Simancas: June 1583 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1896.

Citation:

'Simancas: June 1583', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586, ed. Martin A S Hume( London, 1896), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol3/pp472-486 [accessed 30 November 2024].

June 1583



4 June.	338. Bernardino de Mendoza to the King. I wrote on the 20th ultimo that the Scots' ambassadors had seen the Queen, and since then she has given them a second audience, in which they again submitted to her the principal points of their mission, namely, the importance of an offensive and defensive alliance being concluded between the two countries, in order that their position might be consolidated and their religion more firmly established, and the granting of a loan to the King. They said if these points were not accepted they would be obliged to seek alliance with other princes, which, up to the present, they had avoided on this Queen's account. They concluded by handing her a statement of the pensions granted by the king of France in Scotland, and also of those which M. de la Mothe had offered in his name if the alliance with France were brought about. The Queen replied that, with regard to the alliance, she thought it could not be made binding without the consent of the queen of Scotland, and she consequently would send persons to her for the purpose of discussing the matter. She had expected to be able to preserve her friendship with the King, by reason of the good and honourable offices she had effected during his childhood, and their relationship and identity of religion, but now she saw that it was to be a question of money with him, which was the lowest form of pledge. She dwelt on this point, and Stuart replied that friendship was proved by the readiness with which help was given in times of need. After this the Queen complained to the Treasurer and Walsingham of the importunity of the conspirators, who were always asking for money, and using their religion as a pretext for despoiling her, which she said she would never allow, and the Treasurer approved of her determination. The next day Stuart brought great pressure upon Walsingham to submit to the Queen the reasons which existed for her to help the king of Scotland, and the same night he, Walsingham, did so very warmly, whereupon the Queen replied that her own servants and favourites professed to love her for her good parts, Alençon for her person, and the Scots for her crown, three entirely different reasons, but they all ended in the same thing, namely, asking her for money. The one object was to drain her treasury, but she would take care to defend it, as money was the principal sinew and force of princes. Walsingham repeated this to Stuart, who was very indignant, protesting that the Queen would repent of it, when perhaps it would be too late for her to remedy the evil that would befall her. Walsingham therefore offered to reiterate his arguments to the Queen, and, although Stuart displayed much dissatisfaction at the small hopes of getting any money, it may be suspected that they will give him something, and that all this ceremony is only to reduce the amount, it being the Queen's aim to keep Scotch affairs in suspense, without coming to close quarters with them, and allowing them to press her to declare the King as her heir. This was the reason why she referred the question of the alliance to the queen of Scotland, who will certainly not agree to it, as its object is the preservation of their abominable religion. I will report further developments ; this being the present position. They (the Scots' ambassadors) have been relegated to the earls of Leicester and Bedford, the Treasurer, and Walsingham to discuss their business. The French ambassador has written to his King that the alliance between Scotland and England had been concluded, he having been so informed, in ambiguous terms, by one of the Ministers, but I am fully assured that this is not yet the case. The countess of Shrewsbury has again complained, through a son of hers, of her husband, in the matter of the queen of Scots, and the Queen, after hearing him, referred him to the Council. He replied that as the matter was one between husband and wife, he did not think this course would not be agreeable to his mother, and the Queen then told him to give her a written statement of the allegations, which she promised should be seen by nobody. The substance of the complaint is that, so long as the queen of Scots was in the hands of the earl of Shrewsbury, she would never be secure, as he was in love with her, and this the Countess sets forth with a thousand absurdities and impertinences, which the Treasurer and Walsingham have repeated, the Queen having shown them the statement. (fn. 1) She has written to Cobham, telling him to intimate to the King of France—not as coming from her, but from one of her Councillors— that she intends to send Lord Hunsdon, Sir Walter Mildmay, and Beal, to confer with the queen of Scots respecting her release. This is only for the purpose of beguiling the latter, whilst she (Elizabeth) is dealing with Scotch affairs in her own way. She (the queen of Scotland) is perfectly aware of this, as your Majesty will see by the enclosed copy of a letter I received from her two days ago. I understand that the French ambassador has written privately to Stuart, saying that he cannot avoid feeling some surprise that, he being the ambassador of a King with whom France has been so friendly, they should not have met. I do not know whether Stuart has replied yet. Méneville has returned from Scotland to France, as your Majesty will have heard from Tassis. Alençon has sent hither a secretary of his, who arrived ten days since, to inform the Queen that the rebels were again approaching him with terms of settlement through Marshal Biron. He says he advises her thereof in order to have her opinion as to the conditions he ought to grant. Alençon says he is now convalescent. A Venetian gentleman of the house of Cornari, who has been in France for some months past with the ambassador of the seigniory there, has come hither on the pretext of seeing the Queen. I understand his object is to endeavour to arrange with her for a Venetian ambassador to reside here, in which case he will be the man. The Queen will be very glad of it, as she tried to arrange it some years ago, in order that she might have an excuse for sending an ambassador thither, who might inform her on Italian affairs, but the Venetians would not then allow it, in the fear that his Holiness would not consent to the English ambassador exercising his religion there, even in his own house. They therefore expect to have a minister here, whilst the Queen sends none to Venice. I am informed that this Venetian says that if your Majesty proceeds in this way, they can do the same.—London, 4th June 1583.
4 June.	339. Bernardino De Mendoza to Juan De Idiaquez. My isolation grows daily more irksome, as I receive no despatches either from His Majesty or yourself, which I desire to do for a thousand reasons, apart from my maladies. I sent you a clear letter (i.e. not in cipher) by William Bodenham, (fn. 2) a person of trust and usefulness here, and I must repeat that his loss will be much felt if he be not sent back, in case of His Majesty's deciding to send a minister hither. The Queen continues to make much of the Palatine Lasqui, and a few days ago she had a joust got up expressly for his gratification. He saw it from a window with the Queen and the French ambassador. The personages who were with the duke of Alençon at Dunkirk, I understand have returned to France, Fervacques alone remaining with him. Biron is in the field, but in very bad case. You will see by my letters to the King the talk there is about an arrangement. I cannot help mentioning a very strange thing that has happened in this country, as I am assured by very trustworthy persons. In a place called Beaumaris, in the province of Chester, there is a hermaphrodite, who has hitherto chosen to dress as a man, and, as such, was married and had children. A few months ago, however, he changed his functions and is now pregnant. It seems contrary to nature that he should both conceive and engender as well.— London, 4th June 1583.
5 June.	340. The Queen of Scotland to Bernardino De Mendoza. As I do not wish to proceed ceremoniously with you, I must ask you to excuse me for not writing a long letter now, as I am so busy with the commissioners who arrived here on Saturday. I will only say how pleased I am to hear of your convalescence, and thank you affectionately for your good advice touching the negotiations for my liberation, in which I recognise your great prudence, especially in the reasons you set forth for my stay in this country, which course I think will be most advantageous for me, in view of the state of affairs here. The Queen has written me a very honest and gracious letter, and up to the present, the commissioners have exhibited every appearance of goodwill towards me. God grant that all may tend to His glory rather than to my own contentment. By the last packets I have received from France, my cousin M. de Guise writes me that he still persisted in his first determination to land personally in England, and that as soon as things were ready he would not fail to set out. He was nevertheless hurrying as much as possible the return of the duke of Lennox to Scotland, although I am greatly afraid that they will not let him pass. Whatever happens, I shall be equally thankful to the Catholic King, your master, for his acceptance of my offers and his demonstration of goodwill as if success had attended our efforts. Certainly nothing shall be wanting on this side.—5th June 1583.
6 June Paris Archives, K. 1447.	341. The King to Juan Bautista De Tassis. You were informed lately that a reply should be written soon to the message sent to you by Hercules through the Scots' ambassador ; and you may now tell him that I am glad to hear that he has brought the important matter he mentions to the point he has, and I shall rejoice to see it well finished by his hand. In order not to fail in so good a work, I have written to his Holiness begging him to respond promptly with money, and I offer to contribute my fair part to the extent of my power. I am, however, short of money and obliged to provide for very many exigencies, so that, as the case demands it, and the Pope is better off than I, it is only just that he should supply a liberal proportion of the 100,000 crowns, and it will be well that he should be written to from Paris to that effect, and assured that he (Guise?) will not fail in his good intent. It is true that, as the affair is such a great one, and it is so important that it should not fail if once it is undertaken, I shall be glad to have further particulars of the forces and combinations, and the way in which it is proposed to execute it ; because, although I do not doubt his prudence and experience, and am convinced that the matter is well planned, I should nevertheless be pleased to learn the details, which he (Guise) can send through you. He may rest assured, as I have said before, of my attachment to his interests and particularly in this matter. When I get a reply from Rome, I will advise you of it and provide my part, but, as you remark, even there (in Paris) the supplies from Rome are very scanty, and you had better point out to Hercules that he must insist very strongly upon the money being provided by the Pope, and must press the nuncio upon the matter. The obligation is one which rests especially upon his Holiness, and he is free from the many calls which burden me. This is all I have to say upon the matter at present. You will do your best to encourage him (Guise) in it by assuring him of my warm approval of the enterprise, and report to me the method by which he intends to effect it, the pretext he will adopt, what is his principal motive, and all else you can learn. Impress secrecy upon those who are concerned, as so much depends upon no mistake being made.—San Lorenzo, 6th June 1583.
6 June. Paris Archives K. 1447. 196.	342. The King to Bernardino De Mendoza. I note by your letters of 15th and 22nd April and 6th May the plans that were being hatched between the Queen and the duke of Alençon about Flanders, and the various artifices she adopts to keep the king of Scotland oppressed and captive, whilst she feeds him with hopes and deceives him. The best way to open the king of Scotland's eyes will be for his mother to write to him, telling him what he had better do under the circumstances. I see also what the queen of Scotland, tired of her long imprisonment, wrote to you, and your reply persuading her not to make any change in her residence to France, even if she were able to do so. I approve of this, and you will continue the same course, because it might happen that her presence near at hand might, at a given moment, be of the greatest importance for the Catholics, whilst her absence might be correspondingly prejudicial. The secretary she sent to me will shortly be despatched, and you will be advised as to the reply you are to give to the mission he brought to you. In your last letter, you say it will be highly detrimental for the island and its conversion, as well as for my interests, if the French are allowed to get a footing there on the pretext of Scotch affairs, whilst, on the other hand, I hear that Lennox entirely depends upon Guise, who, as the kinsman of the Queen also, will naturally possess her confidence, as I understand he also does that of the Scottish Catholics and of the Pope's ministers. I shall be glad if you will let me know what is your opinion of Guise, and if you think that anything attempted through him would possess the objections you mention as attaching generally to the interference of Frenchmen in the island, and also whether he would be able to conduct a successful enterprise with a money aid only, and, if not, what else he would require. Let me know your opinion on all points, as you are on the spot and so well versed in the matter.— San Lorenzo, 6th June 1583.
11 June.	343. Bernardino De Mendoza to the King. On the 4th, I reported the reply that the Queen had given to the Scots ambassadors. She despatched them, after all, in the way I suspected, having granted pensions of 3,000l. to the conspirators, although some people say they accepted them for the King as they had promised. She also lends 6,000l. in the form of bills of exchange from merchants here, payable in Scotland. The Scots were informed that these concessions were granted solely at the instance of the earls of Leicester and Bedford, and Walsingham ; as the Queen had made up her mind to give them nothing. It is thought this will make them prize it the more. With respect to the King's marriage, she said she thanked them much for placing into her hands a matter of such great importance, especially as she was informed by her ambassador that your Majesty and the king of France were making many marriage proposals to him. As for herself, she had decided to decline, as she thought she was better without a husband ; but she would give him her opinion on the matter. At present, she would say no more but that there was no person in England with the necessary qualifications for the purpose. After this, the Queen earnestly begged Stuart to tell her whether it was true that Leicester had negotiated through Davison for the marriage of the king of Scotland with the daughter (fn. 3) of his wife. Although Stuart denied this, the Queen became so excited about it as to say that she would rather allow the King to take her crown away than see him married to the daughter of such a she-wolf, and, if she could find no other way to repress her ambition and that of the traitor Leicester, she would proclaim her all over Christendom for the bad woman she was, and prove that her husband was a cuckold. She said much more to the same effect ; and, in order to mollify her, Leicester is now making great efforts to marry the girl to a private gentleman. The Queen gave Stuart a chain worth 60l., and corresponding presents to the rest. They left here in company with Walter Mildmay, who, as I said, is going to the queen of Scotland, which gives rise to the idea that Stuart may be allowed also to go and kiss her hand. Cobham writes to the Queen that Alençon wishes his mother to go to Dunkirk to confer with him, whilst she wishes him to go to Calais. Alençon continues to assure this Queen that he will not agree to any fresh settlement with the States, except on the conditions that she desires ; and says that, if she thinks it will be better for him not to negotiate, he will not do so. The Queen is so puffed up with this that she neglects no opportunity of trying to force me to take offence. There recently arrived in this country a Genoese gentleman married in the Netherlands, named Bartolomé Salvariccia, a subject of your Majesty, who came to give me an account of certain matters in France ; he being a person who regularly corresponds with me, and sends important information of that (the French) Court. His object on this occasion, also, was to open up a correspondence between me and a man whom he has bought over near the person of Don Antonio, which man being a Frenchman, objects to treat with Juan Bautista de Tassis. As he admitted that the only reason for his coming hither was to see me, Walsingham one morning sent five men to the house to arrest him and seize all his documents, which were carried to the court and examined, after which they told him that he had better leave the country instantly, as the Queen had information from an Italian that he had come hither for the purpose of arranging with me to poison Orange, which statement had been made by that heretic Horatio Pallavicini (fn. 4) who lives here. Salvariccia replied that he did not interfere in such matters, nor did he think the Queen had any right to inquire into them, as Orange was a rebel against your Majesty, and he, Salvariccia, had only come here to see me. As for leaving the country, he said, so far as he was concerned, he would go at once, but the Queen would see how I would take it. When Walsingham heard this he said he would communicate with the Queen, which was only to gain time whilst they saw whether there was anything in his papers. They found there was nothing, and consequently they sent me word that, notwithstanding the information the Queen had received against Salvariccia, she could not believe that he came for the purpose of seeing me on an evil errand, and therefore she surrendered him to me as my prisoner. In consequence of his having communicated with me, Orange, as soon as I arrived here, had confiscated the property which Salvariccia's wife owned in Holland, and exiled her from the Netherlands. On this account and as he has sent me much valuable information, especially about Don Antonio, he deserves favour at your Majesty's hands. Colonel Stuart replied to the French ambassador's letter in the terms your Majesty will see by the enclosed copy. The ship I spoke of as going to Terceira with munitions has returned bringing a little woad. They say there were 1,200 soldiers in the island and great scarcity of everything. English ships arriving from Andalucia report having met off Cape Finisterre the ships belonging to Don Antonio which sailed from Havre de Grace, with a fresh east wind that would soon carry them into Terceira.—London, 11th June 1583.
20 June.	344. Bernardino De Mendoza to Juan De Idiaquez. Many thanks for your kindly speaking to the King about my recall. Doña Ana (de Mendoza, his sister), writes telling me of your kind efforts in my favour, and that your advice is that I should be patient and cheerful. Doña Ana also says that you had remarked that you thought when my knighthood was granted my company was taken away, which agrees with what Secretary Mateo Vasquez wrote to me, (fn. 5) as you will see by the copy I enclose. My ill-luck thus turns to my disadvantage what to others would be a boon, as you are aware that I farm out my knight-commandership for 1,300 ducats, and I am now deprived of 500 ducats (pension) and 960 ducats (that is 80 crowns a month for my company), so that I lose money by it, as well as having the best part of the first two years' revenue swallowed up in costs ; but if his Majesty should even take away the knight-commandership as well, his will be done. The loss will not be so great to me as the day upon which I lost the sight of my eye.— London, 20th June 1583.
24 June. Paris Archives, K. 1561.	345. Juan Bautista De Tassis to the King. The plan which Hercules had in hand, as I reported to your Majesty on the 4th May, was an act of violence (fn. 6) against that lady, which someone, probably from interested motives, was to have performed ; but I see that the whole thing is now at an end and nothing more is being said about it, and the funds referred to will therefore no longer be necessary. M. de Meyneville, who is the second ambassador whom the Christian King sent some months back to Scotland at the request of the duke of Guise, and from whom Hercules expected to receive a full account of affairs in that country, has recently returned hither. His intelligence is to the effect that Scotland is not at present in a fit state for our forces to go thither and begin the enterprise in accordance with the plan proposed last year by the duke of Lennox, as the King is the same as before with regard to religion ; and being in the hands of the English faction, and so flattered and deceived with promises by them, believes himself to be at liberty, and that he will be able by negotiation to secure the release of his mother and his own succession to the English throne. Besides this, there is no port for us except Dumbarton, the captain of which will never give it up to anyone else but the duke of Lennox himself, who has recently died here, and he (the captain) is influenced to this end by the 5,000 crowns I gave him for the support of the place. In short, it is clear from Meyneville's account that, neither on the side of the King, by private combinations or the possession of fortresses and ports, is there at present any good grounds in Scotland for undertaking the enterprise. Meyneville gilds his account with the grand hopes he gives that the King may be won over, as may many of his subjects. His idea is that the King may best be gained by the sending thither by the Christian King, under some pretext, of an experienced ambassador, who might gradually lead him to the desired point. Meyneville asserts that he is a prince of very good understanding, and, although he will not at present allow any suggestion of a change of religion, he abhors the proceedings of the ministers of his sect. As regards the subjects, Meyneville recommends that some private person should be sent with money to comply with arrangements by which he (Meyneville) has already gained over certain men, and to continue to buy others, as they are all very venal and may be gained easily with money. This advice has entirely fallen in with the views of Hercules and his associates, and he has therefore chosen for the second mission a nephew of the Scots ambassador resident here, a very honourable gentleman and a zealous Catholic, who promises that he will do all he can in favour of the cause. I have handed to him, at the request of Hercules, 6,000 sun-crowns, besides which I believe that the nuncio has given him the 4,000 crowns he had, and he will start on his mission immediately. Hercules has also undertaken to induce the Christian King to send Meyneville back to Scotland at once. He is a very clever man, in whom Hercules has entire confidence. I do not know, however, whether this part of the plan will be carried through, as it depends entirely on the King's will, and Hercules and his party have not much influence with him at present, so perhaps he will not consent so easily as they expect. If it be done, it is, of course, possible that the result anticipated by Meyneville may be attained, but I cannot say that I am very confident about it, because, as the king of Scotland is still quite unenlightened with regard to the Catholic religion, and contented to be in the hands of the English faction, in the hope that he may obtain from the queen of England by peaceful means all he desires, a bait the Queen will dangle before him to any extent, it does not seem very probable that Meyneville, even if he go, will be able very easily to overcome all the difficulties. Besides this, the only way of winning over the people is by interest, in which there is no certainty, as there seems very little zeal or religion there, and this is what displeases me most. My own feeling in the matter is one of fear that, whatever we may do, Scotland shows but little indications of tending to the way desired, but I have nevertheless shown no disapproval of the decision arrived at, and, on the contrary, have praised it. My reason for this has been, in the first place, because I thought it worth the risk of 6,000 crowns, even if the money turn out to be wasted, to convince Hercules of our desire to please him in all things. The only thing that rather goes against the grain with me is that all these attempts to buy people over are made by, and in the name of, Frenchmen, and it seems as if we were gaining friends for them with our money. Nevertheless, I shall look upon it as well spent if they will serve our ends. With regard to the enterprise itself, Hercules has come to the resolution set forth in the enclosed document. (fn. 7) As there are certain things in it which seem contradictory with what has already been said, I must relate, as briefly as possible, the events which have occurred, even at the risk of seeming prolix. After Hercules had heard Meyneville's report about Scotland and had reflected for some days, he wished me to meet him at the Nuncio's house, where in his presence Meyneville repeated what he had to say. The discourse then turned to the principal matter, and Hercules suggested that it would be better to effect the enterprise by way of England, on the same footing and conditions as were verbally submitted to your Majesty by Richard Melino, which had been reduced to writing and were read to us, the time fixed for the expedition being next September. As the matter was so grave a one it did not seem fitting that I should reply hastily, and the meeting broke up after some general conversation. It was at this point that Hercules asked me about Rome, and I replied as detailed in my other letter. I afterwards reflected that Lennox's plan being now at an end, and that the natural jealousy of this crown (of France) at any enterprise of your Majesty's might be aroused if all the troops for the undertaking came from Spain, whereas if Italians and Germans were employed the affair could not be carried through at the time stated, and the same objection existed to sending much of the material from Spain, I determined to communicate to Hercules my ideas on the matter. I was also led to this by the consideration that, as a beginning had to be made in England, it behoved us to be sure that the party there was strong enough to make it worth while, and whether, above all, we could count upon a good port there ; besides several other points contained in the proposal, which I thought worth consideration. If nothing else came of it, I thought that it would enable us to get more at the root of the business. As the duke of Bavaria will have to be mentioned in my remarks on Hercules' final proposal, I may say that the reason he was introduced was that I was told that the duke had sent offering his aid to Hercules, the business having been communicated to him by the queen of Scots. (fn. 8) The offers of the Duke, moreover, are considered of some importance here. In view of Meyneville's anticipations as to the conversion of Scotland, I did not care to flatly oppose it, but I began by pointing out the danger of national jealousy being aroused if this affair was undertaken solely by your Majesty's fleet, and said that even the king of Scotland himself, on whose behalf it was sent, might come to hate the expedition on this account, and hinder rather than help it. This, I said, must be considered deeply, seeing how uncertain it was that the army would be able to take possession of the whole country as soon as it entered, the said country being held by a woman who would not run the risk of a battle in the open, but would direct her efforts to holding the ports through which succour might reach her. As the whole of the men for the expedition would have to come from Spain, even though they were Germans or Italians, I said it would not be possible for the affair to be effected in September, and the same argument applied to the arms they required, which would have to be sent from Milan. I asked him (Guise) therefore to consider whether it would not be better to defer it until next year, and in the meanwhile the king of Scots might be converted and prepared to take the matter into his own hands, as was originally intended. If the king of Scotland himself took the lead there could be no jealousy on the part of France, where it was most to be feared, and if the queen of England had no support on the side of France she must certainly fall. If, on the other hand, the temper of the English Catholics would not suffer this delay, I said, let Hercules or his brother take the lead with 4,000 men, rather in the form of a succour than as a Spanish national expedition ; and let the affair be done in his name and not in the name of Spain, as he was a relative of the queen of Scots and bound to seek her release. If he took a good force of Frenchmen, the Christian King would not hinder him. This course would obviate the difficulty about the number of men he requested, as, if he found 4,000 men, your Majesty might probably be able to provide the rest without having to send far afield for them. As regards the arms also, they might be obtained here, where there is an abundance of them, and the diversion on the Irish coast might be left to your Majesty, that on the Sussex coast to the brother (fn. 9) (i.e. of Guise) who remained here, whilst as for Norfolk, I said, since the duke of Bavaria was so determined to take part, let him secretly equip some ships on the coast of Holland, with the pretext of the war in Flanders, and embark four or five thousand Germans on them, and run them over to Norfolk. I also touched on the other points of his first proposal, such as sending the exiles over to England at once, &c., but as they are not important I will not detail them. Hercules thereupon made his final proposal, in which he insists that we must make the commencement, and he undertakes to banish the jealousy (i.e. of France) by the diversion that he will make on the coast of Sussex and the efforts he will exert, and will cause his Holiness to exert, in the same direction. This is a great point, because if we can take the matter in hand without exciting the opposition of France, we shall carry it through easily. He would not enter further into the question of the time for the attempt, but left it to his Holiness and your Majesty, although he really tacitly consents to its postponement, because, in addition to the number of men I said it would be difficult to raise in the time, he asks for many more, and indicates such distant nationalities that it would take all the time from now until September merely to engage them. I suppose this to mean that he sees the necessity for deferring the expedition, but will not admit it in so many words. His demands are high, but I am not surprised at this, as it is always easy to spend other people's money, and it is usual to ask for more than is wanted, so as to obtain enough. I have no doubt he will endeavour to comply with his own promises, and I try to persuade myself that he will be able to do so. I wish they would not communicate all the particulars to the duke of Bavaria, but continue with him in generalities, as secrecy is so important ; but I do not think Hercules liked the idea of refraining from telling him everything, although I do not know what good it can do. The Englishmen who have the matter in hand, I mean Dr. Allen and those who went to Spain, are rather disconsolate at this decision, as they think all this talk and intricacy are mere buckler-play, and that we shall be a long time coming to deeds at this rate. I am not sure, moreover, that the English and Scots are quite at one with regard to the prime object of the enterprise, for the following reasons. The former are more anxious that the Catholic religion should be restored, whilst the latter think first of the release of the queen of Scots, and the succession to the English crown, although of course each of these aims is desired by all of them. The English, too, may suspect a tendency on the part of the Scots to look for a controlling influence in the new empire, and as they (the Scots) are naturally inclined to the French, perhaps they would rather see the affair carried through with but few Spaniards ; whilst English hate this idea, as their country is the principal, and they claim that it shall not lose its predominance when Scotland is admitted into the empire. The English are more attached to the house of Burgundy than to France, and have received so much favour from your Majesty that they would rather have help from Spaniards than others. I see signs that the aims are not quite identical, and notice that the English are less active than the Scots in discussing and forwarding this project, although Dr. Allen and his people have been the men who from the first have been preparing matters in England, and upon whom the party there principally depends. They are, however, very prudent, and do nothing to oppose the plan ; but seeing Lennox's scheme entirely at an end, and convinced that they must look for a remedy only to the feeling in their own country, they have made up their minds that they are simply wasting time in depending upon what is arranged here (in France), and will lay before your Majesty a clear statement of the present tendency in England, and beg you to extend your royal pity to the poor afflicted oppressed Catholics there. They will, whilst not asking your Majesty to lose sight of the proposals now made, point out to you the present favourable condition of England, which will make the task there comparatively easy. Allen has impressed this upon me very forcibly, and although I know that exiles are apt to be sanguine, I cannot help believing what he says, and I trust God will reward their zeal by delivering them from their bondage. They say that, even if Scotland were in a fit state for the attempt to be commenced there, it would not be advisable to do so, and the party in England are of the same opinion. At all events, I can see no indication that feeling in Scotland is likely to be favourable for some time, and although this gentleman is going thither with the money, and Meyneville may follow him, I fear much that they will be too late to turn the King, a mere boy who has hitherto been a heretic, and is flattered by the English faction. Everything, moreover, which delays the matter causes the risk of unfavourable changes in the interim, and however little may be looked for from the king of Scots, if he saw the enterprised once undertaken in England, and understood that what was being done was in favour of himself and his mother, he would agree to it. They (the English) are assured of an excellent port, and talk much of the many Catholics and friends they have in the north, and other parts of the country. Hibernia (York?) and Norfolk will be raised by the people of the districts themselves, and also Wales, which they consider very important and secure. They would be content, as your Majesty will see, with very few troops, so strong is their confidence in the people of the country, but they consider that it will be highly necessary for arms to be supplied to equip the country people. They also request that the fleet should bring money to pay the men for the first few months, so that they may live in orderly fashion, and they ask for some surplus money to enable them to raise some men of the country to serve with the army in the form of militia. They are so confident of success, with the blessing of God, in whose service the attempt will be made, that it is impossible for anyone hearing them to help being convinced. Not much importance need be attributed to the fact that this plan is somewhat divergent from that of Hercules, as the latter, the Scots ambassador, and a French Jesuit father, a confidant of Hercules, who have drawn up his plan, are well aware of it, and have asked for much more than they will be content to accept from your Majesty. If just a few Germans and Italians were sent, so that it would appear they were not all Spaniards, that would satisfy them. I believe, indeed, that Hercules will not stand out on the point at all, if he be flattered as hitherto with the notion that he is to be the guide and director of it all, that everything will be in his hands and that the expedition will go whither he may choose. If he is made to think that we shall do nothing without him, and the necessary provision is made for him here, I have no doubt that he will agree to whatever your Majesty may order. In the interest of the business itself, moreover, and to prevent jealousy here, it is necessary that he should take charge. These Englishmen desire, in any case, that the attempt should be made at the beginning of next winter—September or October—as they fear delay. They think your Majesty's fleet will have returned early enough for preparations to be made, and as they hope to God it may return victorious and entire, there being now no enemies at sea, they think the necessary preparations might be made beforehand, and everything be ready when the fleet arrived. Even if a few more troops had to be put on board, they could soon be raised, the principal thing being the fleet itself. They are anxious to be informed of your Majesty's decision, so that they may forewarn their friends, both in the part of the country whither the fleet is to go, and that where the diversion is to be made, so that everything shall be ready and they may, if there be time, send the ship they mention to Spain with expert and faithful pilots to guide the fleet to England. Father Robert (Persons) signified to me to-day that they would make a start as soon as they got even a conditional promise that the enterprise would be undertaken if your Majesty's fleet returns in time, in which case they will at once begin their preparation. I am not quite sure whether this is advisable, and whether it will not risk the discovery of the project. Your Majesty may therefore decide rather to give an answer definitely, yes or no, to them, or if this be impossible and the matter has to be deferred, to advise them exactly when it is intended to effect it, so that they may make their preparations in due time. They should be comforted and encouraged in the meanwhile to keep their party together. They also desire prompt advice, so that they may find means to join the fleet of the exiles in Flanders, under the earl of Westmoreland and Baron Dacre, who are the most influential men in the part of the country whither they intend to go, and they wish to arrange for Allen to go thither, as he comes from those parts and will be near the bishopric of Durham which he is to have. There will be some difficulty in his going, as he is older and more feeble than the rest, and will need more comfort on the voyage. They must make the best arrangements they can. Your Majesty will see that they offer to defray the expenses, and enter into a perpetual alliance. I need not enlarge on the quality of this business, as no one knows better than your Majesty how greatly it will redound to the service of God, the advantage of christianity, and the honour of a Catholic King. It may also benefit affairs in Flanders although it ill befits me to intrude my views on so exalted a matter. I will confine myself to recommending warmly to your Majesty these English Catholics, whose whole hope is founded upon you ; and I supplicate your Majesty, for the love of God, to help them as much as possible. I will only add that, if the enterprise is to be undertaken, it appears to me that the true road to success is by England rather than by Scotland. Another point which partly bears upon it must not be forgotten. The Guises are lately so out of favour and neglected that I understand the flood has nearly reached its full and threatens to burst the dam. They are affronted with the present form of government and the growth of the power of the favourites, and are convinced that as the latter increases the public disorder will also increase, whilst they (the Guises) will decline. They probably fear also that if they continue to put up with it they may lose their influence with the nobles and the people ; and perhaps even the Huguenots will fall upon them, particularly if Bearn should rise in the scale in consequence of the illness of Anjou. I have an inkling that to save themselves from entire submersion, and secure the respect they consider to be their due, they are again tending to a bold course, and may very shortly appeal to arms. This is a delicate matter, and I do not presume to affirm anything for certain, but I hear a secret whisper that they are raising 6,000 foot soldiers. Their first pretext will be against the Huguenots, and they will afterwards demand a reform of the government to compel the King to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, whilst his vassals love and obey him as they should. None of them (the Guises) are at present with the King, both brothers being at Eu, which is an estate in Normandy belonging to the elder. If the affair comes about, the great object will be against the heretics, and it may be expected that it is to this end that they desire to prove your Majesty's friendship, although they have not hitherto given me the slightest hint in the matter. The only word I have heard was from the Nuncio, who asked me the other day whether, in case anyone opposed the Huguenots here, your Majesty would help him. He said he did not know whether his Holiness would help or not, unless the King (of France) himself took the matter in hand. I saw by this that he (the Nuncio) had scented something, or else that he knew more than he said, although when I pressed him he stopped short as if he did not know particulars. When Hercules was discussing the Scotch matter I noticed some inclination in him to defer it until next year, on account of this other matter, as he may have thought he could hardly undertake both things at the same time. But he must afterwards have convinced himself that his resources were sufficient to do so, and that the business here might even help him in the other matter, as it would direct attention away from it. He is right in this, and it would do no harm in Flemish affairs. I have got some enlightenment from Melino, who is very grateful for the favours he received in Spain.—Paris, 24th June 1583.