Spain: October 1544, 6-10 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

Citation:

'Spain: October 1544, 6-10', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544, ed. Pascual de Gayangos, Martin A S Hume( London, 1899), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol7/pp393-419 [accessed 27 November 2024].

October 1544, 6–10


Wien, Imp. Arch. Onz. Conser.

6 Oct.	222. The Offers of France and the King of England's Answer.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	The offers which cardinal du Bellay, the first President [of the Parliament of] Rouen, Secretary de L'Aubespine, and the Treasurer of the Finances [of France] have made in the name of king Francis to the King my master are as follow:—
	To pay immediately the arrears of the pension.
	To continue yearly the payment of the same.
	To pay for the damage and cost which the king of England, my master, has had to sustain since the commencement of these present wars.
	To place the town and territory of Ardres at the disposal of the King my master.
	To make the Scots submit to the will of the king of England my master, in all reasonable things, and if they do not, abandon them altogether.
	To deliver good and sufficient hostages as security.
	The King my master's answer to the conditions above specified, besides which the following are added:—
	To renounce all rights, titles, and interests which the king of France may have or pretend to have on Boulogne and the Boullonois. (fn. 1)
	To renounce and give up entirely to the King my master all the county of Guisnes (Guînes).
	Should, however, king Francis find the continuation of an annual pension to last for ever a grievous and intolerable burden, he may be relieved from that obligation by giving up to the King my master the town of Montreuil, of which he expects to get possession soon, with its territory, besides the county of Ponthieu. The King my master will be satisfied with that instead of the annual pension. (fn. 2)
	To deliver good and fit hostages as security for the additional conditions.
	French. Contemporary copy. Made in London, and sent by Chapuys to Brussels.
6 Oct.	223. The Emperor to His Ambassadors In England.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Reverend pere en Dieu, tres chiers et feaulx,”—Supposing that by this time, and on the receipt of this Our letter, you three are together, (fn. 3) the present will be in answer to the despatch [of the 2nd inst.] signed conjointly by two of you, Monsr. de Courrières and Eustace Chapuys, and received yesterday, the 5th. (fn. 4) The answer will also comprise the particulars relating to the mission of you, the bishop of Arras, to the Court of France for the purpose of and with a view to settling the differences existing between the kings of England and of France, and the proposed appointment by the latter of ambassadors to resume the negociations for the peace.
	As to that King's departure and passage to England, and what you, the said De Courrières and Chapuys (sic), wrote about it, We have nothing to observe. We approve entirely of your resolution to remain where you are, were it for no other purpose than to attend and watch, according to Our particular instructions, the proceedings of the commissioners, and individually and all together look out and procure the means of adjusting differences between the parties, and, in short, to do your best for the peace between England and France.
	As to the representations which you say have been addressed to you both by that King's privy councillors and ministers, respecting the favour with which five standards (enseignes) of French infantry have been treated by Our subjects at their passage through Bredenarde, you may answer, whenever an opportunity offers, that We know nothing about it, except what you yourselves wrote, nor have We received the least notice of the passage of that infantry through Our dominions. If they had really passed, and teen favourably treated by the peasants of that district, it must have been rather out of fear than otherwise. However that may be, We have not failed to complain to the French ambassadors residing at this Court, telling them seriously that We do not intend to allow king Francis' soldiers to pass through Our dominions.
	And since this point of the passage of armed men through Our territory has been touched, We consider it fit to inform you that the French have frequently and most urgently requested us to allow them to purchase, in Flanders, provisions for their army, alleging that, as it is, most of what they now eat and drink comes from foreign countries, and especially from Flanders and the Low Countries. This request of theirs We have refused to grant without attending to the formal prescriptions of our treaty with England, according to which We might very well have granted the French request, inasmuch as Boulogne is not among the towns or districts specified in the said treaty. This is said merely for your own private information, and that you may make use of it, or not, as you please or deem it convenient. (fn. 5)
	Touching the Sieur de Buren, “We are glad to hear that the king of England was, as he himself told you both, pleased and contented with this General's services on this late occasion. As far as We can learn here [at Brussels], Monsr. de Buren has fulfilled his charge honourably and to that King's complete satisfaction.
	But to return to the negociations for a treaty of peace between England and France. As far as we can understand, the chief difficulty is Boulogne, which town, as you, De Courrières and Chappuys (sic), informed Us in various of your dispatches, the English intend to retain, whilst king Francis, on the other hand, as you, the bishop of Arras, tell me, will in no way give up, as the ministers and ambassadors of king Francis have frequently declared to Us, at the same time alleging causes and reasons why the King their master cannot possibly yield on that point. Matters in this state, it will be your duty to use all your ability and discretion in speaking or acting impartially, so as not to raise the suspicions of one or the other of the parties; indeed, the point itself being so delicate and so (affectionné) to both princes, the utmost care should be taken not to offend either of them by appearing to lean towards one side more than to the other, especially as most likely the first thing the French commissioners will do upon their arrival t Calais] will be to ask for the restitution of Boulogne, and if the English absolutely refuse to treat on that ground there is danger of the negociation being broken, the more so that, according to what you, the bishop of Arras, wrote to Us, king Francis has positively declared that he will never consent to a suspension of hostilities unless he knows beforehand that the king of England consents to the said restitution, as a preliminary step to the negociations for peace.
	We cannot at present give you further instructions on this point, but We recommend you to do the utmost according to the disposition and will of both the parties themselves, and the number and strength of their respective forces in the field, thus obviating the many hazardous contingencies that might supervene by land or sea. We hardly need remind you here of what We wrote in Our last. It is of the. utmost importance that you, the Bishop, make the most strenuous efforts and employ all your ability and tact in trying to effect a peace between the belligerents, or, at least, procure a suspension of hostilities or a truce of some duration, long or short as it may be, during which, and according as the state of political affairs will permit, a peace may be negotiated and concluded
	We must not omit to say, for your guidance in this negociation, that the French have seriously spoken to Us about the engagement they had taken of sending their ambassadors to the king of England, as well as about their readiness to comply, as much as it is in their power, with any reasonable demands on the part of England, in conformity with the offers they themselves have made, and the “submission” to Our arbitration stipulated in their treaty of peace with Us shall remain entirely in Our hands. This the French have always insisted upon ever since We made peace with them, continually reminding our ministers and privy councillors of the mutual engagement stipulated in Our treaty with them, protesting that they have done, and will do in future, all that is in their power to put an end to this war, but, at the same time, hinting that should their offer be refused, and any evil come out of that refusal, it will not be their fault.
	As far as We can gather, though they do not openly and expressly say so, the French seem to fancy that, if they have to apply for Our arbitration, ultimately they will be favoured by it. That is why We order and request you, should the opportunity offer, and you deem it fit and convenient, to make use of the above information so as to induce the King and his ministers to facilitate more and more the ways of peace. But let these words and sentiments of the French, when reported by you to the King or to his privy councillors, be said and stated without commentary, and by way of conversational interchange of news, lest the English should imagine that We desire and are trying to get into Our hands the arbitration of differences existing between the two parties, (fn. 6) or that wish to press them (the English) to come to an agreement with their enemy, excepting on terms which they may find convenient and suitable to them.
	Should any remarks be again made to you respecting the naval armaments of France, and should the privy councillors again talk to you on the subject, you will tell them that, if possible, Our warships now in sight of Calais must not run the risk of being wrecked or lost, except for reasonable cause, and yet that the help and assistance which the English require will be afforded to them; but this, again, roust be said in a manner and in words not likely to cause resentment. (fn. 7) —Brussels, the 6th of October 1544.
	Indorsed: “L'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Ang'eterre.” (fn. 8)
	French. Original minute, partly ciphered. 3 pp.
6 Oct.	224. The Bishop of Arras to the Admiral of France.
Wien. Imp. Arch.	“Monsieur,”—I arrived here yesterday [the 5th] as the trumpeter, bearer of this my letter, will tell you, and heard that the King had embarked and left for England on Tuesday last (fn. 9) He, however, left behind him the two dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, besides others of his principal privy councillors, to attend to military affairs. (fn. 10) Meanwhile, as the Imperial ambassadors have already done all they possibly could to induce the King to the peace with France, and his Majesty has nevertheless sailed for England, they (the imperial ambassadors) have moved the Councillors to dispatch a messenger to the King their master, asking for full powers to treat with the French deputies, so that immediately upon the arrival of those whom the Most Christian King may appoint the negociations may commence. In this manner, the very moment that the English deputies arrive with full powers and commission to treat of the peace, both parties shall proceed to work.
	I have considered it my duty to inform you, as I do, of the state of the affair, that you may command my services, and let me know what else I can do to forward your views, begging you to let me know your resolution. I do not write direct to those lords in order not to molest them, and will put an end to this letter by affectionately commending myself to your good graces, and begging our Creator to give you a long life.—From Calais, the 6 October 1544.
	Addressed: “To Mons. d'Hannebault, marshal and admiral of France, &c.”
	French. Holograph. 1 p.
6 Oct.	225. Antoine Perrenot, Bishop Of Arras, De Courrières and Chapuys to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Sire,”—The dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, and other members of this King's Privy Council, having been informed that I (the bishop of Arras) had arrived in this town [of Calais] yesterday, sent me this morning, without my applying first for an audience, as is customary on such occasions, a message purporting that, being assembled at the Town Hall (Maison de Ville) far away from the quarter of the town where we the Imperial ambassadors reside, and they themselves now much engaged at the time, they would be glad to see me and my colleagues at the said Town Hall before or after dinner, as we pleased. Which invitation we accepted for the afternoon of the same day, considering that hour most fit and convenient to have a long conversation with them. (fn. 11)
	After dinner, therefore, I (the bishop) and my two colleagues went to the Town Hall, where the King's privy councillors were assembled, and after referring partly to what Monsr. de Courrières and Chapuys had told them the day before, I (the bishop of Arras) began to explain to them the nature of the charge I bore from Your Imperial Majesty. I told them, in short, that my mission was to solicit and find out the ways of peace between England and France. That my business was to try and persuade the King their master to accept the proposals once made by cardinal du Bellay and his colleagues in the name of the Most Christian King, or, failing that, induce the latter to send here to Calais new ambassadors to treat of peace. And, lastly, that the Most Christian King, finding the terms and conditions proposed by the English rather unreasonable and intolerable, had consented, at the express request and for the sake of Your Imperial Majesty, to send to England a fresh set of ambassadors, who were to leave the day after my departure, that is last Saturday, as I (the bishop) had occasion to write to Your Imperial Majesty from the camp of the Most Christian king of France. That passing by the place where king Francis was encamped, I had heard from the lips of the admiral of France that he had news of the king of England having crossed over to Dover, (fn. 12) and if that were so, he thought there would be some difficulty in sending French ambassadors to England. Doubting, however, whether the news was correct and authentic, I had come to this town, hoping that the King had not yet returned to England, but was still in France. I ascertained, however, that he was already in England, but had left behind some of his privy councillors, and had written to me by a trumpeter the letter of which a copy is enclosed.
	After hearing this explanation of my motives in coming here [to Calais], the privy councillors† retired to an adjoining room to deliberate, and on their return to the Council hall began by thanking me for the trouble I had taken in the affair of the peace. After that they went on to say that, truly speaking, they could not conceive how the King, their master, could possibly, without injury to his reputation, consent to treat of peace in the present state of affairs, for it seemed to them as if the French had no real desire for the peace they were seeking, since instead of applying for it in moderate and dignified terms, such as were requisite in such cases, they were making use of outrageous and threatening language (oltrageries et menasses), thinking thereby to intimidate the King, their master, and compel them to accept the said peace. “That is not (the privy councillors added) the way to induce the King, our master, to listen to proposals of peace, being, as he is, both powerful and magnanimous. The French are very much mistaken if they think that because they are so close to us as they are, and because the two dukes and the Lord Privy Seal, who enjoy most of the King's favour, are at present engaged with the administration of military affairs, they have a greater chance of pushing on their negotiations than if they had to deal with us, who, as members of the Privy Council, would necessarily enough have to attend the diplomatic conferences about the peace, whilst the French deputies themselves might live on English territory without having to attend to other important affairs of State”
	Besides the above argument, the privy councillor, who spoke for his colleagues, brought forward another remark more pointed than the rest, alleging that the very mild terms used by Your Imperial Majesty whilst intervening in the peace were calculated to render the French still more insolent than they were, and that in his opinion, if such a good object as the peace was to be attained, Your Imperial Majesty should employ authority rather than persuasion or exhortation. (fn. 13) In short, that since Your Majesty had expressly declared and reserved that the treaty of closer friendship and alliance between Your Majesty and the King their master, would remain in force and have effect, Your Imperial Majesty was bound, in case of invasion of English territory by the French, to declare against king Francis, and hold him as your enemy (et luy signifier belligerence), as Your Majesty was strictly obliged by the letter of the said treaty. The privy councillor ended by saying that what he had just proposed and advised was the result of his own and his colleagues' deliberation in the Privy Council without consulting the King, his master, whose will and orders on the subject they expected to receive very shortly.
	My answer to the above speech of the privy councillor, and his very polite thanks for the trouble I (the Bishop) had taken in coming [to Calais], was as follows:—I told them in courteous terms that I had done so with pleasure, and would willingly have taken much greater trouble and inconvenience for the sake of their King's service. As to the point at variance between Your Imperial Majesty and this King, and on which I plainly saw that the privy councillors wished to promote a debate, my two colleagues and I myself made such observations and remarks as we considered pertinent and convenient on the occasion. (fn. 14) That we did in the most moderate (honestes) and gracious terms possible, explaining how to our certain knowledge Your Imperial Majesty had hitherto done, and was ready to do in future, in this matter of peace, all that you were obliged by treaty; but that, I said, is not the object of my present mission; it is limited to inquiring whether the King your master will receive the new ambassadors whom the Most Christian king of France was prepared to send. At the same time I did not let the opportunity pass away without telling them that through Your Majesty's late peace with them, king Francis had become, as it were, Tour own confederate and ally, with the perfect will and consent of the King, their master, which fact was sufficient of itself to refute most of the allegations they had made, or might make hereafter, in favour of their demand. “All of us thought,” said I (the Bishop) to the privy councillors, “ that the King your master would see with pleasure the arrival of the new French embassy, as he himself, at his departure, told me and my colleagues (De Courrières and Chapuys). At that time the King knew very well that the French were marching [on Boulogne] against him.”
	With regard to the loss of reputation, on which they founded most of their arguments, I told them that I saw no cause at all to fear it; for besides their King being in arms, as the Most Christian King was, his being actually in possession of Boulogne placed him in a more advantageous position, as far as reputation goes, than the latter, who was now actually suing for peace.
	As to the authority, of which, as they said, Tour Imperial Majesty ought to make use in the present case, it would not do for You, whilst treating of peace, to stipulate for the retreat of the French army, unless You promised that the king of England would also evacuate French territory. Nor was it proper and convenient to do so, for the reasons alleged yesterday, which reasons they themselves had found good and sufficient. (fn. 15) Besides which, the very moment You heard that the King, their master, had actually raised the siege of Montreuil, You had broken up (rompu) Tour army, and therefore my colleagues and I considered that authority not backed by force to remedy the evil in case of refusal would have been of no use at all in the present case, and would certainly have hampered Your Imperial Majesty in the execution of the peace, and You would have lost all credit as well as the means of inducing the Most Christian King to peace.—From Calais, 6 October 1544.
	Signed: “A. Perrenot, bishop of Arras; J. De Montmorency; Eustace Chapuys.”
	Indorsed: “From the ambassador in England of the 6th of October. Received at Brussels on the 9th of the said month of October.”
	French. Original. 4 pp.
6 Oct.	226. Eustace Chapuys to Mgr. De Granvelle.
	“Monseigneur, &c.”—Tour Lordship will see by the letter addressed to His Imperial Majesty the substance of our conferences with these privy councillors, in which conferences Mons. de Courrières and I myself have been spectators and witnesses rather than actors; for greater reason had the apples of the fable to say “We also can swim,” and the fly that stood on the horn of the ox to boast that it was ploughing, than wè ourselves had to pretend to have been of any use or help to Monsr. d'Arras, who certainly has no need of such Delius and Theseus, as we both are [to him]. (fn. 16) One single injury (aggravie) (fn. 17) he has done us, and particularly me, which is his having refused to put down in writing the result of the conferences; but I have taken my revenge by purposely omitting to mention many things that were said thereat, that he himself should take the trouble of keeping them in memory. Indeed, to say the truth, and without affectation of any kind, I do not hesitate to say that His Imperial Majesty could never, for a thousand reasons (pour mille respects), have chosen a fitter person than him to fill the duties of the charge entrusted to him.
	In the present case, however, the two chief foundation stones on which all negociations ought to rest—namely, the opportunity, which is the source of all profitable actions, and the matter itself—should be well chosen. Without those conditions no natural agent can possibly effect anything. As to me, I do really believe that had I been entrusted with Monsr. d'Arras' mission, all my arguments at the conferences would have been perfectly useless and unavailing under the circumstances; for this King, on many considerations, of which Monsr. de Courrières and I myself wrote to His Imperial Majesty on the—, will not easily give up his conquest. Perhaps after turning over in his mind several considerations which your Lordship may appreciate better than myself, he may after all renounce his new acquisition. (fn. 18) As to me, I would not find fault with the French if they made excuses, and did not send their ambassadors and ministers, for out of that nothing should be done; for I doubt whether anything can be concluded, and I am almost sure that neither of the parties will advance or retreat one single step of their own respective pretensions; and who knows whether, after all, one or the other of the princes, and perhaps both, will not cast suspicions on His Imperial Majesty? (fn. 19) After the parties have become tired of spending money in the keeping up of their respective armies, that will be the time for the Emperor to mediate; as the advocate advised his eon, at the beginning of the dispute, never to interfere between two parties until they were actually tired of pleadmg; or, as the proverb says: “Beatus in declinatione morbi medicus.”
	By way of confirmation of the above-mentioned subject, I cannot help telling your Lordship that to-day, after the conference was over, the bishop of Winchester (Gardiner) told me confidentially, and under reserve, after many protests and excuses for speaking his mind freely, that it seemed to him as if His Imperial Majesty, being now on good terms with the Most Christian king of France, had conceived some sort of jealousy and envy at his master the king of England keeping possession of some small portion of French territory which he had conquered during the war; and that as the Emperor himself, by his separate peace with the French, had obtained nothing of the sort, rather than let his late ally enjoy that advantage and commodity, seeing him so great and in fair way of becoming still greater and more powerful, he was trying to mediate between the two kings, and promote some sort of peace that would ultimately leave Boulogne in the hands of the French.
	I must add that the very same bishop in conversation had told me two days before that it would not be asserted, as people generally said, that Your Imperial Majesty had been forced to make peace with France, since, after all, you had obtained everything that was desirable, namely, giving the investiture of Milan to the duke of Orleans on the very same conditions once rejected by the French, and that as to Boulogne and the river Somme, that would have been increasing the expense of the war, as that territory could on no account be kept without an army, and would cause for ever the hatred of the French, besides which it was quite evident that Your Imperial Majesty had already more domains and kingdoms than You wished for, and that what you wanted was peace and tranquillity.
	Whatever efforts I made to stop the Bishop's mouth, I could not do so until I told him that he was actually casting dishonour on the King, his master, who whilst debating with the bishop of Arras and with me on the subject, deliberately said that the conditions [of Crêpy] had been made, could not have been worse had His Imperial Majesty been a prisoner in France.
	Your Lordship, with your great wisdom and tact, will easily understand what may be the purpose of the above and other similar arguments, which I myself could not if I chose put down in writing. As this my letter is already too long and too prolix, I beg your Lordship to excuse me.—Calais, 6 October 1544. Your most humble, &c.
	Signed: “Eustace Chapuys.”
	French. Holograph. 3 pp.
9 Oct.	227. King Henry to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	Orders have been issued for some of his own privy councillors in Calais to negociate and treat of peace with the ambassadors and commissioners of king Francis. Should the French commissioners not agree to the reasonable terms proposed by the English, two of the latter—namely, count Darfort (the earl of Hertford) and the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner)—will go to the Emperor and explain to him king Henry's views and intentions in the matter, telling him in plain words what his wishes are. The Emperor may attach the same faith to the representations of his deputies as if he himself were personally declaring his sentiments and views. Expects soon from the Emperor a resolute and final answer on the whole affair, such as their mutual friendship and close alliance demand. (fn. 20) —Westminster Palace, 9 October 1544.
	Signed: “Henry.”
	French. Original. 1 p.
10 Oct.	228. The Bishop of Arras, the Sieur De Courriêres and Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Rep. P., Fasc. C. 23.	“Sire,”—The day before yesterday two of Your Imperial Majesty's letters, both dated the 6th (fn. 21) inst., came duly to hand, immediately after the receipt of which the bishop of Winchester came to us saying that the King's privy councillors were very much surprised to see that the vessels (bateaux) destined for their passage [to England] had not yet arrived, and begging us to write to Your Majesty to give proper orders about them. Our answer was, according to the contents of Your Majesty's letter, that due provision had already been made for the whole, not failing, at the same time, to remonstrate with him respecting the many abuses committed by the English during the transport of the Flemish mares (juments), and the ill-treatment of the carriers and sutlers. The Bishop promised that in future order should be given to put that right, and this morning, having gone to the Privy Council, we were again assured that proper orders should be issued to that effect, yet giving us to understand at the same time that, as there had been of late no transport of Flemish mares, there was no ground for complaint on that score, nor would there be any in future, for they were too busy in transporting their own horses to think of other cattle. As to the illtreatment of carriers and sutlers (fn. 22) (said they), it was natural enough that in a camp so numerous as theirs was there should be some appearance of disorderly and unjustifiable acts, the reparation of which, if sufficiently proved, would immediately be made. Had they (the councillors) chosen to complain of the carmen (chartons) they would have plenty of cause for it, for some of the artillery drivers, either through malice or because they were drunk, were on the point of letting some of the guns fall into the hands of the French, and whenever they went out of the camp to get beer (cervoise) they remained long out of it, loitering on the roads, or went away farther than was necessary, for the purpose of drinking a larger quantity of it more at their ease. If in this manner some of the carriers have suffered, it was no fault of the English, but their own, owing to their choosing to go out of the camp foraging without waiting for proper escort. With respect to their pay, the privy councillors assured us that they would be paid up to the last penny, but they ought to wait patiently for a few days, for the treasurer who had the money to pay them had crossed over to England; and upon our remonstrating that if the men had to wait for the return of the treasurer, they and their horses would die of hunger, the privy councillor begged us to advise the carriers to go away with their horses, deputing or leaving behind here, at Boulogne, one or more agents of their own sufficiently empowered to receive the sum of money owing to them.
	The privy councillors have gratefully acknowledged the service which Your Imperial Majesty has done to the King their master by the appointment of an Imperial commissary, with whom it has been settled that victuals shall be furnished to the English army at a place near Gravelinghes, and close to the frontier of the territory now under their King's jurisdiction. (fn. 23) With such an arrangement as particularly specified in Your Imperial Majesty's letters, the privy councillors are perfectly satisfied, as well as with the orders issued that the French be not provided with victuals from the same quarter, though supposing, as they themselves have declared to us, that it will be almost impossible to have those orders executed strictly, and prevent the peasants, men and women, from taking food and commodities to whichever place they find a better market for them. The English themselves, said the privy councillors, at the siege of Montreuil would have died of hunger, had not the people of Hesdin and the neighbouring country supplied them daily with food. (fn. 24)
	Your Imperial Majesty's answer to the request of these privy councillors, that the five companies (enseignes) of English infantry should be allowed to pass through the territory of Bredenarde, has likewise been gratefully received, for when the application was made, they really thought that the news they had received was authentic. As to the five war vessels of Your Imperial Majesty that are still in these waters, we have already signified to the Vice Admiral that it is not Your intention that they should remain any longer here. The Vice-Admiral would willingly have remained here one fortnight more for Your Imperial Majesty's service, and for other considerations, if he knew that be could get a sufficient supply of beer (bière) for his ships, the crews of which are suffering greatly for the last five or six days in consequence of that which they had on board having become sour and undrinkable. We are, moreover, afraid that if the ships leave this place they will have to go to Zeeland, for whatever efforts we and the said commander have made to get a supply of beer, it has been impossible to obtain here, with the Council's authority, more than seven casks, which is nothing for 700 men on board the ships, so much so that should they remain here the men will have nothing to drink.
	In short, to return to the principal affair, the privy councillors, on the receipt late in the evening of yesterday of letters from their master, sent us word that this very morning, at 8 o'clock, they would call and communicate with us on the subject. So they did, telling us in substance that the King, their master, considering that matters could easily be determined and concluded in England, did not see a reason for the French ambassadors declining to go thither. He, the King, saw no difficulty whatever in it, and could not imagine what the objection of the French could be; besides which, if any really existed, the Emperor would contribute to its removal. The King, moreover, was surprised to hear (one of the privy councillors observed) that the conditions offered to the cardinal of Paris (Jean du Bellay) and his colleagues were considered by the French to be very hard and intolerable, whereas they were evidently more moderate than those he himself had proposed when the war was declared, as may be seen in the treaty of closer alliance made with Your Imperial Majesty, and milder than those which king Francis himself had offered to accept.
	To the above asseverations, I, the bishop of Arras, leaving aside the task of refuting the privy councillors' arguments, proceeded to relate the great efforts which Your Imperial Majesty and I myself, in Your Majesty's name, had once used to procure permission, in case of the King having returned to his English kingdom, for the ambassadors of the Most Christian king of France to go over to that country, at the same time declaring what had passed between me and the admiral of France (Hannebault). As to what they began to say and hint that I might again write to Your Imperial Majesty, and that they were in receipt of fresh letters from the King, their master, which having been read and discussed in Council, they came back to us saying that the letters just received were very slightly connected with the subject of the peace, since their purport was to announce that the King their master had despatched the earl of Hertford and secretary Paget with sufficient powers to listen to the proposals of the French [ambassadors] under the supposition that the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, and the Lord Privy Seal, (fn. 25) were engaged in military affairs.
	The privy councillors having asked what news we had of the French ambassadors, I, the bishop of Arras, answered in accordance with the admiral of France's letter to me, telling them in substance what was my reply to him. Enclosed are copies both of the letter and answer, as well as a duplicate of another from the Admiral to me received this very afternoon, after dinner. In short, in order to save time and put off the affair, the privy councillors have been of opinion that I, the Bishop, should send a message to the Admiral inquiring how soon the said embassy is likely to be here, who and how many the ambassadors are, the names and titles of each of them, and how many servants and other attendants will accompany them, in order to prepare the necessary safe-conducts and so forth in conformity with the powers which the two Dukes formerly had to treat with them and hear their proposals. To this effect, immediately after their departure [for Calais] the Dukes sent me a trumpeter, to whom I delivered the letter of which the enclosed is a copy.
	Respecting Monsr. de Buren, these privy councillors did certainly give a few days ago a remarkable proof of the satisfaction and contentment they have felt at his services on this occasion, for during the three or four days he, the Count, has spent in this town, he has been feasted and entertained beyond measure, the more so that I (the Bishop) strongly suspect that their treatment of his person has been somewhat exaggerated for the purpose of rendering us jealous of him, and making me feel that my arrival and that of my colleagues in this town has not been over acceptable. Indeed, Briant the Other day could not help saying to him that we must be rather disappointed and in bad humour at not being invited to the many parties and entertainments in his (count Buren's) honour. And although no great reliance should be placed on the words of such a speaker, yet as these people are in the habit of employing such stratagems when discontented, there is every likelihood of the said Briant having spoken on the authority of some personage higher in office than himself. I am the more convinced of it that the day before yesterday the privy councillors sent for the Admiral's trumpeter and gave him different lodgings, at which he slept under care of a guard appointed for the purpose, (fn. 26) and on the ensuing morning would not allow him to depart and take the letters I had given him for the Admiral, nor those of my colleagues to either, but despatched for that purpose another trumpeter of their own. True it is that this very morning they have acted with more courtesy, for after the duke of Norfolk had said a few words to him, the Englishman came to us and asked whether we had any orders for him.
	With regard to the chief point, namely, the giving up of Boulogne, not a word has been said to us, nor have we alluded to it in the least, for the reasons and considerations explained in Your Imperial Majesty's letters to us, both the last and the preceding ones. Neither has an allusion been made on our part to the pressing and urgent requests made to Your Imperial Majesty by the ministers of the Most Christian king of France in order to comply with and submit to the conditions of the peace, for we consider this not to be the fit moment and opportunity to do so, fearing that when the French ambassadors themselves see no hope of peace on this side, they will of themselves touch on this point.
	The governor of Gravelinghes (fn. 27) had written to me (Courrières) about the secret requisition of the French captain at Ardres, asking him to allow him the passage through that territory of 10,000 Frenchmen for the purpose of making an inroad on this side. The Governor had answered that he could not consent to it unless Your Imperial Majesty sent him an order to that effect. Having communicated with my colleagues, I (Courrières) have said in answer to the Governor's letter that should the application be renewed, he is to persist in his refusal, and prevent the passage of French troops through the territory under his immediate command. This I gathered to be Your Imperial Majesty's will in this affair from the answer to the despatch in which my colleagues and I mentioned the rumour that was afloat of five companies of French infantry having passed through Bredenarde. Of this we have confidentially and under reserve given the privy councillors notice, that they may be on their guard, and know that we proceed with perfect good faith in everything concerning them. Since then the privy councillors have again particularly requested us to keep the said passage well guarded, as well as that of the bulwark erected close to the river of St. Omer, about which we wrote to Your Imperial Majesty, adding that if the governor [of St. Omer] had not under him a sufficient force to prevent the passage, they (the English) would guard it, provided Your Imperial Majesty allowed it. Our answer to the privy councillors has been that both Gravelinghes and St. Omer were well provided for, and had sufficient garrisons, and that the above said passages would be well guarded, and we are now writing to the governor of Gravelinghes again recommending the affair to him.—Calais, 10th of October 1544.
	Signed: “A. Perrenot, bishop of Arras;=J. de Montmorency;=Eustace Chapuys.”
	Addressed: “To the Emperor.”
	Indorsed: “From the ambassadors in England on the 10th of October 1544. Received at Brussels on the 12th of the said month.” (fn. 28)
	French. Original, partly ciphered.
10 Oct	229. The Bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to the Admiral of France.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Monsieur,”—This morning the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, the king of England's Lord Privy Seal (Sir John Russell), the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner), and other members of the King's Privy Council came to us, the Imperial ambassadors, to communicate the intelligence and orders they had received from England respecting their commission to treat of the pence. After again insisting on the convenience of the French deputies crossing over to England in order to treat more easily and comfortably of the proposed peace without their having to send backwards and forwards to consult their masters; after my representing to the Dukes the inconvenience of such a plan for the reasons adduced in your letter to me, and above all, that you and the rest of the French deputies would have to pass through the English camp, the Dukes told me that they are expecting to-day the arrival of the earl of Hertford and secretary Paget, who are to be the bearers of the said commission and powers to treat, and no doubt will bring with them the King's final resolution in that matter. Of course, should the King still insist on his idea that the meeting of the commissioners take place in England, I shall let you know immediately, in order that whatever may be wanted for the passage across the Channel of the French deputies (fn. 29) of whose number and names I should be glad to have a list as soon as possible, in order to have the safe-conducts, passports, and all that is requisite on the occasion, prepared without delay. If, therefore, you will kindly send me by the trumpeter, bearer of this my letter, a list of the names, quality, and offices held by those who are to cross the Channel as commissioners or deputies to treat of peace, as well as of their attendants and servants, you will oblige me.—Calais, 10 October 1544.
	Signed: “Anthoine, bishop of Arras.”
	Addressed: “A Monsieur le Marechal d'Hannebault [Amiral de France].”
	French. Contemporary copy.
10 Oct.	230. The Admiral of France to Monsr. D'Arras.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Monsieur,'—I am in receipt this very moment of your letter [of the 6th], (fn. 30) in answer to which I can only say, as I wrote to you this very morning, that I am expecting from hour to hour to receive news from cardinal Du Bellay. I cannot exactly tell you the number of people, secretaries, personal servants, and so forth, that the Cardinal and president Raymond (fn. 31) —who, in my opinion, will be the two persons appointed [with me] by the King my master for the negociation of the peace—will bring in their suite, but according to their quality and rank I should think that it will be at least between 80 and 100 mounted followers. I agree with you that no time should be lost, for things long delayed never come to a good issue, and besides that, I am afraid that you yourself will be greatly annoyed by the delay, and by having to stay so long at Calais without the means of returning to your master the Emperor.
	That is why if you please to apply for a safe-conduct for cardinal Du Bellay, president Raymond, and their suite, not exceeding 100 followers in all, I shall be much obliged to you. As soon as the said safe-conduct reaches me, I shall forward it to the Cardinal, that he and his colleague may at once depart on their mission.—Camp at Fijennes, (fn. 32) 10 October 1544.
	French. Contemporary copy.
10 Oct.	231. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Monsieur,”—The bearer of this letter brought me yours of this day, and I am anxiously expecting news of the Cardinal and of the President, as I wrote to you this very moraine by my trumpeter. I cannot conceive what may be the cause of their delay, for had the cardinal of Paris fallen ill on the road, he surely would have let me know of it. I have sent an express messenger (homme express) to go to Court and try to find his whereabouts. Should he meet him on the road, as I believe he will, my messenger is to apprise him of the contents of your letter, and tell him to make haste. Should he not meet him, then immediately upon my man's return I will write and inform you of the cause and reasons of his delay, if I can hear of or guess at them.
	I must, however, observe that no later than yesterday I received a letter from cardinal de Tournon, saying that the Emperor is now feasting and taking pleasure, and that in his opinion neither you nor any of His Imperial Majesty's ambassadors, not even one of king Francis' commissioners, will cross over to England, since the conferences for the peace can as well, if not better, take place on this side of the Channel, those among the king of England's privy councillors who are on the Continent attending them. As to me, I am of the same opinion; I think that it is more fit and convenient that the conferences for a treaty on the base of the offers and conditions made by our master, and of which the Emperor has already had full cognizance, should be held in some neutral town like Dunkerke, St. Omer, or any other on the frontier of Flanders.
	However that may be, I have the pleasure of sending you one of the Spanish prisoners, who was (I do not know how long ago) taken prisoner by my men (mes gens). He happens to be a servant of the Imperial ambassador at the court of France, and was taken together with some bundles of clothes and other articles which he has hitherto been unable to recover. I do my best to discover in whose hands they are, that the whole may be restored to him. (fn. 33) I promise you to take this affair in hand as diligently and with as much care as if it were my own, and see that the man be fully compensated for his loss.
	I must not omit to say that I believe our queen (Eleoenor) will soon undertake a journey to see her brother, the Emperor, and I hope that you yourself by that time will be returning to the Imperial Court. (fn. 34)
	Begging to commend myself to your good graces, and hoping to receive soon agreeable news of your good health and so forth, I remain, Monsieur good friend, entirely yours. —Written at the camp of Fyennes, on the 10th day of October 1544.
	Signed: “D'Annebault.”
	French. Original. 2 pp.
	Addressed: “To Monsieur the bishop of Arras.”
10 Oct.	232. The English Ambassador's Representations to the Emperor on his separate peace with France.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	The king of England, my master, has been apprised by my despatches, and also verbally informed by the Emperor's ambassadors, (fn. 35) then residing near his Royal person, that after, and in consequence of, Your Imperial Majesty's peace with France, Your Majesty's army has left that country and retreated to Flanders. By doing which the King, my master, who has not been included in that peace, or otherwise satisfied as to his own claims, has remained, and is still, at war with the French. Even after he (the King), on the Emperor's advice, had raised the siege of Montreuil, the French have wantonly assailed the English everywhere, besides spreading the rumour that they are about to invest Boulogne, one of my master's possessions. Should they do so, as they are threatening, the King, my master, will be obliged to keep his army in the field, and that cannot be done save at great cost and expense, which the King, my master, wishes to avoid. He has, therefore, commanded me to lay before Your Imperial Majesty the following considerations:—
	The state of Your Majesty's affairs at the time Your army had penetrated far into France was so fraught with danger, that Your Imperial Majesty thought it convenient to make a separate peace with the common enemy on conditions much less advantageous to Yourself than they would have been had Your Imperial Majesty (as the King my master once suggested) waited to make the same conjointly with Your ally, the king of England, when most surely You would have obtained from the French all You wished for.
	Since Your Majesty's return to Flanders, the cause of the king of England, Your brother, has evidently been forgotten or neglected by You, on the plea, no doubt, that You wanted before all things to recover the town of Landrecy—one of the conditions of Your treaty of peace with France. But even granting that, it stands to reason that now that the said fortress has been restored to You, and that Your army is out of French territory altogether, You should proceed and act with the common enemy in conformity with the treaty You have with the King, my master, which treaty the latter has always observed, and intends in future to observe, most faithfully.
	How the king of England has behaved in these transactions Your Imperial Majesty has no doubt heard, not only from the French lords (seigneurs) who were then at my master's court—some of whom are now here [at Brussels]—but from others among king Francis' ministers, as well as from the correspondence between the latter and the King, my master, and also by the last demands made by the King, my master, to the French ambassadors, which demands and conditions I myself declared and explained to Your Imperial Majesty at Crespy (Crêpy) in the Laonois. (fn. 36)
	As to Your Majesty's assertion that certain ambiguous words and promises were said by the bishop of Arras to have been uttered and made by the King, my master, respecting the peace with France, I am fully authorised to state that the only remark His Majesty the king of England, my master, made on the occasion in regard to the alternative of the marriage, about which the Bishop spoke to him, was that it seemed to him as if the marriage of Your Imperial Majesty's daughter with the duke of Orleans, and Milan as a dower, would be less objectionable than that of the king of the Romans' second daughter with the Low Countries. (fn. 37)
	Even had the King, my master, said to the Bishop that he would be satisfied and glad at getting the most advantageous terms and conditions possible from the common enemy, that could not, and ought not, to be by Your Majesty interpreted as meaning that the King, ray master, was ready to relinquish or diminish in the least his very just claims, or in other words impair his own treaty with Your Majesty. Treaties between Princes are made after long and mature deliberation, and after that set down in writing, and therefore it is very improbable—nay, unusual, that treaties put down in writing, solemnly signed and ratified, should be afterwards altered or changed by mere words uttered at random by one of the contracting parties. Should any alteration or change be introduced by mutual consent, then the said alterations are to be put down in writing. (fn. 38) Not only that, I most resolutely declare that never, at any time, was the King, my master, of opinion that peace could be concluded by one only of Your two Majesties, alone, without the concurrence and co-operation of the other, and not unless both of you were satisfied and contented. (fn. 39)
	His Majesty, the king of England, holds the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to be a lord (seigneur) of unimpeachable veracity and honesty, as well as consummate skill and wisdom, a man incapable of asserting that the King, my master, ever said the words attributed to him respecting the alteration, change, or breaking up altogether of the treaty.
	His Majesty, the king of England, has invariably been in the habit of entrusting to me in full confidence all political and other affairs he may have with Your Imperial Majesty. He has never failed to do so, and I declare that hitherto no letter nor message from him has come to me on the subject. (fn. 40) Had he ordered me to mention it to Your Majesty, I should infallibly have done so out of obedience to his commands and regard for Your Majesty. At any rate, I am sure that the king of England, my master, never intended that the peace with France should be made and ratified by Your Imperial Majesty alone until both of you were satisfied and contented.
	True it is that in consequence of certain overtures made by Your Majesty's ambassadors at the camp and court of Boulogne, my master, the king of England, did approve of the proposal then made that a communication or conference should be held with king Francis' commissioners in order to ascertain whether means could be found of coming to an understanding and reconciliation, but in consenting to that the King, my master, meant that both of you, the allies, should work conjointly and fairly (à bon scient) for so desirable an object, so that neither of the allies could actually conclude a solemn and binding peace unless the other was completely satisfied and contented.
	That such was my master's intention and wish appears evident from the fact of Your Imperial Majesty asking him urgently for a statement of the demands he wished to make from the French, that You might bestir Yourself on his behalf, and obtain them from the common enemy; and that in a like manner—on the above and other like considerations that might, if necessary, be adduced, and knowing that the common enemy of both the allied princes (Your Majesty and the King my master) is bound to submit himself to Your arbitration and sentence—my Royal master trusts and expects to get, through Your Imperial Majesty's influence and power, a quick and complete settlement of all his just and legitimate claims, of the import and nature of which Your Majesty has already full cognisance, knowing them all to be reasonable and of small importance when compared with those which the King my master would be perfectly entitled and justified in making in virtue of the treaty of friendship and closer alliance with Your Imperial Majesty. (fn. 41)
	Sire, to put an end to this long speech of mine, I beg Your Majesty in my Royal master's name to be pleased to request—nay, urgently press the king of France to come to an agreement with the King my master, to admit at once the whole of his demands, and comply with them efficiently. Should the king of France refuse to do so, or seek means and excuses to delay his answer, then in that case I will beg and entreat Your Imperial Majesty to be pleased to declare openly in favour of the King my master, and be the enemy of king Francis, as required by the treaty of alliance. The King my master is quite certain that, his demands on this occasion being so moderate, and at the same time so just, Your Imperial Majesty will attend to his request, and that having regard to the very close and brotherly friendship and alliance which unite you both, Your Majesty will grant his request. (fn. 42)
	Indorsed: “Piece à ajouter à la lettre de l'Empereur à son ambassadeur (fn. 43) en Angleterre, du 10 Octobre 1644.”
	French. Contemporary copy. 5 pp.
10 Oct.	233. The Emperor's reply to the English Ambassador's (fn. 44) Note of Hand.
Wien, Imp Arch.	The Emperor having seen what the ambassador of the king of England, his good brother, stated in writing, has ordered the following answer to be prepared for him to send to the King, his master.
	His Imperial Majesty trusts too much in the wisdom and discretion of his good brother, the king of England, to think for one moment that He (the Emperor) has failed in fulfilling all and every one of the conditions of the treaty of alliance, or of the convention afterwards entered into with the viceroy of Sicily, Don Fernando de Gonzaga.
	As to the Emperor's treaty of peace with France, that treaty was concluded on perfectly justifiable grounds, and with the full consent of the king of England, as well as his excuses for being unable (the ambassador said) to join the Emperor in the undertaking against France.
	The Emperor has no doubt—nay, holds for certain, that the king of England will recollect the very words he addressed to the bishop of Arras and to other Imperial ambassadors, when asked to give his consent to the Emperor's request, which words he (the King) and the members of his Privy Council have frequently quoted and repeated since, and the Emperor hopes that the promises which the King made on that occasion will be kept, since words among princes proceeding in good faith are as binding as the most authentic documents.
	There is no need to contradict the assertion made in writing by the English ambassador, i.e., that the agreement entered into on the occasion of the Emperor's informing the King, his ally, of the overtures of peace made by the French, was that each of the contracting parties should be at liberty individually and separately to treat of peace with the common enemy, provided there was complete satisfaction on the part of the allies. But neither the propositions then made to the king of England in His Majesty's name respecting the meeting of their armies for a joint invasion of French territory and subsequent march upon Paris, nor the condition of the Imperial army at the place in the heart of France, where it happened then to be encamped, nor the answer, which the King himself made to the Emperor's pressing message, could in any way justify the long protracted delay in the King's consent. (fn. 45) Certainly, it was not fear of the common enemy as it was represented to the English ambassador, that caused the Emperor to ask so urgently for an answer to his application. Several other considerations of paramount importance were then laid before him, and afterwards submitted to the king of England himself, which reasons and considerations could not fail, as the King well knows, to impress all worthy people with the idea that His Imperial Majesty has already done in that respect all that could be expected from Him, and has been perfectly justified, even in view of the king of England's answer and excuses, in acting as He did, and treating with the French.
	Nor could the interpretation, or rather supposition, embodied in the King's verbal message to Monsr. d'Arras—namely, that both the allied powers should manage their own affairs separately and individually, (fn. 46) and yet preserve all the time the true and perfect amity, friendship, and alliance existing between them—be admitted, that being of itself a state of things not to be reconciled with the affair now under discussion.
	There is, besides, no shadow whatever of plausibility in the objections raised by the English ambassador that the mere fact of the Emperor having sent to the King a copy of the demands He intended to make from France, and of the king of England having reciprocally forwarded his own, might be taken as an argument in his favour, for in no way did that correspondence bind the two princes one towards the other: (fn. 47) it was the express consent afterwards given by the king of England for each prince to treat individually with the common enemy, and negotiate a separate peace with him, that did in a certain way bind the parties together.
	That consent once obtained, His Imperial Majesty proceeded to execute His engagements as expressly and as honourably as could be desired, taking particular care that the article of the reservation of the king of England's rights should be inserted in His own treaty with France. The king of England, therefore, ought to be glad of the agreement then taken, as he has since appeared to be completely satisfied with it. (fn. 48)
	Indeed, ever since his treaty with France, the Emperor has done the best he could for the interest of the king of England. Neither the Landrecy incident, nor any other consideration, has prevented him from doing all he could on his behalf, and procuring the settlement of the differences between England and France. As to Landrecy, there was no fear of its becoming an obstacle to his wishes, as the Emperor had in his hands sufficient security in the way of French hostages, and so forth. He has done all he possibly could to persuade king Francis to send again his ambassadors to the king of England. Even in his endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the kings of England and France, the Emperor thought that he was working in favour and for the interest and satisfaction of his ally; so much so, that his own ministers and ambassadors have, according to his express orders and instructions, worked incessantly to that end. (fn. 49) Precisely in the same strain, and for the particular advantage of the king of England, his ally, did the Emperor speak to the English ambassador residing at his court, when he advised that the siege of Montreuil should be raised. (fn. 50) That advice the King accepted, though it must be observed that, when first tendered, the English ambassador here [at Brussels] did not approve of it.
	As to the strict observance of Ms treaty with England at present and in future, his Imperial Majesty will not be in fault. He has hitherto complied, and will in future comply, most strictly with all and every one of its prescriptions; he will take care that the reservation of the king of England's rights stipulated in his own treaty with France be carried into full effect. That this will be his line of conduct for the future, abundant proofs have already been given, firstly by his allowing the infantry and cavalry under count Buren to remain with the English as long as the King wanted and wished; (fn. 51) and secondly, by continuing to furnish provisions and carriage, together with a large number of draft horses (limoniers), notwithstanding the ill-treatment of his Imperial Majesty's subjects by the English soldiers, and the immense damage and loss inflicted upon the Belgian peasants and drivers during the war.
	As to urging and pressing the king of France to agree to and comply with the king of England's last demands, and should he refuse to do so, declaring war against him, that is a sort of thing which the Emperor at present declines to do; but he fully promises to act in such a manner that it shall not be imputed to him that he has forgotten any part of the stipulations of his treaty with the king of England, or disregarded any of the means suggested by the king of England to bring about his reconciliation with king Francis.
	In bringing to an end the above answer, His Imperial Majesty trusts that the king of England will take in good part this answer of His, and acknowledge that every clause of the treaty of closer friendship and alliance with England has been and will be punctually executed on His side, trusting also that the king of England will acknowledge that in all these matters the Emperor has acted with perfect sincerity as well as regard for the confederacy and friendship which unites them both. (fn. 52) —[Oct. 10, 1544.]
	Indorsed: “Piece ajoutee à la lettre de l'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre.”
	French. Original. 5 pp.