Spain: October 1534, 21-31 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 5 Part 1, 1534-1535. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1886.

Citation:

'Spain: October 1534, 21-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 5 Part 1, 1534-1535, ed. Pascual de Gayangos( London, 1886), British History Online https://prod.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol5/no1/pp294-312 [accessed 27 November 2024].

October 1534, 21-31



24 Oct.	102. Eustace Chapuys to the Same.
Wien, Rep. P.C., Fasc. 228, No. 61.	Having lately received a message from the Princess to the effect that the King's mistress was in secret treaty with some of the household to cause her all manner of annoyances or bodily hurt, I made a pretence to go to Cromwell, and, coming to the subject of the Princess, took the opportunity of remonstrating against the ill-treatment to which she was subjected, requesting him, in the name of that affection which he once said to me he entertained towards her, and for the preservation and increase of the peace and amity between Your Majesty and his master, to prevent any injury or offence in that quarter, and not oblige the Princess to follow the King's bastard daughter wherever she went, as well as renounce her own legitimacy, and the title, which was her own. Such treatment, I said, could in nowise promote the King's views, whatever they might be; it might, on the contrary, engender some dangerous disease, at which, I was sure, the King, naturally kind and virtuous, would be highly displeased, since the loss of such a pearl as his daughter, as well as of his own reputation before the world, could not but affect him considerably.
	Cromwell's answer was that certainly, as far as he himself was concerned, he had fulfilled the promise he once made me of attending with all the care in his power to the Princess' comforts, most particularly since he had spoken to her (he has only seen her once that I know of), owing to the great gifts of grace and nature which he had found in her. He had, he said, express orders from the King, his master, to look to the Princess' comforts, and see that she was well treated, and if it were found that any of the people in the household had been rude, or not done his duty towards her, he should be punished forthwith. He added that in future he should have no difficulty in having her respectfully treated, considering the paternal affection which the King bore her, and of which, notwithstanding all appearances, he (Cromwell) was as persuaded as of that which the King bore him, (fn. n1) which was notorious and manifest enough. Well might Cromwell boast of that; for certainly the credit and authority which he enjoys with this King just now is really incredible, as great indeed as the Cardinal (Wolsey) ever enjoyed, besides which he is daily receiving fresh bounties from him.
	True it is (continued Cromwell) that the King has occasionally shown displeasure at the Princess having obstinately resisted his will in what concerns the legitimacy of this, his second marriage; (fn. n2) but, nevertheless, his paternal affection is still the same that it was, so much so that for some time past he has openly declared to some of his Privy Councillors—who, imagining they were doing pleasure to the Lady [Anne], put forward certain measures and plans to the Princess' great disadvantage—that he (the King) would never give his consent to them. Indeed it seemed as if, the better to prove his assertion, Cromwell wished to imply that he was one of those councillors who had advised on the occasion, alleging as an excuse that servants very often proposed measures which they considered agreeable or beneficial to their masters with a view to show their devotion, and also to ascertain their will and inclinations. (fn. n3) In this instance, however, the King had so discountenanced the talebearers that there was no one at Court, neither the Lady nor any other person, who dared now speak unfavourably of the Princess. (fn. n4)
	After discoursing on other topics Cromwell went on to say that in order to raise a corner of the veil, and let me, as it were, into the secret of the King's conduct, he would tell me a fact which very few, if any, were cognisant of; namely, that not only did the King cherish the Princess, his daughter, immensely, but he loved her 100 times more than his last born, and that he would ere long give to the world an evident proof of the great affection he bore her; as he (Cromwell) would shortly have occasion to declare to me after reporting to the King my official communication on the subject;—which words in Cromwell's mouth seemed to imply, if I am not mistaken, that the King is actually thinking of having her married in some princely quarter, and that, in order to maintain the King's good-will, and increase the friendship and amity between Your Majesty and the King, his master, he and I ought to do everything in our power to soften and mend all matters relating to her, if it were only for some little time to come. He had no doubt (Cromwell said) that in time everything would be set to rights,—wishing thereby to hint that there was some appearance of the King changing his love. This last surmise Cromwell was well capable of making, though he might think otherwise, just in order to amuse people. (fn. n5)
	After this Cromwell began to say that the King, his master, had news from France and Spain, as well as from Scotland and Ireland, purporting that Your Majesty had despatched ambassadors and agents to the aforesaid countries with a view to excite and inflame the bad passions of the people, and foster rebellion and troubles in the latter, principally with a view to obtain the sovereignty thereof. Cromwell then told me one by one the names and surnames of the English ambassadors, both in France and in Scotland, who had made the said report. Notwithstanding which, he (Cromwell) asserted that he had always maintained against the King himself and the Privy Councillors his colleagues that the news was untrue, suggesting that such reports might well have originated in people jealous of the good friendship existing between Your Majesty and the King, his master,—meaning, no doubt, the French. "It is true (he added) that, besides the news which the King has received from Scotland, I myself within the last few days have had private letters from a councillor of king James, stating that the Emperor's agent is still in that country. But, in my opinion, there is no fear of anything being negotiated or undertaken against the existing treaties; for, at the end of his letter, the Scotchman asks me to intercede with the King to allow ships here in England to load a quantity of grain for Scotland. The letter itself I have shown to the King, who, after hearing it read, exclaimed, "Those Scotchmen do not forget their usual tactics; they make their profit out of all things; they want now to frighten me in order to obtain permission to import grain." Cromwell further alleged, as a proof of his own incredulity as to the reports circulated, that it was unlikely that Your Majesty, lord of so many countries and kingdoms so vast and so rich, would think of so insignificant and poor an island as Ireland was. Nor was it to be supposed (added Cromwell) that for such a small thing as that you would undertake to cause annoyance to the King, his master, considering that your very mighty power gave you plenty of other means and opportunities, if so inclined, to commence war with greater honour and profit to yourself. It could not enter his head (he said), in view of the good treatment which Englishmen in general received in Your Majesty's dominions by your express commands—barring some slight annoyance and vexation caused by the Inquisition to some of this King's subjects (fn. n6) —that Your Majesty could in anywise owe a grudge to England and to the English, especially if the very cordial, benevolent, and amiable words spoken by you to his ambassador were taken into account. Indeed, there was no complaint to make on this head, inasmuch as the person then accredited to Your Majesty's Court, and now residing in England, (fn. n7) had often borne testimony to the graciousness and courtesy with which both you and Mr. de Grandvelle, as well as Monseigneur de Nassau (now in France, and then at the Imperial Court), had received him whenever he had applied for an audience. Nothing more was said concerning Monseigneur de Nassau, of whom I believe Cromwell spoke incidentally, and by way of coupling him with the other two, as if he did not care where the Count was actually residing, whether in France or in Your Majesty's Court. (fn. n8)
	My answer was short and concise, so as to leave room for a future conference after Cromwell had seen the King and returned to London, it being then agreed between us that the subject should be again discussed. I failed not, however, to praise and commend the affection and esteem which he seemed to entertain for the Princess, and his wish for the preservation and increase of the mutual friendship; begging him to persevere in so laudable a path, and reminding him at the same time of the happiness and tranquillity of mind, as well as fame and glory, likely to fall to his lot, if he were the means of arranging matters satisfactorily, as I had told him on former occasions. His reply was, that it would certainly not be his fault if the Princess' affairs did not end well; and that, with respect to the preservation of friendship between the two courts, his idea was that it could hardly be more reciprocal and firm than it had been and was still. True it was that the King, his master, had occasionally complained of the suit which Your Majesty had instituted against him at Rome, but he (Cromwell) had fully shown that Your Majesty could not help stirring in favour of Queen Katharine, bound as she was to you by the bonds of consanguinity and royal rank; and that, considering the King, his master, if in your Majesty's place, might have acted as you did there was no fear of his now taking in bad part your interference in the affairs of so close a relative. He himself had so strongly and so often inculcated that reasoning upon the King, that, in his opinion, no cause now remained for disagreement between Your Majesty and his master, save perhaps the affair of these two good ladies; to remedy which, as he had signified to me, it was needful that we both should agree upon a satisfactory settlement of all complaints, and the knitting of that lasting friendship which might otherwise be endangered. Cromwell ended by saying in passing that it was perfectly true that great union and friendship existed now between France and England, but that I could guess the cause of it. He did not say more on this subject. Your Majesty, by your great wisdom, will be able to judge what Cromwell's last words meant.
	The conversation ended by Master Cromwell telling me that he had positive orders from the King himself to attend to all and each of the Queen's wants, and that he had on that very day furnished 4,000 ducats for the expenses of her household. I must, however, observe that on the previous day Cromwell had held this very language to one of my secretaries, whom he questioned as to whether he was one of those who had gone to the Queen's residence, when I myself attempted to visit her. Cromwell, however, had reason to repent his having put such a question; for my man disguised so well the place where the Queen was, and the treatment made to her, that Cromwell was evidently thrown off the track (piste). (fn. n9) I gave him to understand that I had no wish whatever to enter into such a conversation or discuss the Queen's treatment, presuming that the King, his master, out of his magnanimity, virtue, and natural kindness, would effectually provide for all her wants, as justice and the peculiarity of her case required, more especially as his ambassador at Your Majesty's court had lately given some such assurances in his name. "For this reason (said I to Cromwell) have I avoided, as much as possible, to touch on the subject; but since you have been the first to allude to it, and I know by experience how desirous you are that people should speak to you openly and in a straightforward manner, I am ready to tell you part of my mind on the subject." I then told him that my information was that, far from having all her wants supplied, the Queen was poorly treated, for she had not a farthing to dispose of; which was contrary to the statement made before Parliament, that a larger income was spent upon her now than she had in former times. I granted that large sums had been paid to those about her person; but, as the Queen herself remarked, the money was not spent on her household servants, but on her guardians and keepers, as it were. Except four or five of the former, she had no one about her person. As to her old servants, some of whom had come from Spain with her, and to whom she was bound to pay pensions for their maintenance, they had all been dismissed from her service, and she had no money to give them, not even in charity. In the last two years she had had only two new dresses, &c. Cromwell's answer was that it was in the Queen's power to have as much money and as many dresses as she chose: she had only to apply for them, and send him word, and every provision would be made. Cromwell, however, can safely make such offers, knowing, as he well knows, that she will never ask for anything, nor will she either receive what is sent to her under the address of "Old Princess Dowager," which is the title they now give her. Though it must be said that whenever Cromwell happens to name her in my presence, he does it with a certain courtly civility,—making his excuses if, by the King's command, and the order of Parliament, he is obliged to designate the mother by the title of "Princess Dowager," and the daughter by the name of "Madame Marie," which excuse he never fails to make whenever he mentions the Queen and Princess to me. My reply was that I would not for the world that the King, his master, the Queen, or even Your Majesty, should know that I had mixed myself up with such affairs; for, in the first place, Your Majesty would be displeased at my interference if I did not let you know first; Cromwell himself might make the necessary provision without importuning any one else; besides that, the King, his master, might, perhaps, take my interference as a sort of reproach; the Queen might also think that, speaking as I did, without her consent, and mentioning the indigence in which she lived, it might be supposed that I spoke at her instigation, and in a tone of reproach to those upon whom she depended. I then added under the same protest that it seemed to me very strange, as it seemed to every one else, that the Queen's jewels should have been taken from her to decorate the King's other wife. Indeed, the King could very well guess what reverence and veneration his Queen had for him, since she bore the insult so patiently without saying a word, and not minding what the world might say of her; in fact, that I really believed she would rather die than have to open her mouth to utter a complaint, These arguments of mine Cromwell knew not how to answer except by owning that reason was entirely on my side. After some small talk on other unimportant matters, I left the room, promising to hold another conference with him on his next return from Court.
	Though Cromwell has assured me of the good-will which the King bears his daughter, the Princess, yet, putting aside other conjectures and warnings, I should scarcely have attached faith to his protestations, had there not been some evidence of their truth; for, in reality, the King gave, some time before, orders that she should be well treated; and on the Wednesday before her departure from Mur (More), she had been visited by almost all the gentlemen and ladies of the Court, however annoyed the Lady (Anne) might feel at it. The day before yesterday, being at Richmond with the King's little daughter (la petite garce), there came the Lady, Anne herself, accompanied by the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk and others, and by a party of ladies, on pretence of visiting her own daughter, but in reality to see and salute the Princess,—a great novelty no doubt. (fn. n10) The Princess, however, would not leave her room until the Lady had actually taken her departure from the house, so that she might not see her. Instead of the sedan chair covered with leather, in which the Princess travelled when, in the first instance, she was taken to the residence of the King's bastard daughter, this time, on her journey back from the More to Richmond, she had one exactly the same as the first, but covered with velvet. (fn. n11) Arrived at Richmond, not to follow the bastard's own chair and that she might have a peep at me on her passage, the Princess allowed the little one to go by land, whilst she herself came by water. On the very evening of her departure, she settled with the bargemen as to what bank of the river she wanted them to follow. That being done, she quickly sent me word to be at a certain place on the riverside, between Greenwich and this city, in front of a detached house destined as a refuge in case of the plague; for she said she wanted to see me, and take her revenge for my having gone to Greenwich to see her off. She, therefore, managed her affairs so well with the help of the bargemen, that, instead of following the right side of the river, they followed that on which I myself stood, near enough for the Princess to see me. She then caused the barge to be uncovered, and, mounting the forecastle, did not come down until she had actually lost sight of me. She is now in pretty good health, thank God,—handsome and plump,—and, as far as I can judge, gay, and in good spirits. I had, some time before she left More to return to Richmond, advised her that since the King, her father, seemed to relent of his rigour, it behoved her not to do anything likely to irritate him; and that as the protest once written and prepared by me for her, and of which a copy was forwarded to Your Majesty, was calculated to preserve her from any danger, she was to make no faces or refuse to follow her father's bastard daughter wherever she went; not to make protests as in former times, but, on the contrary, publish and declare to the world that she was very much pleased to act according to her father's wishes. This she has done ever since, and her conduct has evidently been the cause of her father's visit to Richmond, about which I once wrote to Your Majesty, as well as the permission to come to London by water without being obliged to follow or accompany the other one.
	Were it not that this King is of amiable temper and cordial nature, and that the young lady, his new mistress, is fond of the Princess, and has already worked in her favour, one might suspect that the kindness which her father has suddenly shown for her had its origin in dissimulation, and was intended to colour the sin in case the Princess came to harm; which may God forbid. (fn. n12)
	For a long time back there has been here no particular news from Ireland, except that the seigneur de Childara (Kildare), the most powerful chieftain in those parts, had laid siege to Dublin, and burnt its suburbs. It was here considered certain, and in fact the earl of Ausrey (Ossory) had written to say so, that the people of that town had already surrendered to Kildare. How matters stand since then I cannot say. The King, however, has lately been nearly one month in a state of irritability and bad humour, owing to the succours he is preparing to send to Ireland—amounting in all to about 2,000 men, 300 of whom are cavalry—being so long on the way; for only a week ago, I being with Cromwell at the time, news came that the ships that were to take the troops had sailed away; at which the King and the members of his Privy Council rejoiced greatly, though they do not know yet of their having arrived at their destination, notwithstanding their having sailed about a fortnight ago. With regard to the other ships being fitted up here to send to the coast of Ireland and keep guard there (guaytter), it has been found impossible to get them ready for this winter. I have this very morning, and since the above was written, received Your Majesty's letter of the 24th ult., mentioning that of the 9th, but I have been unable, through the sudden departure of this courier, as well as the absence of my secretary, who keeps the general counter cipher or deciphering key, to read the despatches from Venice, on which Your Majesty commands me to report and give opinion by the first courier. Nor have I, for the same cause, been able to read the instructions therein contained respecting the Scottish marriage alliance. With regard to Your Majesty's agent in that country, I can only repeat what Cromwell himself tells me, and I myself have already stated, namely, that he has been well received at Court, and met with no difficulty as Your Majesty apprehended. (fn. n13)
	Respecting Monseigneur de Nassau's mission to the court of France, I must say that, as far as I can judge, it has been rather unpalatable to these people; but by dint of fine words and by my saying to them that immediately after his arrival at that court, and his making certain overtures, the Admiral would cross the Channel and come over to report on the whole they have been, in appearance at least, glad to hear my explanation; yet my firm belief is that, whatever countenance they may put on it, Nassau's presence in France (fn. n14) must prove a flea in their ears; so much so, that their ambassador in France has written to say that immediately upon the arrival of Monseigneur de Nassau he would receive information as to the object and bearings of his mission; (fn. n15) and although the conferences had already begun, and were very close and intimate, yet up to the present no communication on the subject had been made to the English, except the assurance that nothing would be treated therein to the disadvantage of either king, or likely to impair their confederations and friendship.
	It would seem as if the expected arrival of the admiral of France (Philippe Chabot) to this shore was no longer the talk of the day, for the ship that had begun descending the Thames to go and wait for him at Calais has actually come back [to Greenwich] to be inspected by the King in person, who took with him the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk. Certain people had also been summoned for the reception of the said Admiral, but they have since been dismissed, and allowed to return home, there to wait until called upon again.
	The general impression here is, I fancy, that the death of pope [Clement VII.] will put an end to certain designs, and that Monseigneur de Nassau will achieve nothing in France; that consequently there will be no need of the Admiral's coming here, as king Francis will most likely want him near his person, if he should decide to go to Lyons. On the other hand, the French ambassador here, (fn. n16) who was the first to hear of and announce the Admiral's intended mission, has received no further information of his movements that I know of (fn. n17) —London, 24th of October 1534.
	Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
	Addressed: "To the Emperor."
	French. Original, partly in cipher. pp. 11.
30 Oct.	103. The Privy Council to the Emperor.
S.E., L. 1458, f. 56. B.M. Add. 28,587, f. 81.	After Mr. de Nassau's apparently unsuccessful negotiation in France, and the avowed intention of the Most Christian King, which, as may be gathered from past evidence, as well as from the iniquitous and perverse practices he has always used, from the letters of the said de Nassau, and viscount Annart (Hannart), and the memorandum put into their hands by the ministers of that king, is evidently not to come to reasonable terms with Your Majesty, it is important to consider whether the negotiations are to be carried on, and on what footing, or whether they are to be suspended and discontinued altogether.
	In the first place, whether the negotiation is to be carried on still by Mr. de Nassau and viscount Hannart de Lombeck, (fn. n18) through the means they themselves have pointed out, adopting some expedient respecting Milan, such as promising the investiture of that duchy after the death of the duke Francesco Sforza in case of his dying without male heirs, which would promote the public welfare of Christendom, and obviate the evils and inconveniences that might follow in consequence of the question [of Milan] not having been settled beforehand, on which the king of France principally insists, making it an absolute condition of his friendship, as the above-named ambassador writes, and as appears from the words of the memorandum; or whether it is preferable not to specify anything about Milan, but look out for some plausible excuse not to treat of the affair, thus gaining time the better to oppose and defeat the future plans of the king of France, and of his sons, who, as appears from the said memorandum and from the correspondence of the Imperial ambassadors, think of nothing short of obtaining possession one way or other of the duchy of Milan, which, they say, belongs to them. Indeed Mr. de Nassau and viscount Hannaërt are both of opinion that the king of France will never consent to treat about the duchy of Milan on the condition of the duke Francesco Sforza dying without children; but that, on the contrary, such a proposition on our part will increase his hopes, and render him still more insolent and boastful with Italians and other nations, inducing him to demand promises and exact securities from the Emperor as much as from the vassals of the Duchy, and from those who have the command of the forces, the result of all this being that Milan would be considered from that moment as belonging to him, and the Duke himself would lose all favour with the Milanese. This plan, therefore, would not suit the Emperor's sense of right and honour nor his regard for the promises made to the Venetians, and principally to the Duke, especially after his marriage to the Emperor's niece (Christine). This would immediately cause mistrust of His Majesty in all Italy. For such a plan it would be indispensable to secure at least the Duke [Sforza's] consent, which consent it is almost sure he himself will never give, unless forced to it. Nor is it likely that the Venetians, nor the rest of the confederates, will ever counsel such a step. Nor is the proposition, if accepted, less important for the Emperor in what concerns Naples, because, should the duchy of Milan ever come into the hands of the duke of Orleans (fn. n19) —which might happen in a short space of time, considering the present duke's bad health—the duchy would, as it were, be at the bidding of the King, his father, who will never be free from lust and ambition, nor forget the ill-will and hatred he bears the Emperor. Were king Francis not to be alive at the time his son took possession of the duchy, there is still the fear that the present Dauphin, his brother, succeeding to the throne, might feel inclined to help his brother's aggrandizement in Italy, especially in Naples and in the estate of Florence, the better to make sure, and free himself of his brother's rights to the duchy of Bretagne. Nor could any security be taken from the one or from the other, if the French habit of keeping and observing only that part of the treaties which is good for them be taken into consideration. Excuses will not be wanting as to the age of the Princes and the authority of the father, and so forth, to break through treaties whenever it suits them. Besides which, should the faintest hope of succession be offered to the duke of Orleans, it is to be presumed that all the Italian powers would immediately court the French, and try to enter into secret relation with them, at any rate from the very moment that the declaration is made until the Princes entered into possession. In a similar manner, troubles and revolutions might be anticipated at Genoa, so much divided by factions as it now is. Indeed, if not soon, there will surely be a revolution after Doria's decease. The same might be said of Monago, which would be the means of preventing the Imperial fleets from coming to Italy, thus curtailing the Emperor's influence in the country.
	2. If, owing to the above reasons, the Emperor should wish not to go on with the negotiation respecting Milan, it is important to know whether count Nassau and Mr. Hannaërt are to suspend at once any communication with King Francis and his ministers, since he has so absolutely declared his intention and determination on this point; or whether it is better to temporise, and wait for the French ambassador residing at this court, to present some sort of amendment to his master's ultimatum, under the understanding that the King insists greatly on having our answer immediately without the ambassador's intervention, thereby intimating that if there is any delay in the answer he (the King) will take it for granted that the whole is intended to stop and embarrass him in the negotiations which he pretends he can carry on with other powers, and at the same time make him more attentive and diligent to do openly and without dissimulation all the harm he can to Your Majesty. Whether it will be better to write to ambassador Hannaërt that Your Majesty finds the King's memorandum rather too precise, and containing many important concessions, besides which the affair is of such quality and importance that Your Majesty cannot return an answer so soon, especially as a third person is concerned; that Your Majesty will consider what can be done with the consent of the party, and with good grace and honesty, and will then return such an answer as the ambassador may communicate to him, and that in the meantime and at all events the ambassador may go on prosecuting what has been proposed and commenced by Mr. de Nassau to the Grand Master (mayordomo mayor) of France, negotiating with, and, if need be, with the King himself and others, respecting the marriage of the duke of Angoulême with the princess of England, in accordance with the instructions of the count of Nassau and his own, that being a thing no less important, nay, a good deal more advantageous, for the aggrandisement of the King and of his sons, than what he is aiming at with the duchy of Milan. Meanwhile the ambassador might try to ascertain more in detail what the king of France is prepared to do for the welfare of Christendom and remedy of Faith, either with the new Pope just elected, or in any other wise, and likewise against the Turk, and principally for the repulse of Barbarossa. The ambassador ought to be told that in the instructions given to Mr. de Nassau, as well as in other previous treaties, this mutual defence against the Turk and Barbarossa, as well as the consequent peace of Christendom, which was to be the result thereof, were made the principal grounds for treating; and that whenever close alliances, intermarriages, and so forth, have been mutually proposed between Your Majesty and the king of France, those two objects have always been foremost, constituting, as it were, the base of the negotiation.
	Considering that an answer of this kind couched in the above or similar terms will give us more time, and also less matter for suspicion to the French, as well as afford greater opportunities for us to judge how matters stand between them (the French) and the English, perhaps, too, prevent the interview and closer intelligence of the two kings, the Privy Council is of opinion that some such answer should be prepared. It will then be easier for us to learn what has happened, and is now going on between the said king of France, the Turk, and Barbarossa; to ascertain which ambassador Hannaërt is to use his wonted dexterity and discretion.
	3. Whether the duke of Milan and the Venetians, as well as Genoa, ought to be informed respectively of the pretensions of the French king, and his insistance on his said plans, and whether for this purpose a personage should be sent expressly; or whether it is preferable to commit the whole affair to Antonio de Leyva and to prothonotary Carazolo (Marino Caracciolo) as far as Milan is concerned, to prince Andrea Doria and to ambassador Figueroa as to Genoa, leaving Venice to Lope de Soria, and informing each of those powers of Your Majesty's intention, which is only to gain time and prepare for contingencies, in order to ascertain how far Your Majesty can count upon them to counteract and resist the ambitious designs of the French king.
	4. Whether all or part of the confederates ought not to be sounded as to the assistance they might be willing to give in case of Your Majesty being obliged to make war out of Italy against the said king of France; or whether this negotiation is to be entirely entrusted to, and left at the discretion of, the Imperial agents for them to undertake it, or at least send their opinion in writing; or whether no steps at all should be taken thereupon, considering that it is unlikely that the Venetians will help in war by land out of Italy, or by sea beyond the limits specified in the treaty of 1529, unless the Turk and Barbarossa himself are previously reduced to extremities. As to the duke of Milan, he is at present so much embarrassed and in debt, and his time so taken up with fortifying and provisioning the fortresses of his estate that all applications in that quarter would be useless. It is, however, to be hoped that, according as the need may be, the Duke will help in a thing of the utmost importance for him. With regard to Genoa there is not the least appearance of danger for the present, inasmuch as the Genoese themselves are already grumbling at what they will have to disburse for the said defensive league, and therefore it will be next to impossible to get more money from them, except for the armament of their own galleys and so forth.
	5. Whether the dukes of Savoy and Mantua,—more particularly the former,—ought to be informed of the proposals made by the French king respecting the marquisate of Monferrato, is another important point for the Council's deliberation. The Duke's agents at this court have been secretly apprised of Your Majesty's intentions respecting Asti, without, however, any formal declaration being made to them on the subject. It now remains to be considered whether they (the Duke's agents) are to receive here positive assurances to that effect, or whether it will be sufficient to put the affair into the hands of Leyva and Caracciolo, that they may apprise the duke of Mantua thereof, as they may think proper and opportune, and likewise Gutierre Lopez de Padilla, our ambassador at the court of Savoy.
	6. As it is almost certain that the king of France, far from abandoning his projects, will try to make friends and allies, and everywhere let no opportunity pass of doing harm to Your Majesty, the following points are to be considered:—
	7. Whether the fleet which Your Majesty is now fitting out against Barbarossa is to be made the ground for a large maritime armament to be directed against Constantinople, or against France, as may be thought the more expedient according to time and circumstance. A measure of this sort would instil fear into the heart of king Francis, perhaps, too, induce him to assist the said Barbarossa with his galleys, and, if so, might prevent him from coming forward, and make it doubtful for him to carry on war by land. If he does, it will be easier for us to invade his kingdom by sea, and, if so, the appointment and provisioning of the fleet already commenced and decided upon should be continued; the fleet itself to be ready to put to sea at the time fixed, furnished and provided with all that is needful, not only for navigation, but with artillery, ammunition, and troops.
	8. What ought to be written to prince Andrea Doria respecting the preconcerted invasion of France in case Nassau's negotiations in France failed entirely, and how far the opinion of that captain and that of Leyva respecting the port, town, or village to be landed at, and also concerning the galleys of France, is to be attended to. Whether it will be enough to write to him that, owing to the above considerations, he (Doria) is to occupy himself exclusively in all matters relating to the said maritime armament, sending us his own opinion on what he considers necessary for the fleet, and writing also to the viceroys of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia to make stores, considering that winter is near at hand, and the aforesaid undertaking must then cease. Doria must also be informed of the resolution lately taken, which is not to undertake anything against the galleys of France during their voyage to Rome, considering (atento) the Cardinal's quality, (fn. n20) and the cause of his journey, as that would irritate at the first blow (del primer salto) the future Pope and the Apostolic See; or whether Doria ought to be written to, that whilst attending to the fitting out of the fleet against Barbarossa,—which fleet might, as above stated, serve all ends,—he is to look out by means of spies whether there will be next spring a way to occupy some port on the coast of France, capture the fleet, or at least defeat it. And let him answer as soon and secretly as possible, and send us his report.
	9. Whether the said Doria and Leyva and the viceroy of Naples ought to be written to that, in every possible way, and with the greatest secrecy, under the excuse of the said armament against Barbarossa, they must ascertain through third persons how many colonels, captains, and men could be enlisted in Italy to serve in the said fleet, whether against Barbarossa in the undertaking against Constantinople, or against France, by land, if need be, avoiding of course all superfluous expense, keeping the men thus enlisted ready on an emergency, and preventing their offering their services to another power. Should the league be renewed, the said colonels and captains might be engaged and sustained on the plea of serving under it.
	10. What orders should be given to Leyva for the recovery of La Mirandola, since he is himself evidently waiting for instructions from His Majesty. When he (Leyva) last applied for them, he was told to wait until the result of count de Nassau's negotiations should be known. But now that nothing good is to be expected from France, and winter is so far advanced that there is no likelihood of king Francis undertaking anything or throwing impediments for this present year, would it not be advisable that Leyva should at once send thither the Spanish infantry he has in the Monferrato? Considering the iniquitous seizure of that castle by count Galeotto della Concordia, to the utter contempt of the Emperor's authority, and considering the league formed for the defence of Italy, it seems to us that the recovery of La Mirandola by the Imperial forces can no longer be delayed. Besides which, should the Spanish infantry remain longer in the Monferrato, they are sure to waste and ruin the whole of that marquisate, and therefore they must be paid and employed elsewhere. And what better employment for them than the recovery of La Mirandola and of Novi, at which the duke of Ferrara (Alfonso d'Este) would be highly pleased? Once in possession of those two castles, the Spaniards might overawe the country as far as Florence and other towns of Tuscany, and be ready to march anywhere.
	11. Whether count Cifuentes at Rome ought to be informed of the result of count De Nassau's negotiations in France, sending him at the same time a copy of king Francis ultimatum, and of the Emperor's resolution thereupon, that he may, after the election, and when he has ascertained how far he can trust the new Pope, concert with him measures for the peace of Italy and the welfare of Christendom.
	12. Whether Leyva ought to be written to in case of the new Pope refusing altogether to join the League, or delaying his consent, to secure, at any risk, the possession of Parma and Piacenza by appointing trusty governors, and taking away from the French all chance of creating partisanships in those towns.
	13. Whether instructions ought to be sent to count Cifuentes for him to solicit the new Pope, whoever he may be, to observe and respect the sentence which His Imperial Majesty once delivered in the Ferrara affair; and if so, whether the Duke's ambassador residing here, and the one he has at Rome, ought to be apprised of the step taken in their master's favour.
	14. Whether the said Leyva and count of Cifuentes ought to be written to that they may confidentially inform the duke of Urbino (Francesco Maria della Rovere) of the steps that are being taken with the Venetians and other Italian powers, to ensure the peace of Italy, and protect it from aggression, so that he (the Duke) may not listen to any practices whatsoever likely to disturb the said peace; but, on the contrary, let us know of any intrigues, &c., likely to disturb that peace on the side of Florence or elsewhere. And whether the Count can confidentially acquaint the Duke with the provision that is being made against Barbarossa, and ask his advice thereupon.
	15. Whether a letter ought to be written to the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), informing him of the bad result of Nassau's negotiations, and the substance of His Majesty's resolutions, that he may, in consequence, temporise with men and things in Germany, especially in matters of Faith, so that things do not become worse, and likewise that he make no attempt for the present either against the people of Augsburgh, now entirely separated from the Catholic Faith, or against others who might cause revolution or war in Germany; but, on the contrary, if he sees his way to it, to have the Hungarian dispute settled by writing or by conferences without going to war, which would necessitate His Majesty's help and assistance. If so, it would be advisable to inform him how His Majesty is situated, and that, far from the Emperor now helping him in his difficulties, he, the king of the Romans, is expected to be so far disengaged at home as to be able to assist His Majesty with his forces against the king of France, should the latter openly declare in favour of Barbarossa, or, profiting by the Turk's invasion, attack us in Italy or elsewhere. For this reason it is the Council's opinion that the king of the Romans, His Majesty's brother, ought as soon as possible, to adjust his differences with the Venetians who certainly are now showing every disposition to treat. The same might be said of the dukes of Bavaria, and of the rest of the princes and electors, and specially of the landgrave of Hesse; all of whom might, with some management, be brought to side with us, or at least not to listen to the offers of France.
	16. What particular instructions should be given to Andalot, now about to start for Germany for the purpose of securing colonels and captains, and preventing the French from enlisting in that country. Whether this business ought to be expressly recommended to him, and to the archbishop of Lunden, and whether the sum of money destined for that purpose ought not to be increased, considering how important it is to prevent the king of France from drawing men from Germany and Switzerland, the only two countries where he can now recruit.
	17. Whether strenuous efforts should not be made openly and at once with the Catholic cantons of Switzerland to prevent their giving men to France; or whether it would be better to write to Your Majesty's agent in that country to go on temporising with the said cantons, and promising them some sort of reward (gratificacion) from the Italian league, and begging excuses for the delay owing to the late Pope's demise, writing to Leyva and to prothonotary Caracciolo concerning this, and leaving the matter in suspense until next March, as during that time the said cantons might adjust their differences, which we hear are chiefly caused by disputes about the League. It will also be seen how far the Swiss cantons are inclined to favour the king of France, because, even supposing the French paid the money they owe there; if the nature of the Swiss, and what they are in the habit of doing, be taken into consideration, fresh overtures, with the promise of a reward (gratificacion), will most likely prevent the French from drawing men from the country. If, the better to carry this plan into execution, it were deemed necessary to engage a number of men, this might be easily accomplished in the name of the Italian league without arousing suspicion; indeed, much better than in Germany, where it might be presumed that the enlistment was intended against the Lutherans.
	18. Besides informing Mr. de Nassau of the resolution to be taken respecting his negotiation and king Francis' note, what other orders are to be transmitted to him? Is he, in compliance with his secret instructions, to go to Flanders, and concert with the dowager queen of Hungary the best means of placing the country in a state of defence, inspecting the frontiers, raising money, making stores of provisions, &c.? Or will the assembly of the Estates be deferred until king Francis' reply to the memorandum sent from hence in answer to his note, the Queen and the Count not giving up the negotiation for peace as entirely lost?
	19. Should the Marshal and President of Burgundy, and other Imperial delegates in that duchy, be told to prepare for the contingency of war, and look to the defence of a country which, being for the most part surrounded by French provinces, or estates devoted to France, such as Lorraine, Berne, Basilea (Basle), and Novocastro (Neufchastel), beyond Burgundy, most of them now alienated from the Faith, is more open to danger, especially considering the great distance from His Majesty's Spanish dominions, and that the king of France is now holding the county of Montbelliard between Ferrete and the county of Bourgoyne (Burgundy)?
	20. Whether anything is to be done now with regard to England, and especially with reference to the Irish rebellion against king Henry. Whether the offers made to the Emperor by princes and lords in that country, declaring that they wish to become his subjects, and take the part of the queen of England and princess of Wales, ought to be accepted, (fn. n21) since a step of this sort would be very important in preventing the said king of England from helping him of France, inasmuch as that, should the said Irish rebellion increase and assume large proportions, it might seriously inconvenience the King, and be the cause of his repenting and reforming willingly or by force, if the growing indignation and ill-will of his vassals and subjects, as well as the news from Rome and France that he is beginning to be wearied and tired of Anne Boulans (Boleyn), be true. Or whether it will be better to wait till December and send a personage to England,—as His Majesty has written and promised,—for the purpose of informing the English of his intentions. Considering that encouraging letters have been written to the Irish, that during this next winter nothing can be done, and no assistance can be given, the Council is of opinion that nothing more ought to be done for the present, and that we had better wait and see how affairs will turn up. (fn. n22)
	21. Similarly, with regard to Scotland, whether it would be advisable to delay writing to the King till news came of the arrival there of Micer Godescalco, sent by the Emperor from Toledo, and of whom nothing has been heard since he left Ireland for that country. Or whether it would be preferable, all matters considered, and supposing that the said Godescalco has been prevented by illness or some other accident on the road from delivering the message he had for the king of that country, and that there is no appearance of marriage between the duke of Angoulesme and the princess Mary, to write to the Queen (Mary of Hungary) and to Mr. de Beures (Adolphe de Bourgogne); to whom king James addressed himself first on the subject of his marriage to the daughter of the king of Denmark, that since the hand of that princess has been granted to the palatine Frederic, they should resume the negotiation entrusted to Godescalco, and do their best towards promoting that of king James with the princess Mary of England, thus preventing his taking engagements with France or making close alliance and confederacy with England.
	Spanish. Original. pp. 20.