Spain: July 1542,16-31 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2, 1542-1543. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1895.

Citation:

'Spain: July 1542,16-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2, 1542-1543, ed. Pascual de Gayangos( London, 1895), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol6/no2/pp63-76 [accessed 27 November 2024].

July 1542,16-31



16 July.	29. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233.	"Venerable, tres chier et bien (fn. n1) aime,"—Your letter of the 10th inst. (fn. n2) containing your advice and recommendations on the subject of the revocation of the Navigation edict have come to hand. We thank you for them. We have already issued orders to all the ports and maritime places of these Low Countries to allow English subjects to lade freely and export all sorts of goods and merchandise not forbidden by the laws of that kingdom, just as they did previously to, and before, the promulgation of the edict of the year XL.
	We now forward to you the enclosed for the Emperor, Our lord and brother, which is to be forwarded to him as quickly as possible. Should you find that George, (fn. n3) the courier, has not yet embarked for Spain, you will send it on to him before he sets sail; if, on the contrary, he has already departed, you will take care that he receives it by express messenger regardless of expense You will let Us know what the expense is that you may be immediately reimbursed, and let this be done without fail, for the matter is urgent.—Brussels, 16 July 1542.
	French. Original draft. p. 1.
19 July.	30. Eustace Chapuys to the Queen of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233, f. 45–58.	"Madame,"—As I wrote by my despatch of the 1st, I called on the King, who, among other things, declared to me in a long speech how important it was for Your Majesty to provide for the defence of the two islands, of which I wrote on the 3rd inst., (fn. n4) openly and frankly owning to me that at the time that he fancied that Your Majesty intended making war on him, he himself had projected, in case of Your Majesty beginning the attack, to surprise and strengthen himself in those very islands, for the defence and relief of which, should he take possession of them, there was on the coast of his own dominions one port—the best, the largest, and the most admirably situated for the purpose; from which port, called Ul (Hull), the crossing to the said islands could be effected in twenty-four hours. He was sure (the king said) that the duke of Olsten (Holstein) had now his eye fixed on those islands, by means of which, if he got hold of them, he could put all Holland under subjection, as if he had the whole of the country in his hands, and might also have the assistance of the duke of Clèves. That Your Majesty might the better weigh the importance of his advice he would show me a chart, which he then and there exhibited, in which the two islands above alluded to were admirably pourtrayed, saying that I might send the chart on for Your Majesty's inspection, on condition, however, that you ordered it to be returned to him as soon as possible. I, therefore, humbly beg Your Majesty that it may be sent back after inspection. The king further said to me that he would not rest or sleep until he heard that his advice had been followed, and the defence of the islands sufficiently provided for, not so much on account of the damage he (the Duke) might do to His Imperial Majesty's subjects, as because he (the King) would be very much annoyed at having such a neighbour hereafter. Indeed, there was a report, as he had been informed, of the Duke having said [to one of his courtiers] that should he by chance fail in his enterprise against Holland, and other countries belonging to the Emperor, through their having been placed in a state of defence, the king of England, who thought of naught else than eating and drinking, might be made to pay for the costs of the game. (fn. n5) May God be pleased that the Duke commence his game by those countries (par dela), and thereby over-irritate this king, for should he follow up his game to the waters of Ul (Hull)—as it is probable enough that he will, if he is to attempt anything against this kingdom—he (the Duke) will be so well received, and get such a thrashing that, for this time at least, he will relinquish all idea of attacking us. For these reasons, and because this king will not let me be in peace until I have reported to him that the islands have been placed in a state of defence, I humbly beg and entreat Your Majesty to let me know what I am to say when interrogated on the subject.
	The King did the other day repeat to me in abstract the conversation which the French ambassador lately held with him, which conversation agrees substantially with the account given of it in a letter of king Francis to him, of which a copy is enclosed. It differs only on one point—that it was the English ambassador in France who had given occasion for the compliments contained in the letter. I took, of course, no notice of the omission, and did as if I were ignorant of the contents of the letter. The King further said that king Francis had sent a secretary of his (fn. n6) with a letter of credence written entirely in his own hand. The secretary had arrived that very day (the 16th), though two days before this king had heard of his appointment and approaching departure from his ambassador at the court of France. The King, however, has put off the ambassador's audience for two days, which I fancy the French will not like at all, for, as he (the King) says, they intend, in conjunction with the Turkish fleet, to assail Catalonia, (fn. n7) at the same time that a considerable land force of theirs marches on Perpignan.
	The above news the King requested me to communicate to Mr. de Granvelle, without, however, saying that it came from him. He did not attach much importance to the projected enterprise, nor to others which king Francis is said to have in view, for, as he said, the season is too an advanced for either he or the Turk to undertake anything serious this year, provided only the duke of Holstein could be prevented from setting his foot on some island or other where he could winter at ease.
	Respecting the assistance to the king of the Romans against the Turk, I see no appearance at present of its being granted. Pressed by me to give an answer to the application, the king declared to me, dryly enough, that money was not so plentiful as to be spent in an enterprise without foundation and out of season. That if the treaty now being negotiated between Your Imperial Majesty and himself came, as he sincerely wished and hoped, to a good end, there would be plenty of occasions for spending the money he possessed, and even more, and that he considered any expenditure in war against the French to be as meritorious as against the Turk.
	Perceiving that, for the present at least, it was of no use attempting to convince him, I did no longer insist upon his answering the king of the Romans' letter, that I might again have occasion to return to the attack. Besides the many excuses he has offered for refusing assistance against the Turk, of which I have from time to time apprised Your Majesty, perhaps the most singular of them is that he considers the Hungarian war over, inasmuch as four thousand Turkish horse, who had sallied out of Buda, had actually been defeated in a skirmish. As a similar report had also come from France, he attached faith to it, and firmly believed that the war in that quarter would soon be at an end.—London, 19 July 1542.
	Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
	French. Holograph. pp. 2.
20 July.	31. The Same to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233, ff. 148–53.	"Sire,"—Not to delay the transmission of the inclosed packet of letters from the Queen Regent in Flanders just received, which, as I hear, are very important and must needs be forwarded as soon as possible, I will be brief. This King, fearing lest the duke of Holstein (fn. n8) should get a footing on some part of Holland, and especially on the two islands which are at the mouth of the Canal of Amsterdam, (fn. n9) has owned to me, as I have already informed the queen of Hungary, that at the time that he was fearing an attack from Your Imperial Majesty, he himself formed the project of surprising and occupying the said two islands, which (said he) might easily be defended and relieved owing to their vicinity to a certain port—the best and largest in his kingdom—called Ul (Hull); adding that should the duke of Holstein once get hold of those islands, the keys of Holland and Fritzland (Friesland) perhaps also, with the assistance and help of the duke of the Clèves, all that country would be in his hands. That he (the King) very much disliked the prospect of such highly inconvenient seizure and conquest of those islands happening in his days, not only on Your Imperial Majesty's account, but because he (the King) should not like to have such a neighbour as the Duke, who had for some reason quarrelled with him, and been heard to say, not long ago, that if he could not undertake Holland and other countries belonging to Your Imperial Majesty, he would at least attack the king of England—who ate and drank freely without heeding anything else—and make him pay for the cost of the play. (fn. n10) "I shall never rest (added the King) unless I hear that the defence of those islands against a coup de main' has been properly attended to," and then he showed me a chart, and told me to send to the Queen, which I did, begging me to write home as warmly and speedily as I could.
	Two days before my visit to the King the French ambassador had also been with him, and spoken in terms nearly similar to those of king Francis' letter, (fn. n11) of which a copy is inclosed, with the one only difference that no mention was made to me of the paragraph alluding to the English ambassador's conversation with king Francis, nor to his having been the first to commence the game (entamer le jeu) and give occasion for the compliment alluded to in the letter. (fn. n12) I took, of course, good care not to let the king know or suspect that I was in possession of a copy of king Francis' letter to his ambassador (Marillac).
	The King then said that a servant of king Francis had arrived in London with credentials in king Francis' own hand, and had this very morning applied for an audience, which he (the King) had granted him for the 21st inst. He said nothing to me, nor did I ask any questions respecting the gentleman's mission; but as I have been able this very morning to obtain from our friend a copy of the king's instructions to him, I need not observe that the gentleman's name is Claude de L'Aubespine, and that his mission is what Your Imperial Majesty will see by the enclosed copy of king Francis' instructions to him. (fn. n13)
	As to persuading and inducing this king to help and assist against the Turk, there is no probability of his taking any measure towards it, he himself having offered among others the following excuses: That should the negociation, which has commenced between Your Imperial Majesty and him come, as he has no doubt it will, to a good issue, he himself will want all his money to defray the expenses of the war with France, and that any treasure spent that way will be far more profitable for us than in any undertaking against the Turk, adding that the French counted upon the Turkish fleet attacking the Spanish ports of the Mediterranean, whilst they themselves would invade it by way of Gascony and the Roussillon. Indeed he (the King) knew on good authority that king Francis would soon start for Perpignan at the head of a most powerful army. I might, if I chose (he said), transmit this intelligence to Mr. de Granvelle when I wrote next, without, however, mentioning him as the author of the news.—London, 20 July 1542.
	Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
	French. Holograph, partly in cipher.
20 July.	32. The Same to the Queen of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233, f. 55.	"Madame,"—I yesterday wrote to Your Majesty the news of this city, and received this morning the letter of the 16th inst., (fn. n14) together with a packet for Mr. de Granvelle, for the prompt transmission of which I shall do my best, that it may reach the Emperor's Privy Seal as quickly as possible. Yet, if George has sailed, as there is every reason to fear, I really do not know how to send the packet of letters on, inasmuch as Your Majesty does not tell me if I am authorised to look out for an express messenger. Even that could not be easily procured, for he must be a trusty one, besides which, until His Imperial Majesty has provided the zabres (zabras) according to agreement, and appointed a person in Biscay to forward the letters to Court, it will be necessary, if the affair is of sufficient importance, as I do believe it is, to send an express messenger with it, and, as I said above, there is no one here now whom I can trust. Meanwhile, however, I will do my best. I will send one of my men after George, and see whether in the English ports there will be any vessel bound for Spain, to which end I will make use of this Admiral's letters of favor.
	Your Majesty will see by the enclosed copy that the man in whose favor and commendation the Emperor must already have written to Your Majesty is not asleep. (fn. n15) Please Your Majesty to keep him in mind, and likewise send me news of the military preparations made there to meet and oppose the much boasted French aggression, chiefly for the satisfaction of these people and mine, and that I may show confidence in the result.—London, 20 July 1542.
	Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
	French. Holograph. p. 1.
20 July.	33. The Same to Mr. de Granvelle.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233, f. 19.	"Monseigneur,"—Your Lordship will see by my letter to His Imperial Majesty the news of this country, and likewise the good services that the friend (fn. n16) is continually rendering; he certainly deserves well to be remembered to you, especially now that he himself is in great distress.
	It seems to me that there is no occasion to mistrust this king, because his ambassador in France has addressed to the Admiral (Brion-Chabot) the words contained in the latter's missive to Mr. Marillac, of which a copy is inclosed. (fn. n17) There are more reasons than ever, as the Lord Privy Seal (Fitz-William) said to me some time before the departure of the bishop of Westminster, for this king holding at present such language through his ambassador, and for the latter speaking to the Admiral in the terms he has done.
	I must not forget to say that whatever I do to dissuade the King, he still persists in his idea that the efforts the Pope is making to induce this Imperial Majesty to conclude a peace with the king of France, have their origin in the Emperor himself, who has actually applied for his intervention; that the king of France considers the Pope to be partial to the Emperor, so much so, that he is deliberating on suppressing the monasteries in his kingdom, as he himself has done in England.
	The King did also tell me that the Emperor ought to look out for some expedient or other for quieting the duke of Holstein (Frederic) without having recourse to the count Palatine [Philip], who, after all, has as many reasons to be dissatisfied with His Imperial Majesty as the Duke, according to the declaration made by the Palatine himself when he was last in England. (fn. n18) —London, 20 July 1542.
	Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
	French. Holograph, partly ciphered. p. 1.
n. d.	34. The Queen Regent, Governess of the Low Countries. Instructions to Messire Eustace Chapuys and Master Jehan de le Sauch.
B., Neg. d'An. Vol. 3.	First of all they will present the Queen's affectionate recommendations, and say that she is aware from the letters of the ambassadors residing here and there, as well as from other messages mutually sent, that the king of France has recommenced war against the Emperor, and invaded his dominions both here, in the Low Countries, as elsewhere on both sides of the mountains, thus breaking through and violating the treaties of peace of Madrid and Cambray. That, therefore, His Imperial Majesty has been provoked and forced, to his great regret, to take up arms for the defence of his kingdoms, subjects, allies and confederates, notwithstanding his having previously done everything in his power to keep and observe the said treaties of peace, and better than that, having often consented to accept reasonable and honorable terms and conditions, sometimes even yielding part of his own rights in order to secure lasting peace to Christendom, of which there is now greater need than ever, and averting as far as possible the great evils that always follow in the train of dissension and war amongst Christian princes.
	The ambassadors will also say that the Queen has always praised and extolled above all things the zeal and affection which the king of England has show a towards peace, trying to mediate between the Emperor and the king of France and make them agree together, and thus far working for the peace and quiet of Christendom, in doing which the king of England has acted the part of a good prince, the friend and ally of both the Emperor and the king of France. He, the king of England, will do a meritorious work by persevering in such just and holy intentions, and endeavoring by all honorable means to put a stop to the hostilities that have already broken out. Had the Queen not consented one year ago to the withdrawal of the force which the Emperor had in the Low Countries, nothing of the sort would have happened; but it was not in her power to do otherwise. Yet, to respond to the king of England's good intentions, she has always tried, as far as she could, to avoid troubles and annoyance (fascheries) and procure peace, which has always been, and is, her constant aim.
	The ambassadors will further remind the king of England of the old alliances and amicable relations between the two countries, so often confirmed, renewed, and improved by his (the King's) predecessors, as well as by the Emperor himself; which friendship and alliances the inhabitants of both countries have peacefully enjoyed for a long period of time. The King may be well sure that he will never see the contrary of that. In short, should he recall to his memory the many defensive alliances he and his predecessors on the throne have made with the Emperor, he will find that on no occasion has he had to complain of the Low Countries. Nor can the Queen imagine that the king of England will ever wilfully consent to the Low Countries being oppressed, molested, and destroyed, considering that the evils and inconveniences caused by war can in nowise be profitable to his own kingdom, but may on the contrary fall on it, and expose his English subjects to the very same dangers and ruin threatened by the French, who are England's inveterate adversaries and mortal enemies. Indeed, one may easily guess what king Francis' intentions may be when he has contracted a marriage alliance with Scotland for the sole purpose of securing the services of 20,000 of king James' men to help him in his own warlike undertakings.
	The Queen calls the ambassadors' attention to the fact that king Francis is actually approaching the frontiers of Flanders and the Low Countries at the head of a large division of his men-at-arms (gendarmerie), with heavy artillery and so forth, with no other intention than that of invading these countries, that being the reason why it behoves her to have recourse to the help and protection of her and the Emperor's good friends, neighbours, and allies, and above all of the king of England, rightly considered as one of the most ancient and truest friends of these Low Countries. The Queen, therefore, begs and requests the King on this occasion to help and defend her against the violence of the French—just as she herself would be prepared to do were England attacked or invaded by the enemy—since, as said above, the king of France is now advancing at the head of overwhelming forces.
	Should the king of England make any difficulty in assisting with men for the defence of this country, you and your colleague (Le Sauch) are to propose, as if it came from yourselves, that he be pleased to assist Us with money (deniers), that is to say, with 200,000, or at least with 100,000 gold crs., and should he refuse that, you might ask him for the said sums as a loan on suitable securities, such as her own and the Emperor's word. Accordingly as you may find the King disposed to one or other of these two measures, you will take the necessary engagements in the Queen's name, not forgetting to inform her as soon as possible of the result of your negociation.
	Should there be an opportunity, the ambassadors may tell the King's privy councillors or ministers that it is a notorious fact that some years ago he himself offered to assist the French, then his allies, with money, and that he cannot now do less for the Emperor, according to the letter of the treaties of defensive and offensive alliance between the two crowns.
	The ambassadors ought also to ask the king of England to send one of his to king Francis, intimating that he is the friend and ally of the Low Countries, and bound by treaty to defend them, and, therefore, that he cannot allow them to be invaded. That might perhaps prevent the king's advance, for once aware that England is in our favor and ready to help, it is not likely that the French will persist in their attack. The ambassadors might also try, as if it originated with themselves, to persuade the king of England to ask for the prorogation of the truce with France under the plea that during that time peace—so much wanted in Christendom—might be effected; for certainly it would be a great shame for the Christian princes if under present circumstances, putting aside their own petty differences and quarrels, they did not together march against the Turk. (fn. n19)
	French. Contemporary copy. pp. 2.
25 July.	35. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
B. Arch. de Bourgogne.	"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—We have delayed answering your letters of the 12th, 16th, 19th and 20th of this month, owing to the many cares and calls on Our attention by which We are surrounded in consequence of the king of France—without any regard to his promise under oath to keep the truce concluded between Our brother, the Emperor, and him; and without previous challenge or defiance, as customary in such cases — having invaded the country under Our government on two different sides, namely, on the side of Luxemburg on the 13th inst., and on that of Clèves on the 15th. We fear, moreover, that king Francis is about to make a third attack on the frontier of Arthois and Lower Flanders, notwithstanding that not later than the 12th, on the eve of invading Luxemburg, he himself positively declared to Mr. de Marvol, the Imperial ambassador in France, that he would attempt nothing against this country unless We gave him cause for it. Now, as We have done nothing on Our part to provoke such an uncalled-for aggression on the territories under Our government, as We have always tried not to give him offence lest Christendom should be troubled and in danger, We find his act in this respect a most unjustifiable one, the more so that by the sudden invasion of these provinces, without previous challenge, as is customary in such cases, he (king Francis) has undoubtedly gained an advantage over Us, since, as aforesaid, he has despatched the duke of Orleans, his son, with an army towards the Luxemburg, where he has taken Dampvilliers, a small town (villette) incapable of defence, and may perhaps take also several others in the interior, which, not being fortified, may easily fall into his hands. Indeed, very few, if any, of the towns in the Luxemburg are susceptible of defence. That is why We have given orders that only a few, such as Thionville and Yvoix, which have regular fortifications, should be further strengthened and furnished with ordnance, ammunition, and every other necessary of war, so as to enable their garrisons to sustain a siege to the last extremity. Should We keep those two towns from the French, they will not profit much by their occupation of the Luxemburg.
	On the side of Clèves, Mr. de Longueval, together with Martin van Rossen, who has taken the title of "Marshal of Ghelders," have penetrated into the district of Vos le Due, (fn. n20) burnt some villages and robbed the poor peasants (pauvres subjects), without however being able to surprise any place of importance. True is it that they have taken Hochstrate, the country seat of the La Laing family, which they thought would be a place of some importance; but they were deceived, for it turned out to be a pleasure house rather than a fortress. They boast of coming soon to Anvers (Antwerp), and laying siege to it; but We have reasons to believe that they will be wiser, and not come this way; if they do, they will find that it is no easy matter to lay siege to a town of that size having Our forces in their rear, which, though now divided, may be concentrated and brought to bear against the besiegers. For the present, however, having been taken unawares, We must submit, and endure the damage which the enemy may do in the flat country (le plat pais), but We hope to God that, once assembled and concentrated, Our army will be able to pay the enemies their due.
	I have purposely entered into these details that you may, if the opportunity offers, inform that king of this sudden and uncalled-for invasion of the French, as well of whatever else may contribute to increase and foster the king's avowed tendency towards a closer friendship and alliance with the Emperor. And if you can, with your usual discretion, ascertain whether the King would feel inclined under present circumstances to succour and help these Low Countries, assailed as they have been on so many sides, you will do Us great service. But that must be done indirectly, as if it came from yourself, unless you see a fair chance of obtaining that king's help, however small it may be, by representing to him that should the French now get possession of Flanders and the Low Countries, they are sure to attempt in some way or other to dictate to the English, whom they would no longer care for or dread. That intending, as We do, to offer all possible resistance, and do Our best in this matter, We have no doubt that with his help and assistance, should he grant it, We shall be able to gain Our object, which is, as you may imagine, to preserve these countries from the enemy's ambitious designs. These considerations, and others which your knowledge and experience of political affairs may suggest, you will take care to lay before the King as if they came from yourself, and hint that should he help Us on the side of Arthois and Flanders, whilst We oppose the enemy on this frontier, Our position will be much improved.
	Should you have audience from the King, you might tell him that We have thankfully received the advice and warning he once sent Us respecting the Islands—which the duke of Holstein might perhaps attack and take possession of—on the coast of Holland. (fn. n21) That precautionary warning on the part of the King We consider to be a further proof of his true and sincere affection for the Emperor and his subjects in these parts, as well as for Us. You will, therefore, after thanking him, say in Our name that We intend to provide in such a way for the efficient defence of those islands that neither he nor Our own sea coast may suffer from the Duke's aggression should he attempt to establish himself there. That, in order to guard against such an event, We are now arming a number of ships to prevent the Danes from landing in the Islands, or even approaching them with hostile intentions. You may also tell him that a few days ago Our people captured close to the Verre, in Zeeland, a large ship of the duke of Holstein, armed for war, and cruising with the intention of landing men to find out what was being done there and at Flushing (fn. n22) as to naval preparations, and that her captain, being interrogated as to whence he came, and what the ship's cargo consisted of, confessed to having been sent by the duke of Holstein expressly to visit the maritime coast of Holland, for the purpose of ascertaining what military preparations were being made for its defence, and that, according to orders, he had already landed two men on the coast of Holland, and was about to land two more in Zeeland when his ship was captured. The captain further confessed that his orders were, after doing his business in the Low Countries, to sail for England and do the same sort of work there, trying to inquire and ascertain what maritime armaments were being made ready. Then he was to cross over to France, and present to the king of that country certain letters from his master, which letters the captain threw into the sea the moment he saw he would be taken prisoner. He never declared what were the contents of the letters, pretending he knew nothing about them, and that his charge was merely to have them delivered to the king of France. It may, however, be presumed that his orders were to go to France and report on what he had seen and observed on the coasts of Holland and England, so as to settle what his master, the Duke, would have to do with the ships which he is said to have armed and fitted out for sea. He was then to revisit England, and, should he meet with contrary winds, come back to this sea and try his fortune, and, corsair-like, capture and rob as many English merchant ships as he possibly could. We are determined to have the man interrogated afresh, and, if necessary, put to the torture, in order to ascertain whether his mission was really what he tells Us, and should the judges extort from him anything that may personally concern the King or his kingdom, shall not fail to write that you may bring it to his notice.
	As to the revocation of the edict published here on the navigation to and from England, even before the receipt of your letter of the 12th inst., which was delivered by the court-master of the English merchants residing in this country, it had already been carried into effect to the satisfaction of that official, as he himself has written to Us. We have sent him word that should he meet with any impediment or obstacle he is to let Us know, and We will take care that everything is settled to his complete satisfaction. (fn. n23)
	If king Francis' secretary (fn. n24) spoke to that king in the terms specified in your letter to the Emperor, of which you sent Us a duplicate, We find that he was in full accordance with what the king himself said on the 12th inst. to the Emperor's ambassador two days before he commenced war on this side, namely, "that he would continue to be friendly as long as We did not give him cause and occasion to be otherwise," and if so, that king will be able to judge of the sincerity and good faith of His Most Christian Majesty.
	Should the Emperor address Us any letters by way of England, (fn. n25) pray have them forwarded to Us as soon as possible, as you did once with those which We wrote to him whilst in Spain. We fully acknowledge the services which you are doing Us in this particular, as well as the care you take in keeping Us daily informed of events in that country. Pray continue to do this.—De M[alines], the 25th of July 1542.
	Indorsed: "The Queen of Hungary to the Ambassador in England."
	French. Original draft. pp. 3.
25 July.	36. Luis Sarmiento de Mendoza to the High Commander of Leon.
S. E. L. 173, f. 130. B. M. Add. 28,593, f. 131.	What Your Lordship tells me of a report being current at Valladolid of the Infanta, (fn. n26) daughter of this king and queen [of Portugal], growing so fat that it may hereafter prove to be an impediment to her having children, there is not a word of truth in it.... (fn. n27) The Infanta is taller than her mother; she is well made, more stout than slim, it is true, but at the Palace, where many good-looking ladies may be seen, no one looks better than her. On the other hand all agree that her condition and temper are angelical, that she is very liberal, gracious, and very fond of dress. She dances very well, and as to music she knows more of it than a band master (maestro de capilla). She also knows Latin, and, above all, is a very good Christian. From certain ladies of the Royal household, who still remain here, of the suite of Doña Maria de Velasco, (fn. n28) and are now in her service and in that of her mother, the Queen, I have tried to procure reliable information respecting her person and habits; they all tell me that she is uncommonly robust and healthy, &c. (fn. n29)
	I will make Don Juan (fn. n30) look at her closely through his spectacles, and I should wish that people would come from these parts to inspect her, and report to His Imperial Majesty and to Your Lordship also. This is what I know of the Infanta up to the present time, and I do not hesitate to state it under my signature and seal. Her father and mother, I must add, doat upon her.—Lisbon, 25 July 1542.
	Signed: "Luis Sarmiento."
	Addressed: "To Don Francisco de los Covos, High Commander of Leon, in the Order of Santiago."
	Indorsed: "Paragraph of a letter from the Emperor's ambassador in Portugal to High Commander Cobos."
	Spanish. Original, in cipher.