Simancas: April 1584 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1896.

Citation:

'Simancas: April 1584', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586, ed. Martin A S Hume( London, 1896), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol3/pp520-525 [accessed 27 November 2024].

April 1584



1 April. Paris Archives, K. 1448.	374. The King to Bernardino De Mendoza. [Extract.] The heirs of Antonio de Guaras, who has died, have made a claim for money expended by him when he was in England. The Accountant-General has demanded vouchers for the expenditure, but they aver that they have none, as Guaras burnt all his papers in England by orders of Don Juan. The King desires to have Mendoza's opinion on the matter before deciding whether the money shall be paid to the claimants or not. (fn. 1) —Madrid, 1st April 1584.
12 April. Paris Archives, K. 1563. 9.	375. Document headed "Information sent from England by the correspondent left there by Don Bernardino De Mendoza." The ships that were being equipped for the Indies were stopped for want of money, and only Raleigh and Walsingham's son are going, with four small, but well fitted ships, the largest being of 280 tons burden. Hawkins' brother is also very secretly preparing to leave shortly. Scotland is in revolt, and unless they obtain aid from the French it will go badly with them, as the rebels are the stronger party and they will certainly not lack help. The queen (of England) has asked the lady friend of the correspondent about Don Bernardino, and had complained bitterly of him, as she said he had given great help to her rebellious subjects. But, she said, he had better recollect that monarchs had long arms. William Waad had arrived there, much gratified at the kindness shown to him in Spain.
18 April. Paris Archives, K. 1563. 10.	376. Juan Bautista De Tassis to the King. [Extract.] The correspondent left in England by Don Bernardino reports that the ships for the Indies are being fitted out with all haste. I have heard nothing of the sort, except that some private persons are fitting out ships for Newfoundland, and perhaps he (the correspondent) does not like to say this. Don Bernardino will be able to judge best what to think of it. (fn. 2) He also reports that the Queen is making ready some ships for fear that the French may send help to Scotland. At least that is what I gather from his words which are so badly expressed as to be almost unintelligible.
18 April. Paris Archives. K. 1563. 11.	377. Juan Bautista De Tassis to the King. I have handed over to Don Bernardino de Mendoza the whole matter of the English design, and would not think of again referring to it, but occasion has offered for me to speak to people here on the matter, and I find very good reasons expressed for making a beginning in England itself, if possible, rather than in Scotland. Some mention has already been made of these reasons, but I cannot refrain from dwelling further upon them here. There is no doubt that it would be of the greatest commodity and security for the debarcation and formation of the troops, to have a port in Scotland where the landing might be effected without trouble, and amongst friends, and the force marched tranquilly towards the enemies' country. If this course could be adopted, there is no doubt it would be the best, but considering that the object in view is to subdue England, and liberate the queen of Scotland, both on her own account and that she may be an instrument for the permanent submission of England, the following points must be borne in mind. Towards the first object, our principal help must come from a Catholic rising in our favour, of which the English who have the arrangement of the matter are very sanguine, and even believe that whole counties and towns will declare for us. This will run the risk of failing if the army do not immediately join them, and the earl of Westmoreland and others be not able to return to their territories and raise their partizans to revolt. If the queen of England is given time, she may take such precautions as may prevent anyone from stirring. The second object will be frustrated by the long distance to be traversed from the port of debarcation in Scotland, and the place where the queen of Scots is confined, so that people could not at once go and release her, as the queen of England would have plenty of time to put her into a place of security. The time, moreover, which would be occupied in going from the landing-place in Scotland to England, may perhaps be longer than we imagine, seeing the many things needed for the march of an army, things which probably may not be so easily obtainable in Scotland as we think. This may enable the queen of England to send to the frontier a force to resist us, especially now that she is on her guard and making ready. She would even, in such case, have time to summon foreigners to her aid, which might result in a long civil war, bringing in its train many difficulties. The best way to end the affair promptly is to suddenly set her (the Queen's) house aflame, both with a foreign force and a rising of her own subjects, and to put the whole country at once in a blaze and turmoil. If things are done in this way, it is not unreasonable to believe that, even if the difficulty and risk be somewhat greater, it would be much better to land in England itself, rather than elsewhere, especially if the landing be effected at one of the two places near Scotland already mentioned, either on the east or the west side, where the army could obtain the same advantages from Scotland as if it had marched through the country, and any Scotsmen who pleased might easily join it. In addition to the above reasons, any army which might approach England from Scotland might be generally misunderstood amongst English people to be a Scots army, and as there exists a natural hatred between the two nations, this might cause, even amongst our friends, a certain coldness, and lead the Catholics themselves to defend their country, under the impression that the Scots with foreign aid were coming to conquer it. This moreover would be a great instrument in the hands of the queen of England to encourage all her people to resist, even if she did so at the expense of allowing to the Catholics liberty for the exercise of their religion as a reward, and this point is of considerable importance. I have talked on this matter with some of those who have it in hand, who depend entirely upon Muzio (i.e. the duke of Guise), and have asked them to consider it thoroughly, with the object of being able to advocate the most desirable course. Both they and their master, however, seem so little enamoured of the idea, that they attribute it to English intrigue, resulting from their dread of the Scots. I quite believe that the English would not like being dominated by Scotsmen, and that if the crown of Scotland is to be joined to their empire, they, the English, want still to be cocks of the walk, as their kingdom is the larger and more important one. On the other hand, the Scots may be unduly inflated with the opposite idea, so that imperfections may exist on both sides, but still, after all, it should not prevent them from listening to different opinions and adopting the most desirable. They persist, however, in the idea that the best course will be to enter by Scotland, which I do not contradict, but only place the above arguments before them for their consideration. The landing in Scotland offers one great advantage, namely, that we shall be in a perfectly safe country as if it were our own, in which, without running any more risk than we think fit, we can commence operations, whilst if it be God's will that the affair should be prolonged, aid can be sent to us as may be required, and if it be a question of our retreat, which God forbid! we have a safe port of withdrawal there, which is no small matter. If we go to Scotland, at least order should be given at once for the earl of Westmoreland, Dacre, and others who are to raise their partizans, to enter their territories with all speed, in order that that aid may not fail us, as it is so important. If they could take with them some separate force, preferably cavalry, to enable them to hold their own, until they were joined by the army, the landing of our troops in England would be less necessary. If it were possible for them (i.e. Westmoreland, Dacre, etc.) with a body of men to land at some English port simultaneously with the arrival of our army in Scotland, it would be better still for them, and would facilitate the raising of their friends, and their standing firm until the army reached them. This seems the surest way of avoiding the danger of delay, although as nothing certain can be calculated upon in sea voyages, this course, even, is not without risk, because if the army were to be much retarded in its landing in Scotland, these few men could hardly sustain themselves against the fury which, of course, would immediately be let loose upon them. It would seem however, even in this case, that they might take refuge over the Scotch border, which will be so near them. A body of cavalry might also make an attempt at a dash from Scotland to where the Queen (of Scots) is, and release her and carry her off. It is true the distance is a long one, but by God's help the plan might succeed. This point, however, is a very anxious one, because, granted that we landed in England, it could not be done with such speed and secrecy as to prevent its being known before we set foot on shore, and could have men ready for the rush to the queen of Scots ; so that even by these means her release will not be more easily effected than from Scotland. It does not seem very feasible by any means, and perhaps the only real way for her to help herself and get free is the method she has mentioned several times, which she had arranged, and for some time past has been asking for 12,000 crowns to pay for. The day before yesterday her ambassador begged me again very earnestly to ask for this sum to be provided at once, and as he urges it so strongly as he does, it may be concluded that the plan is now settled in a way that enables the Queen to be sure of success, unless they take her away from her present abode and place her in the hands of another custodian nearer London, in which case she would of course be lost, which would be a great misfortune, as she is the true instrument to smooth matters there easily and permanently. Besides this, she is a woman of such good sense that she will not fail to show proper gratitude to your Majesty by aiding in the settlement of affairs in Flanders, and in ordering all other things to your Majesty's pleasure. If the attempts be made from Scotland it will be necessary for the army to be a powerful one, having regard to the doubts already expressed as to the Catholic risings in England if delay occurred in the arrival of the army there, and the probability of the Queen's being armed and on the defensive by the time we arrive. It is well to be prepared for this, and we should have a force strong enough to succeed in any case. With regard to raising forces in Scotland, which certainly will have to be done, there appears to be no great objection to it if it be undertaken with moderation, and if a sufficient number remain to be raised in England, so as to obviate the distrust and suspicion between the countries, and banish the fear of the English that the object is to conquer their country in favour of the Scots. Besides this it is desirable that the English contingent should be the superior and stronger one, so that if the enterprise succeed, as God grant that it may, the English may settle the Government in their own way, they being the first and most important party. This would not only be just, but would be the most advantageous for us. I suspect that their intention is for the king of Scots to lead the army in person, and enter England with it, and for this reason I wish he had declared himself a Catholic. I have no doubt that Muzio will do all he can in this respect, and to judge by the signs given by the lad's letters, putting aside the probable worldly advantage to him, great hopes may be entertained that he may come round to the Catholic religion. But even when this is done, and he being a declared Catholic is allowed to lead the army, it will be well to keep all eyes fixed on the mother, in order that she may be sought out and made mistress of the empire which is to be won, and not allow any other idea to be countenanced whilst she is alive. The king of Scotland undoubtedly shows a good tendency to return to the righteous road, and as he has certainly been led thus far to oppose the English faction strenuously, in consequence of the exhortations addressed to him from here on behalf of Muzio, and of the assurances of aid given to him, to which Muzio has verbally pledged himself to the utmost extent that he has been able, it is no wonder that his, Guises, going thither (to Scotland) should be urged, the more particularly after the message sent to him last summer by Northumberland from England, saying that he could not go thither, and that it was necessary to enter from Scotland. Constant reports are arriving also of the growth of the English faction and the fears that he (the king of Scots) may be captured and held by them again, seeing the unceasing efforts being made to that end by the queen of England, who has even sent the Hamiltons (people of the highest influence) to the border with money and musters of men to give countenance to the English faction and their objects. I am also informed that jealousy and discontent exist amongst those who follow (the King's) party on private grounds, and because some have received more than others, this passion of greed being the dangerous one of the race. It will become all the more dangerous now, for it may be certainly assumed that the queen of of England has been sleepless and ceaseless in her efforts to work upon it. Since Don Bernardino left I have had shown to me letters from Scotland which clearly prove this to be the case, and amongst them one from that Jesuit Holt, who is there, and who presses most earnestly that the King should promptly be supplied with what was promised to him, in order that he might not relapse, which he was otherwise in danger of doing. This being so, it is no wonder that Muzio so urgently advises it, and there is no good reason why it should not be done. It would be very appropriate if the 12,000 crowns could be here promptly for remittance at once, and the King's guard be put into a desirable condition, and some sort of security obtained for the King's person, pending the sending of the rest of the money. They tell me that, failing this money, they (i.e., the Scots) are going about here trying to raise funds for the purpose, and it was thought that the Nuncio would give 3,000 crowns. It appears, however, that he has recently been instructed not to dispose of the money until further orders, and he refuses the aid now until his fresh instructions come. When the Scots' ambassador told me the day before yesterday the news I have set down he said that the Queen his mistress expressly ordered him to pray me to urge speed upon your Majesty in the public business and that it might be carried out without consideration for her own safety, as she looked upon her life as well spent if success were attained. I think Seton's son will not be sent to Rome, as they find they can do as well by writing.—Paris, 18th April 1584.