Spain: June 1543, 6-10 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2, 1542-1543. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1895.

Citation:

'Spain: June 1543, 6-10', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2, 1542-1543, ed. Pascual de Gayangos( London, 1895), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol6/no2/pp363-385 [accessed 30 November 2024].

June 1543, 6-10



6 June.	148. The King of the Romans' Instructions to his Internuncio Tranquillus Andronicus.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl., 9.	"Ferdinand, king of the Romans, &c.,"—What you, Our honourable, learned, faithful, and beloved secretary, Tranquillus Andronicus, Our inter-nuncio, whom We now send to the court of the most serene prince Henry, king of England and France, &c., lord of Ireland, Defender of the Faith, Our dearest brother and relative, are to do and say in England, is as follows:—
	Immediately after your landing in England, wherever the King holds his court, you shall call on the resident ambassador of Our brother the Emperor, and with his advice and co-operation ask for an audience from the King. This being obtained, you will go to the King's palace alone by yourself, or in company with your colleague the Imperial ambassador (as both of you may think proper and convenient), and when in the Royal presence, will exhibit your credentials, as well as Our own particular letter to the King. After assuring the King of Our constant love and affection for his Royal person, as well as of the unalterable friendship of Our brother the Emperor, you will proceed with due reverence and in appropriate terms to explain the purpose and object of your mission as follows:—
	You will tell him at once that you are sent by Us for the express purpose of asking his powerful and prompt aid and assistance against the Infidel Turk. You will explain to him how powerful and strong Christendom's most inveterate enemy is, and declare that should he be able to get possession of Buda and Pesth, there is no saying in what danger Our own patrimonial dominions, and indeed the whole of Christian Europe, would inevitably be placed. For if the news We have from the Levant be authentic—and We are afraid it is so—Solyman in person will presently come down upon Hungary at the head of an innumerable host, and after reducing that part of the country, which still acknowledges Our rule, will push on towards Vienna and penetrate into Germany, burn the crops, devastate the country, put the inhabitants to the sword, and extinguish if he can the very name of Christian.
	You will represent to him in Our name that, exhausted and fatigued as Our subjects, nay, the whole of Germany, have been by past wars, they are scarcely in a condition to contend efficiently with the Turk. That the States of the Empire on this emergency have already voted a considerable sum of money and a large contingent of men to help Us in the impending war; that We have no doubt that all Christian powers will do the same, and that it is for him, who bears the title of Defender of the Faith, to lead the way and give the example.
	Should you and your colleague, the Imperial ambassador, perceive that the King is inclined to help Us in Our present critical situation, and willing to contribute with a body of men, you will tell him that as the season is so far advanced, and the distance so great, his succour in men would hardly arrive in time to be of use, and that it would be more convenient for Us if his help should consist of money.
	This being obtained, Our inter-nuncio will take care that the sum of money which the king of England may thus grant Us by way of help and assistance against the Turk be, by him or his ministers, sent in bills of exchange upon some town of Germany where Our own treasurers, or bankers deputed to that effect, may receive it, &c. (fn. n1) —Prague, 6 June 1543.
	Latin. Original draft. pp. 11.
6 June.	149. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl., 9.	"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—The continual reports from the French frontier of the concentration and massing of troops which by king Francis' order is being made at Noyon and its neighbourhood for the purpose of invading these countries under Our government, compel Us to request the king of England to give Us assistance and help according to Article VII. of the treaty of closer friendship and alliance. The reports that come to Us from various parts of France all agree that the King is journeying towards La Fere (fn. n2) and Gouffy, where he is actually collecting an army of upwards of 30,000 foot and 8,000 horse, besides 40 pieces of ordnance, with the ammunition and provisions necessary for such a large force, and that he is determined to invade personally these countries under Our government, and do therein as much mischief as he possibly can before the arrival of His Imperial Majesty. These news, We have no doubt, the King of England must have already received from other quarters, and therefore, though We have refrained until now from applying to him for help and assistance, yet, considering the great stress in which We are placed, and the inconveniences that might result from Our silence, We have now changed Our opinion, and decided to ask for help. You, Chapuys, shall go and tell him the great military preparations the king of France is making, and how his army of 10,000 men, exclusive of foreigners, is ready to take the field, and therefore that We request his aid and assistance according to the letter of the treaty between him and the Emperor, Our lord and brother. Though We have no doubt that the King of England will comply with Our request, it is for you to employ all the arguments and persuasions you may think of to persuade him to grant Us the said assistance, at the same time assuring him that the Emperor, who is already on the road to come to these parts, will see with singular pleasure that during his absence the king of England has taken the task of resisting the progress of the common enemy. You will also inform the King, that although by one of the conditions of the treaty We are empowered to apply for succour of money instead of men, yet such is Our trust in him, and Our conviction that he looks to the affairs of these countries under Our government with no less care and attention than if they were his own, and also in order that the soldiers of these parts should make acquaintance with and imitate the English, and be in future in closer intelligence and friendship with them, We have decided not to ask him for money, but for men only, all, or at least the greater part of them, to be foot (piétons).
	There are two reasons more for Us to desire the help to be in English men rather than English money; one is, the greater satisfaction the King and his subjects will receive thereby; the other, that if the treaty is carefully examined, it will be found that he is bound to supply men rather than money.
	If the King, as We hope, shows a desire to grant the said assistance, you (Chapuys) will beg him in Our name to afford it as soon as possible, since the enemy, as above stated, is ready, and will do his utmost to invade these countries under Our charge before the arrival of the English. The King, therefore, is not to stop at the period of time specified in the treaty, for, after all, the four months of which the article speaks will not begin to run until the men he is sending over have set their foot in these Low Countries.
	According to the calculations made here, 700 crs. of 40 sols. each per day are sufficient for the pay of 7,000 infantry or 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse, that of the captains and "doubles payes" all included. (fn. n3) If whilst treating of this with the King's ministers, another and a different calculation should be made, you will take care to let Us know.
	Even if the enemy had not yet penetrated into Our territory to lay siege to some town or other, or encamp somewhere, yet considering the need in which We are of help and assistance, and that the enemy is close upon Our frontier, and may invade it whenever he likes, We hope that the King will not delay the promised succour, especially during the Emperor's absence, when it is most needed. You will tell the King that in demanding his succour at the present time—should there be no urgent cause for such a demand—the Emperor and We consider Ourselves obliged by the treaty to refund all the money the King may have spent in the preparation of the said succour in men, and We earnestly recommend you to do your best to induce the King to assist Us as soon as possible.
	We have no news of Toison d'Or, who, We hope, has arrived in Calais before that King's herald, and are glad that the instruction forwarded to him has met with the King's approval, and that the amendments introduced therein by Us have passed without difficulty as unimportant, as in effect they are. But We wish to know what alterations, if any, have been made in the instructions of Garter, that king's chief herald, about whom you say nothing in your letter of the 29th ult., (fn. n4) just received.
	As to the King's ambassadors residing here with Us urging that on being asked as to where and by which frontier the Emperor intended to invade France, your answer was "wherever the king of England considers it most convenient," We must observe that if the King understood your words as conveying absolutely that meaning, he must have taken for an obligatory engagement what was only meant as a "courtoisie." That voluntary error on the part of the King or his ministers you will take care to correct when the time comes. We will do the same here with the English ambassadors, from whom, however, We have not yet heard that their master really intends, and is ready, to invade France next season.
	The King, as We see, considers it very prudent and convenient, in order to resist more efficiently the attack of the French, that a truce should be made with the duke of Clèves, in order that all the forces of the allies should take the field. We have done all that was in Our power to attain that object, but such is the Duke's obstinacy that We do not see how We can treat with him, or take pledges for the observance of a truce, which most likely he would break as soon as he found it profitable or convenient. That We could never do without harm to Our reputation, and, therefore, it is very important for the success of the Emperor's affairs that the king of England should at once declare himself to be the Duke's enemy according to the letter of the treaty.
	Our letter of the 27th ult. must have informed you of the great pressure which the English ambassadors have put upon Us respecting the exemption of their merchants from the duty of one per cent., and the answer We have made to their pressing request, without their having spoken or said anything on their side with regard to the gift promised by the parties to be exempted. We, therefore, order you to speak to the King, and request him to consent to the English merchants paying that duty in the manner described in Our said letter of the 27th.
	The sieur de Grantvelle has written to Us that the Pope is resenting much the conclusion of the treaty lately made between the Emperor and the king of England.
	P.S. [added in Her Majesty's hand].— (fn. n5) We beg you to do your best to obtain from that king the succour applied for. We are now in great need of it, owing to the enemy assailing Us on every side. At any rate let Us have news as often as you can, that We may know as soon as possible if We are to expect, and at what time, help from that country.—6 June 1543.
	French. Original draft. pp. 3.
7 June.	150. Mr. D'Aspremont to King Francis.
S. E. L. 806., f. 67. B. M. Add. 2859 f. 184.	"Sire,"—Not being able to obtain from the King, Your brother, free passage for my couriers, I am literally obliged to have recourse to strangers, and even those who bear the name of Your enemies, (fn. n6) if I am to inform You and report on affairs connected with the Royal service. A drawing (deasaing) of that wretch Lartigue's, intended for the treacherous purpose of letting these English know the weak points of our coast, whereat most harm can be done, having accidentally fallen into my hands, I could not do less than send Your Most Christian Majesty a copy of it, that You may, in case of there being any truth in that man's report, and that the places are really so defenceless and accessible as described, give competent or lers for their being put in a state of defence. I have the more hastened to forward this despatch, as well as the man's original paper—of the reception of which I should like to be advised—that I doubt whether these people are not planning now some secret attack upon the coast of France. Indeed, I believe that trusting more to surprise than to industry or force, they will attempt to make some invasion or other, though, to say the truth, they have a much better opinion of themselves in military affairs than they really deserve.
	The King left last Monday for Harwich, one of the English ports, where the whole of his fleets (armée de mer) is to assemble and then put out to sea, according to his commands. After that the King will return to this city. The duke Philip of Bavaria went away three days ago, in disgust, as they say. Count Bernardino di Sanct Bonifacio and another Italian captain have obtained leave to return home; the former having received from the king of England 200 crs. and the latter only 100.—London, 7 June 1543.
	Signed: "Daspremont."
	French. Original. p. 1.
n. d.	151. Lartigue's Report.
S. E., L. 806, f. 68.	It seems to me that it will be advantageous to go straight to the rade of the Conquest (Conquet), and there cast anchor and land, and take the said Conquest (Conquet) and the abbey of Sainct Malie (St. Malo), if possible. According as the weather may be, the landing might be effected at Blanc Sablon (Blanc Sablons), or at Premanquest. The Conquest and St. Malie (Malo) once taken, the army might march upon Brest and lay siege to it, the castle of which is six leagues distant from Conquest, whilst the fleet might sail to Crandon, in the bay (rade) of Berteaulx. After that the land force will be able to enter the abbey of Brest, and take up a position at the Old Crandon. It will be necessary to have at hand a good number of small barges for the purpose of landing men, provisions, and ammunition, also a considerable body of pioneers, for in Bretagne (Brittany) ditches and hedges (hayes) abound, and I should think that if Brest is as badly defended as it was when Mr. de Norfoeq (the duke of Norfolk) was at Morles (Morlaix) (fn. n7) it will be easy to take possession of it. Within the park of the abbey of Brest are three rivers, one of which passes by Landernau, a nice little town four leagues from Brest, the river itself forming there a sort of harbour, where large ships may commodiously anchor, though the castle with its artillery might perhaps defend the entrance to it. Another river is that which comes from Dufou and Doullens, two considerable villages [of Brittany]. The third river runs towards Landernau (fn. n8) and Chasteaulong, where there is a very commodious harbour (fort bon lieu) for a good number of large ships. The castle of Brest could not prevent the ships from anchoring in the three above-mentioned rivers, for it is seven leagues from [Du] Fou, as many from Chasteau Lin (chateau-Lin), and five from Doullens. From Chasteaulin to Inpercorantin (Quimper) the distance is seven leagues by land. Inpercorantin is one of the most populous towns in Bretagne, but it is not fortified, and would be easy to take provided the invading army did not stop before Brest. If, however, it pleased God that Brest was taken or that it surrendered, one could occupy in the space of a fortnight a whole province beyond the sea, and Brest itself, its capital, surrounded as it is on all sides by sea, would be almost impregnable.
	The three above-named rivers, which cross the abbey of Brest, water a number of good-sized villages distant two or three leagues from each other at the most, none of which will offer any resistance, for they have no fortifications of any sort. It must also be considered that in order to defend Bretagne (Brittany) against an invasion, considerable forces and much time are required, for the country is large and has nine bishoprics, that is, Nantes and Rennes, each distant 50 leagues from Brest; St. Malo, 40; Vanens (Vannes), 30; Thoull (Dol), 40; Lautriana (Treguier), 24; St. Brion, 24; St. Paul (Pol) de Leon, 15; Inpercorantin (Quimper), 17; and that the said bishoprics can raise 8,000 men, called Les Franz-archiers et les Esleuz, (fn. n9) paid monthly at the rate of one hundred sous per month, which amounts to two crowns and one "teston," (fn. n10) defrayed by the said bishoprics. Each man is bound to serve six weeks for the defence of his country, and after that, should the King [of France] want their services, he must pay them for their time. So all gentlemen holding noble fiefs (qui tiennent fiefs nobles) are bound to serve with horse and arms for the space of six weeks as above said. In this manner the nobles of the country and their retinue make up a number of 3,000 horse, more or less. Of these about 300 may be reckoned as really efficient men-at-arms, well mounted and armed; the remainder are worth little or nothing. The Bretons are not accustomed to go to war out of their own duchy, besides which they are just now discontented—first of all owing to king Francis having broken through the marriage contract of king Louis [XII.] and queen Anne [de Bretagne], by which contract it was stipulated that the second son or daughter born of their marriage should be lord and duke [of Bretagne], whereas now the Duchy has been annexed to the crown of France. This misappropriation several gentlemen of La Basse Bretagne would never acknowledge or agree to, that being the reason why some of them have been long kept in prison; besides which, the King since then has imposed upon the inhabitants the salt-tax (gabelle), which has been the destruction and ruin of Bretagne, and the cause of the many revolts and risings against the royal commissioners. Since the beginning of the present war king Francis has pardoned the Bretons, on condition that they deliver to him at Rouen, in Normandy, a quantity of salt within three years' time. Whence it is to be concluded that never, at any time, were the Bretons more discontented or in despair than they are at present. That is why I think that their country would now be easy to conquer, as it would be long before any help or succour could come to them from the heart of France; for the nearest force under the King's command at the present moment is upwards of 150 leagues from the Basse Bretagne. I have therefore no doubt whatever that, if undertaken with vigour and at the proper time, the conquest of that country may be effected without great difficulty, for the Bretons themselves are not people to engage in battles; perhaps, too, owing to the general discontent above alluded to, a portion of the inhabitants might, after all, be gained over on friendly terms. In case of need, I could designate the personages to whom overtures of that kind might be addressed.
	There are only four strong places in the whole of the duchy of Bretagne where garrisons are kept. One is Brest, the other St. Malo; the third Nantes, and the fourth Conquernau (Concarneau). This last place would be easier to take than Brest itself, but on the other hand it would be harder to keep, and yet it might be isolated with greater facility, and also blockaded by sea much more efficiently than Brest itself. It seems to me that His Majesty, the king of England, ought to be as strong as possible on the sea, and if it were possible to attack at the same time La Rochelle and Bretagne, it would be an excellent plan, for the inhabitants of the former province are likewise very much discontented at that salt-tax of which I spoke above, as ripe for revolt as those of the Basse Bretagne, and as much incensed against the Royal commissioners; so much so that king Francis has sent for the principal inhabitants of La Rochelle, has made them come to his presence with a rope round their necks (la corde au con), and has only pardoned them on condition of their taking to Rouen the 25,000 bushels (muys) of salt which they owe king Francis for the period of three years, which tax is so exorbitant that it will be the ruin of the people. The Rochelans are still more discontented than the Bretons, and, therefore, if a fleet appears before that port, I have no doubt that the island Dorise, (fn. n11) which is on the coast, may be easily taken, as well as those of Oilleron (fn. n12) and Brouge, (fn. n13) from which upwards of 100,000 tons of salt, a good deal of wheat, and a large quantity of wine may be got. There is no castle or fortress in the immediate neighbourhood of La Rochelle, so that I am sure the town can be carried without difficulty. If so, it can be isolated and blockaded by sea. Should the Emperor join his forces to those of the king of England, he can easily send a number of Biscayan hackbutiers from Spain. The Venetian ships now in the Thames might also be of use for the transport of troops and ammunition, as well as of provisions, for the English army. Between La Rochelle and Paris there is no castle or fortress to detain an army on its march. If necessary, I can put down in writing all the towns and villages on the road, none of which, as I say, is worthy of notice in point of arresting the progress of an enemy's army. It would be desirable to retain the services of thirty or forty seamen, Bretons or Normans, to serve as pilots; they must be chosen as soon as possible among the mariners of St. Ouen, or La Rochelle, or——— (fn. n14), in which places there are no francs archers nor other military men obliged to serve without pay, but only the arrière-ban or reserve, nor are there either in that part of France many people fit for war.
	French. Contemporary copy. pp. 2½.
n. d.	152. Names of Strong Places in France where are Captains or Governors and "Mortes Payes."
Wien, Imp. Arch. Varia, Engl., 4.	First of all, in Picardy.
	The sieur de Biez, captain of Bollongne (Boulogne-sur-Mer).
	The sieur de St. Cheuail, (fn. n15) captain of Ardres.
	The sieur de Villebon, captain of Terouannes (sic).
	The sieur de Camaples, captain of Montreuil.
	The sieur Destrea (d'Estrées), captain and bailli of Amiens.
	The sieur de Criqui (Crequi), captain of Abbeville.
	The sieur de Helly (Heilli), captain of Heding (Hesdin?).
	In Normandy.
	Jehan Ango, viscount and captain of Diepe (Dieppe).
	The sieur de [La] Meilleraye, captain of Hableneuf (Le Havre) and of Honfleur.
	Le sieur de Marbonne, captain of Can (Caen).
	The count of Turnde (Tende?), captain of Mont St. Michel.
	The sieur de Trassa (?), captain of Tombeilleux.
	Potton Vefin (Ursin?), captain of Cherborch (Cherbourg).
	The sieur de Boysy (Boissy), captain of Grantville.
	In Brittany.
	The count de La Vall, captain of Pontorsor (?).
	The Constable of France (Anne de Montmorency), captain of St. Maló.
	The Admiral of France (Brion-Chabot), captain of Brest.
	The same, also captain of Conquernau.
	The Constable of France (Anne de Montmorency), also captain of Nantes.
	Count de La Vall, also captain of Vennes (Vannes).
	The sieur de Chasteau Briant, captain of Foguères (Fougères).
	In the duchy of Gynne (Guyenne).
	The sieur de Jarnac, captain and mayor (mere) of La Rochelle.
	Le sieur d'Archiac, captain of Blaye. (fn. n16)
	Le sieur de Jarnac, also captain and mayor (mere) of the town of Bordeaux, and captain besides of the castle or citadel of that town.
	The king of Navarre, captain of Chasteau Trompette within the said town of Bordeaux.
	Le sieur de Freschillon, captain of Aix.
	Le sieur de Burie, captain and governor of the town of Baione, as well as of the new castle (chasteau neuf) in the said town of Baione.
	Le sieur de Vostye, captain of the Old Castle in the aforesaid town of Baionne.
	The same, captain also of Mauleon de Soule.
	In Languedoc.
	Le sieur de Sainct Aman (St. Amand), governor and captain of Narbonne.
	Le sieur de Marguerites, captain of Laucate. (fn. n17)
	Le sieur de Cleremont, captain of Aigues-Mortes.
	In the county of Provence.
	Count de Tainde (Tende), captain of Marseilles.
	Le sieur de Madolon (Magdolon?), captain of Toulon.
	Le sieur de Antilo (Antibes?), captain of Bugantson (Beaugency?).
	In the Daulfinnes (Dauphinois).
	There are no strong places therein, save those in which there are morte-payes.
	In Bourgoingne (Burgundy).
	Le sieur de Unfe (?), captain of Beaunne (Beaune).
	Le sieur de Pignau, captain of Digon (Dijon).
	Le sieur de Godfroy, captain d'Ossonne (Auxonne).
	Le sieur de Nagu (?), captain of Talaneg (?).
	In Champagne.
	Le sieur de Lotrec, captain of Langres.
	Le sieur de Bourissant, captain of Murson.
	The Bastard of Olfy (Dolfy?), captain of Meusieres-sur-Meuse (Mezières).
	Le sieur de Longueval, captain of Vaings (?).
	The Names of the Captains of Men-at-Arms of the "Ordenances" of France, and a List of them presented to the Majesty of the King [of England] by L'Artigue. (fn. n18)
		Men-at-arms.
	Monsieur the Daulfin, governor of Normandy	100
	The duke of Orleans	100
	The king of Navarre (Henri d'Albret), governor of Guyenne	100
	The duke of Lorraine	100
	The duke of Sainct Pol, governor of the Daulfine (Dauphinois)	100
	The duke of Vendôme, governor of Picardy	100
	The duke of Guize (Guise), governor of Champaigne	100
	The Constable of France governor of Languedoc	100
	The Admiral of France, governor of Bourgoyngne (Burgundy)	100
	The marshal d'Aubigny from Scotland	100
	Le sieur de Chasteau-Briant, governor of Britanny	100
	Le sieur Sanpaolo, Italian	100
	The marshal de Hannebault, governor of Piedmont	100
	The count of Nevers	50
	The count d'Aumale, son of the duke of Guize (Guise)	50
	The count of Lainginang (?), brother of the duke of Vendôme	50
	The marshal de Biez, governor of Boulogne	50
	The prince of La Roche-sur-Yon	50
	The count of Tande (Tende), governor of Provence	50
	The count of Montreuil, governor of Bresse	50
	The count of Pontyuers (Pontivy?), husband of Mme. the duchess of Estampes (fn. n19)	50
	The count of Boissy, first gentleman of the King's Chamber	50
	The prince of Melphi (Amalphi), Neapolitan	50
	Robert de la Marche (de la Mark), sieur de Sedan	50
	The marshal de Tholon, governor of Narbonne	50
	Le sieur de Montpezat, marshal of Poitou	50
	Villebon, provost of Paris, governor of Terouanne	50
	Le sieur de Burie, governor of Bayonne	50
	Le sieur de Criqui (Crequi)	50
	Le sieur de Boursault, governor of Monsor. (fn. n20)
	Lancelot du Lac, governor of Orleans.
	La Roche de Mayne, marshall of the county of Mayne	c.
	Bonnevalle (Bonneval), governor of the Limousin	c.
	Routiers(?), lieutenant-governor of Piedmont during the absence of marshal d'Annebaut (Hannebault)	c.
	Le sieur de Sainct Andre, governor of Lyon	c.
	Le jeune Mouy, vice-admiral of France (fn. n21)	c.
	Maugiron(?), marshal of Savoy	c.
	Le sieur de Cursot, marshal of Beauguers	c.
	Lesuyer (L'Escuyer) d'Assiel, marshal of Carsse (?).
	Martin de Lange (Langeais?), captain of Turin.
	The baron of Curton.
	Lafaiette.
	Le sieur de Bermolis (Bernay).
	Le sieur de Heylli, (fn. n22) bailli of Amiens, captain of Hesdin.
	Longueval, baylly de Vermandoys.
	The King's household and Royal body-guard.
	Loys, Mons. de Nevers, captain of one hundred gentlemen of the Old Guard.
	Le sieur de Canaples, (fn. n23) captain of another one hundred gentlemen of the same Old Guard.
	Marshal d'Aubigny, captain of one hundred archers of the King's Scotch guard.
	Chauigny, captain of one hundred archers of the Royal French guard.
	La Naudie, captain of another one hundred archers of the same French guard.
	Le sieur de Sedan, captain of one hundred Swiss foot.
	Item; one company of one hundred men-at-arms, two hundred archers, and one hundred "conseilleurs" (sic); without the servants of the one hundred men-at-arms, there may be in all one hundred men, and six hundred horses at least. (fn. n24)
9 June.	153. The Emperor to the Prince of Spain, his son.
S. E., L. 59, ff. 10–4. B. M. Add. 28,593.	"Most Serene Highness, my dearest and most beloved son,"—From San Remo, in the Riviera of Genoa, We wrote to you on the 23rd ult., giving you an account of Our journey thither, and informing you of Our intention to enter that city on the morning of the following day [the 24th]. Yet finding in the morning that We were in sight of Saona (Savona), We decided to land and pass the whole of the day there owing to the next being Corpus Christi, and also because We wished to wait for the remainder of Our fleet which had stayed behind. Thence We again set sail, and after hovering for some hours in sight of Genoa, We entered that port almost at the same time as the rest of Our fleet. There We found the marquis del Gasto, and various others of Our own servants and friends (aficionados), who were waiting for Our arrival, among others the duke of Castro, who had arrived by land the day before, and had a long conversation with Us on political affairs. Though the Duke, on his being admitted to Our presence, said that he had come to Genoa for the sole purpose of paying his respects and hearing how he could be of service to Us—an offer which he made with every possible show of affection and good will—he evidently wished to hold a conference with Us, for he began to say that he had been at Bologna with his father, the Pope, and had spoken to him about the interview which the latter wished to hold with Us. The Pope (he said) had signified to him how desirous he was that We should not leave Italy without meeting him somewhere, because (said the Pope) should an interview be effected, many mutual suspicions and misapprehensions now existing in political matters might be removed or cleared up. Our answer to the Duke was that We were as desirous as His Holiness of such an interview; though respecting the city where the meeting was to take place there might be much difference of opinion between Us and His Holiness, and so it happened, for there was much contention between Us and the Duke, he pretending that the interview ought to take place at Bologna according to His Holiness' wishes, whereas We insisted on its being held either in Pavia or in Mantua, the two cities proposed and designated before We quitted Barcelona, or in Castil de San Juan, (fn. n25) a town close to Piacenza.
	Many potent reasons were given by Us in support of Our refusal of going to Bologna. First; of all We alleged the haste in which We were of going to Flanders; 2ndly, that if We penetrated far into Italy We should require a more considerable escort for the guard of Our person and to support the Imperial authority; and 3rdly, the time that would be lost, and various other considerations. It was at last decided that the Duke himself would return to Rome and inform the Pope of these objections of Ours, he promising at the same time to do everything in his power to persuade His Holiness to agree to Our wishes. Two or three days after Cardinal Fernés (Alessandro Farnese) arrived, sent by His Holiness to visit Us, with whom the question of the interview and place of meeting was again debated, until, on the third day after Our departure from Genoa, the Pope's answer came still insisting on Our repairing to Bologna, and excusing himself from going to any other of the cities designated by Us on account of the catarrh he was suffering from, and his consequent debility, at the same time signifying that if We could not go as far as Bologna, he himself, notwithstanding his ailments, would try to leave Bologna 12 or 13 miles behind, and meet Us somewhere in the neighbourhood. This We again refused, alleging several potent reasons why We could not go to Bologna or anywhere else in the neighbourhood of that city, nor deviate too much from the road [to Flanders], begging and entreating him at the same time to look out for some fit place for Us to hold the interview, so that We Ourselves should not be obliged to go out of Our way and lose too much time. At last His Holiness, having sent Us word that should he be strong enough to undertake the journey he would do his best to meet Us at Parma, close to Carmona (Cremona), in this State of Milan, not far from the road We intend following, nor very distant either from this place where We now are, which is secure enough considering the armed escort We intend taking, We wrote to him that if he went to Parma We on Our side would try to go thither also.
	With this answer of Ours Cardinal Farnese went away on the 6th, and We came to Pavia to wait three or four days, during which His Holiness' final resolution might perhaps come to hand So it did, with the intimation that four or five days after he would be at Parma. Meanwhile, We Ourselves have come to Cremona; orders for the approaching interview have been issued, and you shall be informed of what takes place.
	At Genoa, besides the proposal of an interview (advocacion) with his father, the duke of Castro made another one through the marquis del Gasto, namely, that if We agreed to give the investiture of the duchy of Milan to his son, the duke of Camarino (Ottavio Farnese), his grandfather, the Pope, would be glad to give Us two millions of gold in ready money with which to defray the expenses of the present war, and altogether relieve Our Treasury, besides paying Us an annual rent (censo) for the Duchy, adding, that if this were done the cities of Parma and Piacenza might easily be incorporated with the duchy of Milan, on condition, moreover, of all the fortresses of the Duchy remaining in Our hands, and other terms equally advantageous for Us as well as for the welfare of Italy. After carefully examining the Duke's proposal, and consulting on the affair with the marquis del Gasto and others of Our ministers and councillors here, We have caused an answer to be returned to the Duke in these terms: "That the affair is of such importance, and the reasons for Our not disposing now of the state of Milan are so potent, though there might be others equally strong in favor of its alienation—that, not having thought of it before, We naturally should have to consult thereupon Our brother, the king of the Romans, and Our sister, the Regent of the Low Countries, and likewise the members of Our Council of State in Spain, the majority of whom have always been of opinion that one of these days the peace with France might be ensured somehow or other by means of that duchy." Such has been Our answer to the Duke's proposal, and yet We should like to hear more particularly what His Holiness' views are in that respect and what his offers are, in order to have the affair properly investigated and reported upon.
	We must add that the Duke himself, having heard of Our answer, came and thanked Us most warmly, protesting that, whatever might be done for the Farnese family, any honor, dignity or power conferred upon it would increase the debt of gratitude of the Farnese towards Us, and that the whole of the Papal family would for ever be devoted to Our service. The Duke then asked Us, "What message am I to take to the Pope on the part of Your Imperial Majesty?" He also begged Us to think that the proposal did not proceed from His Holiness, but from himself, who had ventured upon it. To which We replied, "At any rate it must have been with His Holiness' knowledge"; after which he went away. As to the Cardinal, though he has not talked with Us about this affair, it would be seen by the report of others, to whom he has opened his heart on the subject, that His Holiness is very glad at the proposal having been made, as well as at the answer returned by Us, and that, being aware of the importance and magnitude of the affair, he avoids speaking about it until he can do so in Our presence.
	This is in the abstract what has hitherto been done in this affair of Milan. We have entered into these details that you may, in the Council of State, deliberate upon the whole, and tell Us what the Councillors' opinion is on the matter.
	But in order that the councillors may better do their work, We will subjoin here a summary of the principal reasons there are for or against the alienation of the Duchy. We shall begin by those in favor of the proposed alienation. One of them is undoubtedly the immense burden, labor and expense which We are obliged to sustain continually for the preservation of the said State; its perilous condition at the present moment, which may in future become still graver and more complicated should the provision of money required for its defence and support fail, owing to the strait in which We are placed for want of funds.
	The sum of money offered, which, considering the various undertakings We have in hand just now, will, as you may judge, be the more opportune, will enable Us to materially increase Our reputation with all Our friends and allies, and at the same time overawe Our enemies, who on that account, and having lost all hope of getting the investiture of Milan, might perhaps be induced to make peace, and if We only could reserve a portion of the sum paid We might redeem a considerable part of Our patrimonial estate actually mortgaged or sold. On the other hand, if compelled to go to war, We might, with the help of God and the aid of that money, bring Our enemy to reason, and perhaps, too, apply Our attention and means to other affairs of greater importance to Us than the possession of the duchy of Milan, such as adjusting the differences between the German princes, and compelling them to obey the laws of the Empire and so forth.
	Another reason in favor of the alienation is that the investiture of the Duchy would be according to the nature and quality of the fief itself, and, therefore, that if given to the duke of Camarino (Ottavio Farnese), already married to Our daughter, (fn. n26) the king of the Romans, Our brother, and all the rest of the princes will offer no opposition, and so if Our daughter, the Duchess, has sons the State will virtually remain in Our family.
	That the Italian powers will also agree to the alienation cannot be doubted, for it is well known that all of them wish for a duke of Milan who is an Italian by birth, not over rich or powerful, and, therefore, that if the investiture is given to Our son-in-law and the fortresses of the Duchy remain in Our hands—and this last point will be properly attended to—it will be equivalent to Our possessing the Duchy.
	The aggregation of the two cities of Parma and Piacenza might also prove a source of strength and security for the State of Milan, and afford ample means for its defence in future, because the territory of those cities is known to be rich and the rental thereof considerable, besides which, a league would be made with the Italian powers for its defence on equitable conditions, and if so, the security of Milan and the rest of Italy from French attacks would be permanent, since it is to be hoped that the above state of things would last as long as the present Pope's life, and perhaps also after his death. Meanwhile matters might be adjusted, and many things done which at present would be altogether unattainable. We should find Ourselves relieved from the heavy expenses which We are put to at present, and be thereby enabled to devote Our attention to other matters and countries.
	Another reason is the regard to be paid to the negociations (platicas) now going on between the Pope and the French, and, if possible, to put a stop to them, thus removing the suspicions and mistrust (sospechat y desconfianzas) which have been raised, and preserving His Holiness' friendship by means of a manifest desire on Our part of increasing the prosperity and welfare of his family.
	These are in abstract the reasons and arguments adduced in favor of the alienation; you, my Son, will presently hear those of some of Our councillors who hold a contrary opinion.
	It is argued by them that the quality, the greatness and importance of this State of Milan, (fn. n27) the authority which—the Duchy being in Our hands together with the Imperial dignity—it affords Us for the affairs of the Empire and of Italy itself, and likewise its great utility for the security and preservation of Our kingdom of Naples, are to be taken into consideration. For (they argue) should We alienate the duchy of Milan, and leave it, as it were, in other hands and at Our back, the enemy might easily invade that kingdom, for the defence of which considerable forces would be required; whereas if the Duchy remains in Our hands, the defence of Naples would be comparatively easier and more effective with than without Milan.
	As to the consideration so frequently brought forward by some of Our councillors that by disposing of this Duchy peace with France might perhaps be secured, and that if We dispose of it in favor of his (king Francis') son, the duke of Orleans, We may thereby be benefited, inasmuch as all causes for war, with which the former is continually threatening Us, will thus be removed, it is certainly a strong argument against its alienation. But, on the other hand (Our councillors allege), were We for the sake of peace to dispose of the Duchy and give the investiture of it to king Francis' son, what securities can We demand sufficiently strong and firm for the observance of the peace and the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated? Besides which, they allege, were We to part with the Duchy in that manner We should be the loser, both in authority and in the profit to be derived from that source, all of which We should pass over to the king of France. Indeed, it may be presumed, nay, asserted, that once the master of Milan, and finding himself with much greater forces and ampler means than before, king Francis will lose no opportunity of extending the limits of the Duchy and occupying any part of Italy that he may fix upon, which attempt, if he made it, could not be defeated save with great difficulty and at considerable expense, so much so that if Milan remains at the mercy, as it were, of king Francis, it cannot be otherwise than highly injurious to Our authority and reputation at all times, and especially now, under present circumstances, when the truce has been broken, war has commenced, and king Francis is prosecuting it with ardour.
	To this may be added that if We give the investiture to another party, king Francis may think that he has thereby a greater chance of obtaining it for himself than if it were to remain in Our hands, for surely, whoever got the investiture, could not defend it as well as We Ourselves can. That the Pope, by the laws of Nature, cannot live many years, and that after his death no great trust could be placed in any league or confederacy made for the security of Italy, and thus the whole weight and responsibility would fall on Us.
	The bad odour of a transaction of this kind, or rather the the sale of a State like the duchy of Milan, for a sum of money paid by the Pope, which money ought to be spent for the defence and welfare of Christendom, is another of the objections brought forward by those who are opposed to the alienation. Last, not least, the suspicion which the king of England and the German Protestants might conceive at hearing of this negociation of Ours for the establishment of closer friendship between His Holiness and Ourselves, might also be highly impolitic under present circumstances, and ought to be avoided.
	It is for Our councillors in Spain to weigh and examine the above considerations, and others that might be adduced for or against the alienation of the duchy of Milan. It is for you, Our Son, to cause the Council of State to assemble, deliberate, and report upon the whole, so that We may have their opinion, and let the result of their deliberations come to Us as soon as possible, for His Holinesss will naturally be anxious to know what Our resolution in the matter is.
	The duke of Florence (Cosmo de' Medici) has come here [to Cremona]. Having begged and entreated Us most urgently, as he did in 1541, before Our departure for the Algiers expedition, to give orders for the fortresses of his State—such as the castles of Florence, Liorna (Leghorn), and others still in Our hands—to be delivered up to him, alleging that this act of Ours will materially increase his reputation with his own vassals as well as with the Italian powers in general, who will thereby learn the trust We place in him, and that We fully acknowledge the services he has rendered Us, as otherwise, by keeping the said fortresses in Our possession, it might be presumed that We had no confidence in him. After mature deliberation and previous consultation with prince Doria, marquis del Gasto, viceroy of Sicily, and others of Our ministers in these parts, We have decided to make over the said fortresses to him on condition of his paying Us one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand ducats for the expenses of the war We are now carrying on against France. In this manner We shall be able to leave in the hands of the marquis del Gasto a sufficient sum of money to spend in military preparations, and should the barons of the kingdom of Naples be persuaded to grant Us an equal sum, We have no doubt that Our affairs in Italy will go on prosperously, and the French invasion of Flanders and the Luxemburg averted. As stated above, some of Our councillors here have advised Us to part with the said fortresses; a message to that effect has been sent to the Duke, and We have no doubt that the bargain will soon be closed. (fn. n28)
	Our escort from this place to Parma will consist of the Spanish infantry of the Sicilian regiment (tercio) (fn. n29) besides 1,000 more who came with Us from Spain, and those who were here in Italy under the command of field-marshal Luis Perez de Vargas, making in all about 4,000 men, so inconsiderable a number altogether that We have ordered a levy of 4,000 Italians more, besides 600 light horse. With this escort We will proceed to Parma, and there meet His Holiness.
	From Flanders the news is that king Francis and his confederates have bodies of men on the frontiers here and there, but Our forces in that country resist them, so that they gain little or no ground at all. We will journey thither as quickly as possible to do whatever appears fit and suitable according to time and circumstances.
	At the Imperial diet a good sum of money was voted for the defence against the Turk, and the king of the Romans, Our brother, will do in that matter all that he possibly can.
	From Turkey and the Levant the intelligence varies. Some say that the Grand Signior has already left Constantinople, and is coming towards Hungary; that Barbarossa had left Constantinople on the 15th of April with about 30 galleys; and that he was to be joined by 80 or 90 more, besides those of corsairs, which might be in all 120 sail or thereabouts. He himself was at Negroponte careening and caulking his galleys, and preparing to go forward. (fn. n30) If so it is necessary to have an eye on him and provide for the defence of the coast both of Africa and Spain, and that Bugia be strengthened and well provisioned, taking care that the works We ordered for the further strengthening of the castle be completed, because it is to be feared the Turkish fleet will first sail in that direction, owing to the commodiousness of its harbour. That is why We request you to attend as quickly as possible to the fortification and provisioning of the said town and port, taking care to make some provision for the islands of Majorca, Minorca, Iviza and Sardinia, all of which, We hear, are insufficiently provided with artillery and ammunition.
	Prince Doria, with his own galleys and those of Naples and Sicily, will soon sail for Messina to scour that sea, and do what he can against the Turk. Don Bernaldino de Mendoza has received orders from Us to return to Spain with his, those of Antonio Doria, Monaco, Cigala, and the marquis de Terranova, and scour the Mediterranean as far as Cartagena. From thence he is to sail for the Balears, and since the 1,500 foot ordered from Oran to Perpignan will no longer be wanted on that frontier, since out of the garrison of Perpignan 2,000 more may easily be drawn—especially if the Germans remain there, and no signs of war are visible in the Roussillon—Don Bernaldino has been ordered to take on board his galleys the said infantry and bring them to Genoa, and let them march to Lombardy that they may replace those whom We are now taking as escort, unless he considers that they will be more needed in Sicily, in which case Don Bernaldino is to sail for that island and land them thereat. Should the 1,500 men from Oran not have gone to Perpignan or to Cartagena as ordered, Don Bernaldino is to return [to the Balears], for if it be true, as reported, that Barbarossa's naval force is destined for those seas, it is needful that all Our galleys be together to meet the enemy as may be fit and convenient. We, therefore, beg you to see that on the arrival of the 1,500 Spaniards from Oran, and of the 2,000 from the garrison of Perpignan, you may without loss of time have them provided with money, food, and anything else they may want for their passage, and let Don Bernaldino bring them to Genoa, as above said. Should the infantry from Oran not arrive before Don Bernaldino's departure, then the galleys and vessels on board of which they are shall convey them to Genoa, at the same time bringing the complement of the 2,000 men from the garrison of Perpignan, if all of them had not sailed off in Don Bernaldino's galleys. Of this force on landing field-marshal Varaez (fn. n31) will take charge, as he has received orders to that effect, as well as respecting what he is to do with them. The men, of course, are to be provided with anything they may want in the shape of biscuit and other provisions out of the stores at Barcelona and the coast of Catalonia, without forgetting to give them their pay in one way or other.
	The marquis de Aguilar has been appointed viceroy and captain-general of the principality of Catalonia by Us with a salary of 8,000 ducats every year, 6,000 as viceroy, and 2,000 for the officer who is to act as his lieutenant at Perpignan, the 6,000 ducats to be paid to him in specie, as the duke of Gandia, the former governor, had them, and payable at Barcelona, the remaining 2,000 to be paid by Castillian treasuries as hitherto. The Marquis, however, is to hold his captainship as an additional office, (fn. n32) with this proviso, that should there be 12 or 15 captainships vacant among the forces under his command, he may appoint to them as many relatives or familiar servants of his own as he chooses, as was offered before him to the duke of Alba. (fn. n33) We have purposely apprized you of the Marquis' appointment and nomination that you may know of it, and attend to his wants for the defence of Catalonia. You are to provide also that the right of nomination and appointment of captains under him remain to the Marquis as long as he may serve Us in the charge of viceroy of Catalonia, taking also care that the person whom the Marquis may depute for the command at Perpignan be a fit one, so that the frontier may be well governed and defended against the enemy.
	Being at Barcelona, it was debated whether it would be expedient to recruit a small body of cavalry for the defence of its territory in case of an attack from the enemy. It was resolved to have as many as 100 light-horse to guard the frontier of Perpignan. So on Our arrival in Italy, We ordered the marquis del Gasto to raise that number of men under an experienced captain. We hear that he has already done so. Don Bernaldino de Mendoza is to take the men in his galleys under his command, and the horses may go in the two old ones which came in this late voyage of Ours, though taken in tow by others of the fleet. That the galleys should be fitted out at once, the Marquis has given the crews one month's pay. We have written to Our ambassador in Genoa (Gomez Suarez de Figueroa) to give the men another month's pay at their going on board, that is to say, to each light horse five crs. every month, forty to the captain, fifteen to the lieutenant, and ten to the ensigns (alferez), and as, if not paid exactly every month, the men might serve badly or refuse to serve at all, it will be necessary to provide that they have their regular pay.—Cremona, 9 June 1543.
	P.S.—Since writing the above We have received a letter from prince Doria, whose opinion is, that if the news We have of the Turkish fleet turn out true, it is urgent to concentrate Our naval forces somewhere. That obliges Us to change Our plans as follows:—The Spanish galleys and the others that were to join them and sail all together to Messina for the purpose of watching the movements of the Turkish fleet, and preventing the landing of forces on the coast of Naples or Sicily, are no longer to go to Spain; and although it had been resolved for the greater security of our coasts and ports in the Mediterranean that, after doing their work in these parts, the said galleys should go thither, take on board the 2,000 Spaniards, convey to Spain the marquis de Aguilar, and take the one hundred light horse, yet, following prince Doria's advice, and in consequence of letters very lately received from Our viceroy of Naples, purporting that the Turkish fleet has really and truly made its appearance at Lepanto, We have written to the Prince that We will follow his advice and will change entirely Our plans of campaign. As it is but just that We should give the first attention to whichever point is in the greater danger, We have issued peremptory orders for all the galleys of Our fleet to sail at once for Naples and Sicily, telling the Prince to do whatever he considers best for the defence and security of Our dominions in this part of the Mediterranean Sea, and for preventing any harm the Turks may intend doing. In any event, should Barbarossa make his appearance on the coast of Naples or Sicily, or should he go to La Goleta, Bugia, or any other port on the African or Spanish Coast, he (Doria) is to follow the enemy wherever he goes, and closely watch him, so that he may not have time to take in water and provisions, &c.
	As to La Goleta there is no danger; the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga) writes that the fort is well provided, for he (the viceroy) has letters saying that a vessel laden with provisions had lately arrived there. We have written to prince Doria that immediately after his arrival at Messina he is to send a messenger to Francisco de Tobar, the governor of Tunis, informing him of the enemy's movements, and where he is likely to go next. Should Barbarossa determine to attack La Goleta or Bugia, if the Prince's fleet is collected in some port of Sicily or Naples, those places might easily be succoured with transport vessels escorted by galleys, as his naval and military experience may dictate. In case of emergency he is to place under embargo in Naples or Sicily, or wherever they can be found, any vessels and transport ships that may be wanted for the carriage of men or provisions; he is to raise money on bills on Our treasury, and, in fact, do whatever else he considers fit for Our service. This, however, to be done as economically as possible and without incurring unnecessary expense, considering the state of Our treasury. Should the Turkish fleet not come to these seas, nor to that coast, and should Doria think that the galleys of Spain had better return home, they may do so. It is for the Prince to consider whether they ought not to be escorted by some of the Neapolitan or Sicilian troops, as was decided in the first instance, for fear of the French fleet, if it should happen to be superior in numbers. We have no doubt that the Prince will carefully look to this, and take such measures as he may deem necessary for the security of Our fleet. We have likewise written to him to procure a passage for the marquis de Aguilar, who will be the bearer of this despatch. Should he think that another galley is required for the security of the Marquis' person, another one is to be sent along as an escort, for it would not do for him to fall into the hands of French privateers. The Prince has also been ordered to fit out transports for the passage of the one hundred light horse for the frontier of Perpignan, for as no galleys can be spared to tow the two old ones (las viêjas) on board of which the men were to go, there is no other mode of conveyance for them. (fn. n34)
	The Prince is also to think about the means of bringing here, to Italy, the 2,000 Spanish infantry who were to have come in the said galleys, either to land in Genoa and do service in the State of Milan and in Piedmont, or to go straight to Sicily, whichever it may be; though, considering the state to which that island may possibly be reduced through the Turkish fleet sailing to its coast, it might perhaps be more advisable that the said infantry should go straight to Sicily in such transports as might be procured there, in Spain, and making their voyage by way of Majorca, Minorca, Iviza and Cerdeña (Sardinia). In this manner, should they hear of Our fleet having already sailed for the coast of Africa and Spain, the infantry might remain in the aforesaid islands or wherever it might be most wanted.
	It is for prince Doria to decide on all these points according to his long experience in naval affairs, and his knowledge of Barbarossa's tactics. He has been told to send along with these despatches his own advice on these matters, with such considerations as he may think proper in support of it. We therefore request you to have Doria's despatches and letters carefully examined in Council, and after due deliberation let a resolution be taken on these points, the best, the most prompt, and that which may offer most security, taking the greatest care, as We have already told you, and tell you again, to see that Bugia, as well as the most important towns on the coast of Spain, be properly attended to and provided with the means of defence.—Datum ut supra.
	Signed: "Yo el Rey."
	Countersigned: "Vazquez."
	Addressed: "To the Prince, Our dearest and beloved son."
	Indorsed: "From the Emperor to the Prince."
	Spanish. Original. pp. 8.