as of Your entry into France and the progress of Your Imperial arms throughout that country last summer, the subsequent French overtures, and, last not least, the peace concluded at Crêpy, and the state in which political affairs remained at Idiaquez' departure. I humbly kiss Your Majesty's hand for the singular favour You have done me of informing me in detail of Your victorious march through France, and subsequent conclusion of the treaty of peace.
	Secretary Idiaquez also read to me the original instructions he himself had received from Your Majesty for his mission, as well as a full explanation of the alternative marriages proposed for the duke of Orleans in the treaty of peace made with his Father, the king of France. No sooner had I carefully read and examined the Instructions, and learnt that Your Majesty wished to know my opinion and that of the Council of State on the whole, than I caused its members to be summoned to meet, which they did on three or four consecutive days, Secretary Idiaquez being also present to explain to them in words what Your Majesty's intentious were on so important a matter. And as Your Majesty had signified to the said Secretary (Idiaquez) how desirable it would be that the Count of Cifuentes should also be present at the deliberations of the Council in order to ascertain through him the more or less inclination my sister (the Infanta Doña Maria) may feel to her marriage with the Duke, and then let Your Majesty know what the result of the deliberations had been, and likewise what the Infanta's wish was; as by Idiaquez' arrival here, at Valladolid, and owing to the reasons Your Majesty knows, there was no longer need of moving the Court to Madrid, where the Count of Cifuentes (fn. 44) was then staying somewhat indisposed in health. It was thought that from that or some other cause he might excuse himself from coming to Valladolid, and as I was, moreover, almost sure that my sister, the Infanta, would not so openly declare her sentiments to Secretary Idiaquez or to the Count himself, as she would to me—I decided to go thither for the purpose of visiting her and my other sister (fn. 45) and bringing the Count back to Valladolid with me, as I did, returning to Valladolid on the 29th of November after a stay of 12 or 13 days at Madrid.
	During my absence, as I had ordered in obedience to Your Majesty's instructions, the members of Your Majesty's Council of State held four or five consecutive meetings, and as the matter submitted to their deliberation was, and is, so important, I directed that other fit persons not members of the Council, should also take part in its deliberations. The President of the Council of Castille, the Vice-Chancellor of Aragon, and Dr. Guevara, all of them men of high reputation and sound learning, well versed in State affairs, were selected and invited to take temporary seats in Council, and state their own individual opinion.
	After the matter had been discussed at large, it was found that the councillors were not unanimous. Seeing which, I requested the councillors again to discuss the matter and to put down in writing their individual opinion, sign it with their own names, and enclose the same to me that I might report to Your Majesty. This was done as I directed, so that on the receipt of this ray letter Your Majesty will be able to judge what has been the result of the Council's deliberations. As far as I, myself, can see, all the members of Your Majesty's Council of State, and those persons aggregated to it on this occasion, regret that You should have considered Yourself bound, in order to secure a lasting peace with France, to promise to give the hand of my sister or that of my cousin to the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois); but they differ in opinion, some of them voting for the marriage of my cousin (Catharine), the daughter of the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), with Flanders as a dower, whilst others maintain that the Duke's marriage with my sister Doña Maria, and Milan as a dower, would be on many political considerations altogether preferable.
	Among those who voted for the cession of Milan and the marriage of the Infanta Doña Maria, my sister, with the duke of Orleans, were the cardinal of Toledo, (fn. 46) president of the Council of Castille; the count of Cifuentes, and the High Commander of Castille (fn. 47) [in the Military Order of Santiago), Dr. Guevara, and others, who said that, as the States of Flanders have been so long in Your ancestors' hands, and have since become Your own patrimonial inheritance, they should not on any consideration whatever be alienated from Your Imperial crown, especially as their inhabitants, subjects of Your Majesty, like the Flemish, have been found always faithful and strongly attached to Your Majesty. Indeed, it would be unreasonable and highly impolitic (the above-mentioned councillors alleged), nay, exceedingly injurious to Your Majesty's conscience, honour, and reputation, as well as derogatory to Your Imperial authority, and opposed to the tranquillity and rest of Your mind in future, to alienate those States in any way, or deprive Your successors of them; for even if given as a dower to my sister, the Infanta, on her marriage to the duke of Orleans, Your Majesty reserving for Yourself, during the Infanta's life, the sovereignty of them, and the government and administration of those countries being conducted with justice and proper respect for Your Majesty's authority, should my sister (Doña Maria) die without children (which may God forbid), or else despair of having them, her husband, the Duke, might easily, with the assistance of his father and brother, rise and take possession of the country; for he could at any time, and without waiting for such a contingency, give them cause and opportunity for entering the land, making secret compacts with Your Majesty's enemies, and setting up all manner of intrigues for the express purpose of depriving You of the sovereignty of the land, and keeping it for himself. This the Duke, or his successors, might perhaps accomplish without much difficulty; he might pick a quarrel with Your Majesty as to his manner of conducting the government of the country, or he might take offence at Your attempting to arrest the violences and vices of administration, from which attempt on the part of Your Majesty ill-feeling and anger would arise, and be the cause of the war with the French being renewed; for even taking for granted that the Duke of Orleans behaved in all matters as a good, faithful, and obedient son of Your Majesty, his father and brother, or at any rate this latter (Henri) after the death of king Francis, his father, might very well, being so close a neighbour, and more powerful than he, and having besides a greater force under his command, enter those States against his will and take possession of them before Your Majesty had time to prevent it. In short, should the French in one way or other get possession of Flanders now, the recovery of it would be, if not altogether impossible, exceedingly difficult. Through the loss of those States by us, in whatever way effected, the kings of France would naturally become much stronger than they are now both by land and by sea, and Your Majesty would consequently lose much of Your authority and reputation with other European powers, and chiefly with the prince-electors of the German Empire; whilst king Francis, by means of such an increase of power, would become much greater, would possess himself of all the small States bordering on France, and finally by aid of that greatness and power so acquired, and by his well-known practices and intrigues, win the hearts of the German Princes, (fn. 48) and place in jeopardy Your Majesty's dignity and authority with the Empire, and in process of time become superior to and greater than the King who may eventually wear the Crown of these Spanish realms.
	In order, therefore, to avoid this and other dangers, and to preserve intact the imperial authority, these councillors are of opinion that Your Majesty should not part in any way with the States of Flanders, so beneficial and profitable as they are to these Spanish kingdoms and to Your Imperial Majesty on account of the intercourse of trade, and of the help and assistance they can afford in war-times by land as well as by sea, especially against king Francis or his successors, if they should again attempt to invade these Spanish kingdoms, or other dominions of Your Majesty; whilst the alienation, in whatever way and under whatsoever conditions effected, would decidedly be the source of much displeasure and discontent among Your Majesty's subjects all over the world; besides which, as Your Majesty wisely remarks in Your letter, as well as in the Instructions, there is the danger of the failure of succession, (fn. 49) and many other difficulties that might arise therefrom, as has been practically observed in many Royal and ducal families which, though blessed at one time with a plentiful succession, yet on the death of the chief possessed no male heir to fill the vacant throne, as happened in the time of the Queen, my Lady (fn. 50) [grandmother].
	As to Milan, the cardinal of Toledo said, it has always been considered as a comparatively modern acquisition, and by no means one of firm and permanent possession, but on the contrary as unsteady and fickle, having frequently passed from the hands of one family into those of another, or been occupied and retained by whomsoever happened to be the strongest amongst the competitors, as the experience of the past has shown—a field always open for contention and strife, and a chief cause of all the past wars and shedding of blood by which Christendom at large, and especially these Spanish kingdoms, has been afflicted of late years.
	Such has Milan been in the past, and is likely to be in future, for king Francis will never relinquish his pretended claims on that Duchy, nor will he relent in his ambitious desire of obtaining possession of it somehow. Even if his own son, the duke of Orleans, were to acquire Flanders by his marriage with my sister (Doña Maria), and the king of France were to dissemble for some time, the Dauphin (Henri) and his successors on the throne, whoever they may be, would not lose the right which according to them France has to the possession of Milan, alleging, among other reasons of their own, that king Francis could not waive rights belonging to them, nor could they either contradict or oppose his will. That Milan is a feudatory State that Your Imperial Majesty cannot hold for Yourself, or that, considering its quality and origin, it is even doubtful whether it can be transferred to a Royal son or daughter, whilst retaining its feudatory character, and that retaining it for Yourself, or passing it over to me as Your son and heir, would arouse the suspicions and fears of the Italian Powers, (fn. 51) and give them, jealous and afraid as they are of Your Majesty's greatness, cause and occasion to rise against You and make alliance with Your enemies, as they have already done more than once. This, in the opinion of the above-named councillors, would become a certainty the very moment that, as hinted in the letter to me as well as in the Instructions, the incorporation of Parma and Piacenza and other territories in Italy once belonging to the dukes of Milan, takes place. Besides which it must be borne in mind that both the Catholic king of Spain (Fernando of Aragon) and Your Majesty yourself have in past times resisted the attacks of the king of France, defeated his armies, and vanquished him in Italy, which might with greater ease be done again by Your Majesty under the name and title of Protector and Defender of the Italian potentates and their liberties, than as principal and absolute owner of Milan itself. (fn. 52) And finally, that since Your Majesty, in order to restore peace to Christendom at large, had determined and resolved to alienate from Your own crown one of the two states, they (the councillors) were of opinion that it would be the lesser evil to get rid of the duchy of Milan, the cause of so many wars, and that by doing this the pretensions of the French would be put an end to, and the occasion of renewing them disappear, thus keeping for ever Your ancient patrimonial estate, so important for Your honour, authority, and service, whereas if Your Majesty disposes of Flanders, the French might, with the additional strength which that cession would afford them, easily conquer Milan afterwards, and perhaps, too, invade other kingdoms and dominions of Your Majesty.
	In addition to the above reason for the cession of Milan in preference to that of Flanders, it was urged that if after this last peace with France fresh differences should arise, and war break out again between the two countries, this Council of State might naturally be blamed for having advised Your Majesty to give up Your own patrimonial inheritance and thereby increase the power of our adversary, making him Your superior, as it were, and affording him the means of contending with You successfully, whereas the same accusation could not be brought forward against them if Milan were bestowed on the son of France as a fief; for after all this Duchy is not a State inherited from Your ancestors, and You can grant it to any prince or nobleman You choose to appoint; and if You now bestow it on the Duke of Orleans as one of the favours (beneficios) conferred on France on account of the late peace, if the political relations between Your Majesty and king Francis become embroiled, and war breaks out again, nobody can blame Your voluntary action in that respect, such as it is, but will attribute it entirely to Your Imperial magnanimity and Your ardent zeal for Religion and the weal of Christendom at large. (fn. 53)
	These councillors further observed that, should Flanders be alienated, whatever conditions, restrictions, and ties were imposed upon the holders of the fief, the sovereignty of that State will never go back to Your Majesty, for once lost, no neighbour (vezino) would help you to its recovery; whereas, if Milan were given up, and king Francis or his son prove unfaithful, and proceed to assail other adjoining territories, he would have to encounter, besides Your Majesty's forces, those of Venice, which hates the French and their domination, those of the Pope, Florence, Genoa, and other minor powers in Italy, all of whom, considering the cause their own, would ally themselves with Your Majesty or with Your successors, and help to the recovery of the Duchy, or assist against any French invasion, and would, moreover, beg and implore Your Majesty, as people to whom French yoke is most intolerable, to help and assist them on the occasion.
	They also urged that it may after all happen that, guided by Divine inspiration, king Francis will keep the peace, and fulfil all and every one of its conditions; but even if he did so, it would be far better to give up Milan than part with Flanders, because the duke of Orleans, if invested with that Duchy, will find it necessary for his own security and comfort to be obedient and devoted to Your Majesty, in which case a good deal of annual expenditure and, cost in Italy will be saved. Should, however, the king of France disregard the conditions of the last treaty—which is much to be apprehended, judging by past experience, and the difficulties which occur to a right understanding and compliance on his part with the conditions he has undertaken; then, in that case, it is quite evident that it is far preferable to get rid of the duchy of Milan than to give up such fine possessions as the States of Flanders, especially now that His Majesty, the Emperor, has added to them by conquest, and at no small personal risk, the duchy of Gueldres, and that the French are making difficulties about restoring Hesdin, which is a sure sign that king Francis does not intend to observe all the conditions of the treaty, nor to deliver the castles he still holds in Piedmont, as agreed, but wants to keep open for himself the road to Italy.
	These councillors also remind Your Majesty that when king Francis, and afterwards his two sons, were prisoners in Madrid, no attempt whatever was made to take from him one single turret of what he then possessed, not even the duchy of Burgundy, which belonged to Your Majesty's ancestors; and, therefore, that to give now to France the States of Flanders would be paramount to darkening the splendour and glory of Your Majesty's past victories throughout the whole of Christendom. (fn. 54)
	As to the argument put forward by those who dissent, that should Milan be given to the French, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would be in danger, these councillors reply that those kingdoms could more easily be defended and kept by Milan becoming French than by Your Majesty keeping possession of it, because, should Your Majesty retain it and not give it to the French, there will be need of two armies, provisions, ammunition, and so forth, one for Milan itself, and another for Naples and Sicily, which could not be provided without difficulty and at considerable expense; whereas, if Your Majesty do not keep it but give it to the French, there will only be wanted one army, and the defence would be easier and much sooner effected by having all Your Majesty's forces concentrated on one point, than divided; besides which, the Italian Powers, always jealous and afraid of French ambition, instead of encouraging them to prosecute their warlike plans against Your Majesty, would rather unite themselves with Your Majesty against them, especially the Republic of Genoa, (fn. 55) which, if the report be true, will be attacked the very moment that the French become masters of Milan, though the Genoese have lately fortified it, and will offer considerable resistance, determined, as they are, to remain free, under their republican institutions and government, though strongly attached to Your Majesty, whose protection they need, and the profit they gain through their maritime enterprises.
	As to the marriage of the Infanta, my sister, some councillors were of opinion that, considering the report We have here of the Duke's inclinations, tastes and character, even if the States of Flanders and Milan already belonged to him, it would be very questionable whether the Infanta should be married to him; and much more so if the States are to be given with her.
	With regard to the suggested marriage of the son of the King of the Romans (i.e., Maximilian of Austria with the Infanta Maria): seeing that Your Majesty is willing to grant Milan as a dowry to the daughter of the King of the Romans (Catharine) if she marries the Duke of Orleans, it would be a great diminution of your dominions if you conferred also the States of Flanders on the Infanta. At the same time the councillors agreed with Your Majesty's remark that, considering the present condition of the affairs of the King of the Romans, if the Infanta received the States as a dowry Your Majesty would be obliged to uphold her and husband in their government. Looking, therefore, at the youth of the Infanta, and that a delay of three or four years would not be prejudicial, they are of opinion that it would be better to wait for a time to see how the affairs of Hungary and the Turk proceed. Your Majesty moreover may, it is to be hoped, have grandsons in Spain who may inherit these States of Flanders. Your Majesty yourself, too, may hope to live many years to enjoy them; and in the opinion of the councillors should at present busy yourself rather in adding to your own power and prestige, than in arranging for the future inheritance of your descendants.
	The Cardinal Archbishop of Seville (fn. 56) was of a contrary opinion. He said that, although the Flanders States, Your Majesty's old patrimonial inheritance, were undoubtedly an important appendage to the Crown of Castile, yet they were by no means profitable, or easily defended in case of invasion by an enemy. On the contrary, they have been, and will continue to be in future, the cause and occasion of a good deal of expenditure, as the experience of the past has shown; for ever since Your Majesty inherited these Spanish kingdoms no money or help of any sort whatever has come from them, whereas Your Majesty has been frequently obliged to go thither, as in your dangerous passage through France (fn. 57) in 1529, in order to quell the rebellion of Ghent; and your recent expedition to Gueldres. You had to go thither at the head of a powerful army.
	Milan, on the contrary, is a very convenient and useful possession for the Spanish Crown, for it not only preserves Naples and Sicily, as well as Genoa, in their devotion to the Emperor, but upholds and increases his authority among the Italian powers. Should the Duchy be disposed of in such a way that the king of France may have a band in it, all the authority and influence which His Majesty has in Genoa would be lost, and consequently the respect which other Italian powers have for him. The doorway open for the defence of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would, in case of king Francis invading them, be for ever shut, and no succour from Spain or Germany could be sent to them.
	The Cardinal went on to say, in explanation of his vote, that if Your Majesty, as we all wish, is to keep and if possible increase Your authority and reputation and influence with the Empire and with Germany, it would be necessary to keep Flanders, and that were You to dispose of them, You might lose part of Your influence and authority over the Germans; for if, possessing Flanders as Your own patrimonial inheritance, You have not always been able to manage the Diets, or gained over the Prince Electors to your cause, what hope is there that Your Majesty will be able to do so without them? He was of opinion, therefore, that the possession of these States was vital for Your Majesty's power in Germany, and in the interests of the King of the Romans; and that Your Majesty would be much weakened by giving them up.
	The Cardinal continued that if king Francis' experience of the past, his constant unsuccessful attempts to harm the Emperor, (fn. 58) and the failure of his deceitful and vain attacks against Perpiñan be taken into his consideration; if he bears in mind that, notwithstanding his having sought and obtained the aid of the Turk, and brought that Infidel's fleet to the shores of the Mediterranean, he, himself, though powerfully assisted, could hardly do (at Nice) the trifling mischief he did, and that after Your Majesty had last year (1543) conquered the duchy of Gueldres, gained much reputation through its conquest, entered France at the head of a powerful army, and obliged the King of that country to take to flight, Your Majesty following him to a place fifteen leagues distant from Paris, where peace was made and signed, it may be concluded that, so tutored by experience, king Francis will observe the conditions of this latter treaty of peace more faithfully than he has former ones, and that seeing the bad result of his former enterprises, he will not think in future of again engaging in wars with his neighbours, and that, having regard to the generosity with which His Majesty has acted towards him, offering to his son, the duke of Orleans, the hand of His daughter, the Infanta, or that of his niece, it is to be hoped that the present peace may be maintained, as well for His Majesty's honour as for the rest of Christendom at large.”
	Above all, if the news that has come and circulates of the Duke's character, mode of life, and habits be correct, and there is no certainty of a change, the Cardinal did not hesitate to say that he would never be a fit husband for the Infanta Doña Maria. (fn. 59) Even if he himself brought to the marriage the States of Flanders, His Imperial Majesty ought to refuse to him the hand of his daughter. But if better news came of his life, there was no other prince [in Europe] more fit for the Infanta, my sister, to choose for a husband. Besides which, were the marriage with the Infanta, with Flanders as a dower, to take place as proposed, that would not amount to alienating it; but giving it to Your own son, keeping the sovereignty as at present, during Your lifetime, which it is to be hoped God will prolong, and after Your death it would be inherited by Your grandchildren, so as to remain always in Your family.
	For the above reasons, and many others, which I omit for brevity's sake, the cardinal of Seville was of opinion that should Your Majesty think, hear, and ascertain that the king of France intends to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty [of Crêpy], and will be your friend in future, it will be less inconvenient and less dangerous to give up the States of Flanders than the duchy of Milan. If, however, there is the least doubt about it, or the slightest suspicion that he will infringe this last and other preceding treaties with Your Majesty, then in that case he (the Cardinal) thinks that it would be less dangerous for Your Majesty to dispose of the duchy of Milan, because should war break out again, it would be better to keep and retain, as aforesaid, for Your Majesty's reputation and influence in the Empire and in Germany, the absolute and sovereign lordship of those old patrimonial States of Yours in Flanders rather than Milan, which is a dominion recently acquired, as it were, and respecting which it maybe doubtful whether the nature of the fief be such that Your Majesty can legally retain it. If war in Italy cannot be avoided, it must be made at the expense and cost of Milan, which after all seems destined to be the battlefield for the whole of Italy.
	The duke of Alba, (fn. 60) the count of Osorno, (fn. 61) the High Commander of Leon, (fn. 62) and the Vice-Chancellor of Aragon, spoke next; their opinion was in substance as follows:—
	There can be no doubt that the States of Flanders are of great value and importance; they are Your Majesty's patrimonial inheritance, and have been profitable and of much use to this monarchy as far as the authority and the trade of Spain with other nations are concerned, though up to the present day, to judge from the past, no great help or assistance can in other matters be expected from them to the dominions of the Spanish Crown. The government and administration of Flanders, in the absence of its natural lord, must always offer difficulties, and be very costly, as the Emperor points out in his instructions. Should the duchy of Milan be disposed and in the hands of the French, the States of Flanders would be in great danger of being lost if the king of France invaded them, for there would be no other way of providing for their defence (the road through the Milanese being closed) than that of the ocean sea—always difficult and almost impracticable, especially if the king of England had made an alliance with the Emperor's enemy; for although it be true that, Flanders once given to France, the power of that country would be greatly increased by it, it must be considered that if the country were given as a dower to the Infanta on her marriage with the Duke of Orleans, it would not pass to the king of France but to Your own children. (fn. 63) Should the duke of Orleans even forget the favour received from Your Majesty by the marriage, he must, nevertheless, hold Your Majesty as his father, and the king of the Romans his protector, against his own brother, the Dauphin [Henri] and his father, and guard himself against them, because in cases of supreme command (en casos de reynar) and of private interest, everyone looks out for his own, and entirely disregards those of his father and brother. It is, therefore, to be supposed that such will happen in this case. Should the contrary happen, and should the Duke follow the inclination and advice of his own father and brother, which would be unreasonable and unlikely, that would not be during the lifetime of the Emperor (whom may God preserve as long as we all wish), and who would be lord and master of Flanders, whilst the Duke would only be the governor and administrator of the States in his name. Should he, however, think of an attempt to rise against His Majesty in order to usurp that part of the Emperor's dominions, give entrance to his own father and brother into the State against the authority and sovereign rights of His Majesty and the faithful subjects, then, in that case, measures can and will be taken to remedy the mischief done, especially if we retain Milan—which is conveniently situated for that purpose, being, as it were, the gate to go to and come from Germany and Flanders—and to provide for the defence of the latter if invaded, and at the same time uphold and maintain the authority of the Empire. Without Milan it seems as if Flanders could not be well governed and administered, besides which all the other kingdoms and dominions belonging to His Majesty would be isolated, and unable to help and assist each other in case of attack by an enemy. His Majesty will then have to consider how, in such case, States thus invaded could be successfully defended against an enemy, and the peril and danger in which his subjects would be placed, if despairing altogether of assistance, and not knowing whence it could come to them.
	The State of Milan is very important and necessary not only for the defence of Naples and Sicily, but also for the security and tranquillity of these Spanish kingdoms, and for keeping the way open for His Majesty the Emperor to go to and come from Germany and Flanders, and enabling him to send either from Spain or from Germany the succours of men, provisions, and other things that may be wanted, in any event, and at any time whatsoever, for the defence of the said kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and resistance against France. All the bloodshed and the money spent in keeping Milan must be considered as well employed, since by means of it and through the wars it has had to sustain, the defence and security of both Naples and Sicily have been achieved, whilst these latter have been the cause of these Spanish kingdoms not having been invaded by the enemy. (fn. 64) Had not His Majesty the Emperor had such means of communication with Germany as Milan can afford, he certainly could not have gone to Gueldres as quickly as he did in 1543, and victoriously carried out his undertaking. What His Majesty did then he can do whenever he pleases, provided the State of Milan remains on his side, whereas should the Emperor dispose of it in favour of the duke of Orleans, though the latter chose to be a dutiful and obedient son of His Majesty, or of the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), neither he (the Duke) nor any other prince in whose hands the Duchy may be could possibly retain the same, except the Emperor and his successors. Nor could anyone prevent the king of France from descent into Italy. Without Milan it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to stop him in his career, and provide for the defence of Naples and Sicily, which would then be lost without remedy, the more so if king Francis, or his successor on the throne of France, happens then, as at other times, to keep up intelligences with the Turk. Should the State of Milan remain in the Emperor's hands, as it is at present, and should Parma and Piacenza, as the Emperor himself remarks in his Instructions, be joined to it, and some towns which might easily be obtained from the Piedmontese, giving to the duke of Savoy other towns by way of exchange and compensation, there can be no doubt that king Francis would gradually lose that for him irresistible desire, besides his own pretensions to Milan, of mixing himself up with the affairs of Italy. Indeed, it is quite evident that all the king of France's obligatory renunciations of the duchy of Milan, as well as of the kingdom of Naples, contained in previous treaties, are dead letters for king Francis, and that he will never relinquish the idea of getting somehow full possession of it, as has been remarked even by those councillors who are of the contrary opinion, and vote for the retention of Flanders and alienation of Milan. Should, therefore, the Duchy remain as it is at present, well attended to and provided for, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily will be secured, and Genoa and the rest of the Italian powers will unite in favour of the Emperor if attacked by the French in those parts. That would be the only sure remedy against king Francis' ambitious designs thus shutting against him the passage into Italy, and the means of going thither, promoting wars and attacking his neighbours instead of keeping within his own frontiers.
	For the above and other like reasons, the councillors who voted with the Duke of Alba were of opinion that, although the cession of Flanders had its drawbacks and disadvantages, yet it seemed to them on many accounts far preferable to that of the duchy of Milan, not only for the preservation of the present peace with France, but also for the security in future of Your Majesty's dominions in general, as well as for the authority of Your Imperial dignity, and Your own reputation in Italy, the more so that the fears once entertained of the duke of Orleans inheriting the crown of these Spanish kingdoms have become fainter since the Princess [my wife] (fn. 65) has been declared to be pregnant, and his chance of succeeding to the crown of France has also diminished by the fact of the Dauphin of France having sons. (fn. 66)
	Although the States of Flanders are very important, it would be better (said the above councillors) to give them to my sister, the Infanta, who is already marriageable, and at present, as Your Majesty remarks, there is not a more suitable husband for her than the said duke of Orleans, and the councillors have been of opinion that, in the event of the peace being broken, there would be less danger if Flanders instead of Milan were given to her as a dower, for if ever king Francis, or his son the Dauphin, does put his foot in Italy, or by any means obtain a free passage to that country, with the signs he has given of his lust for power, and his vehement desire (desordenado apetito) of mixing himself up with Italian affairs, it is doubtful whether war would not break out again under some pretence or other, if not in king Francis' lifetime, after the succession of his son, the Dauphin, whose ardent desire to penetrate into Italy is well known, since he has publicly declared his pretensions to Florence; and that if peace is so desirable a boon for the whole of Christendom, no sacrifice, however costly, on the part of Your Majesty, would be considered too great to obtain that object, and ensure for the future the tranquillity and quietness of Italy, and the safety of Your Majesty's dominions in those parts. Indeed, should Your Majesty, as suggested, be able to effect the investiture of Milan, and endow my sister [Maria] with a good marriage portion in the States of Flanders, having her married to the duke of Orleans, as stipulated at Crêpy, that would be, in the opinion of the above councillors, the best method for ensuring peace, whereas the opposite plan might lead to wars more fierce and destructive than the past. (fn. 67)
	With regard to the marriage of the Infanta Doña Maria to the prince of Hungary, son of the king of the Romans, the Duke [of Alba] and those of his opinion agreed entirely with the cardinal of Toledo and his party.
	As to the king of the Romans, all the councillors were unanimously of opinion that whatever may be Your Majesty's resolution respecting the duke of Orleans' marriage, he (Ferdinand) cannot fail to be satisfied and pleased, especially if his son, the Prince, (fn. 68) were to be married to the daughter of the king of France, by means of which marriage king Ferdinand, himself, might be efficiently assisted and favoured in his negociations [with the Turk]. If that marriage can take place, Your Majesty will doubtless procure it.
	Whilst adhering to the above opinion in all its details, and agreeing with the duke of Alba as to the cession of Flanders in preference to the State of Milan, the High Commander of Leon (Francisco de los Cobos) added that when he (the High Commander) voted for the alienation of the States of Flanders, it was under the conditional understanding and supposition that Your Majesty, during Your lifetime, will retain the sovereignty of them, by which amendment the said High Commander meant that in his own private opinion the cession of Flanders should be to a certain extent limited, and not be made unless there is perfect security and certainty that Your Majesty will remain and be absolute lord and master of the said States, and that if there should be no positive certainty and security of this, he, the High Commander, would consider the cession of Milan preferable to that of Flanders, the latter being a State of such importance and quality, so large and populous.
	Such has been, after a most careful and prolonged discussion, the councillors' opinion and advice on the points submitted by Your Majesty. The councillors have examined and weighed the matter with the zeal and affection they entertain for Your Majesty's service, and the utmost desire of hitting upon the best, not to say the less injurious, solution of this affair for Your Majesty's honour, authority, and service, as well as the good of Your kingdoms and subjects. May Your Majesty accept the result of their deliberations as a proof of their goodwill, and with Your wisdom and discretion choose that of the two opinions, which may seem to You the best.
	As to the inclination my sister, the Infanta Doña Maria, may have to her marriage with the Duke, Your Majesty will learn by the letter in my own hand. (fn. 69)
	Respecting ecclesiastical affairs, such as Your pressing a request, backed with a requisition from king Francis, that the Pope should at once assemble the General Council of the Church, the Council of State is of opinion that it is a request well worthy of Your Majesty's honour and reputation, for the speedy meeting of the Council is, in the opinion of all of us, very much wanted for the settlement of affairs in matters of Faith and Religion. May God be pleased to permit that other princes, on whom the very same duty is incumbent, correspond and help to the same direction, in order that so desired an object may be obtained.
	As to the orders received from Your Majesty for me to look out for and select the prelates of these realms of Castille, as well as those of Aragon and Valencia, who are to go to Trent, the matter has been discussed in the Council of State, and it has been finally resolved, as Your Majesty thought, that three or four prelates will be sufficient from these realms [Leon, Castile, and Andalusia], and from Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia two more, making in all five or six; and that as there seems to be plenty of time for it, a list should be forwarded to Your Majesty of those willing to go. This has been done, and herewith enclosed is a memorandum of the said prelates, who unite most of the qualities required for the task—good health and goodwill. Your Majesty will be pleased to designate those who are to go [to Trent], that they may prepare for the departure when necessary.
	Your Majesty should exert Your influence with the Pope not to insist, as he did last time, upon the attendance, in addition to the bishops You send, of the two Cardinals and other dignitaries entitled to be present, but who do not wish to go. With regard to this paragraph, however, as to the compulsory attendance of other dignitaries, beyond those nominated by Your Majesty, count de Cifuentes is of opinion that it will be prejudicial that any such request should be made to his Holiness, inasmuch as the greater number of votes at the disposal of Your Majesty the better will be the resolutions adopted in the service of God and the welfare of Your realms. Moreover, the Count was of opinion that it would not look well for Your Majesty to appear to be raising obstacles to their attendance. The other councillors did not agree with the Count, but I have thought well to let Your Majesty know his opinion.
	Respecting the expenses of the said prelates, which, it is suggested in Your Majesty's letter, might be provided by those who are not to go, the opinion here is that this is quite impracticable, and that no mention should be made of it. This Council of State submits that those Spanish prelates whose ecclesiastical dignity imposes upon them the obligation of going [to Trent] for the general meeting of the Church are already sufficiently provided for by Your Majesty's goodness with money enough to defray their own expenses, and therefore need not have a supplementary allowance made to them. Your Majesty, however, will bear them in mind, and take care that if they need Your Majesty's merciful favour in other matters, it shall be bestowed. Each of the prelates should take in his company one or more lawyers (letrados), the affair being of such importance, to whom there will be no necessity to grant any subvention whatever.
	But besides the lawyers (letrados) who may accompany the prelates [to Trent], it would be advisable that Your Majesty send thither three or four scholars highly graduated in Theology and in Canonical as well as Civil Law, who may well understand, study the points at issue, and advise Your Majesty's representatives at the Council. These doctors may be selected from the enclosed list, and Your Majesty will have to provide for their expenses.
	Secretary Idiaquez read to me a copy of the article (fn. 70) concerted between Your Majesty's deputies and those of the king of France, respecting the affairs of the Indies (sobre lo de las Indias). It was then officially read in this Council of State, and there was some discussion about it, the opinion of these councillors being that the article in question should be sent to the Council of the Indies, and that the councillors should discuss it, and state their opinion in writing. This was done, and the President's (fn. 71) report shall be enclosed, and sent so that Your Majesty may have it examined there. After this, at a subsequent meeting of this Council of State, the article was again discussed, and it was resolved that the matter—being, generally speaking, so important for these Spanish kingdoms—ought to be also discussed in the Royal Council [of Castille]. This was done accordingly, and I ordered the members of this Council of State to meet and deliberate upon the subject, and summoned the President of the Council, and Dr. Guevara. They all came, and the President stated that the article had been fully discussed, and that the opinion of the Royal Council was that on no account should the clause referred to be adopted, in consequence of the serious evils which might result from trade being allowed, as set forth in the clause. The Council think that it would be extremely prejudicial to the welfare of the Indies, and Your Majesty's interests, and might lead to war, since they (the French) would not conduct the trade properly, no matter what regulations were made on the subject. The Council of State were also of this opinion, and thought that it would be better that matters should remain as they are. The cardinal of Seville (fn. 72) alone dissented from this, his opinion being that the clause should be accepted with some modifications, and that trade should be permitted. The reply from Portugal on the subject has not yet arrived. I learn that it is being brought by a gentleman sent by the King specially. Valladolid. 14 December 1544.
	Spanish. Original draft. 17 pp.