9 March.
H. H. u. St. A.
England. f. 2.
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Charles V to the Ambassadors in England.
We received yours of January 20th, replying to our letters of
October 31st and November 17th. Although we have recently
written you by Francisco Frias, we shall reply as usual.
The English ambassadors here had already informed us of
most of the points in your letter. In addition they say that if
truce cannot be concluded, leaving out the Scots, Henry hopes
to finish the Scottish campaign while the negotiations are still in
progress. Therefore they will delay as much as possible, sending
no powers to Rome until the pope replies to Wolsey's letter and
until they know what the king of France will do ; afterwards
Wolsey will send to us, so that our powers may be sent jointly
to Rome. Thus the whole summer will be spent in these goings
and comings. Meanwhile, if we have no other aid and, trusting
in a truce, make no other preparations, we shall be in great
danger from all sides. Therefore, it seems, little is to be hoped
of an armistice.
The English ambassadors have also said that, if we are not
satisfied with this plan for truce, we should give order for an army
in Flanders to join the English army, capable of besieging towns
and of meeting any emergency. You should know that we
replied that we are only bound by treaty to maintain two
thousand men to protect the Low Countries ; this we have done
and more. A larger army would be futile and expensive. Nevertheless,
if Henry will put a good army in the field this summer,
we shall do much more, for our part, than the minimum required
by treaty, and shall also put a powerful army in the field.
The English ambassadors suggested that to prevent the Swiss
and some Germans from serving the French, the archduke
Ferdinand should reside this summer at Ferrette [in Alsace] or
in Wurtemberg. We replied that we were of the same mind, and
thought that the archduke should have some force of horse and
foot, not only to restrain the Swiss and Germans, but to hold the
French in fear, and oblige them to keep an army to defend the
duchy of Burgundy. This would cost money, however, which
should be at the common expense, and we had done nothing about
it so far, lacking Henry's agreement.
As to what Wolsey said to you about the pensions, in making
our excuses say that the payment for a year which Wolsey
received at Windsor was, we thought, supposed to include the
present term. Since we understand that the money is due, we
are sending a trustworthy person to pay this pension and others
due in England as soon as possible. He will leave within two
weeks, bearing letters of exchange on Flanders.
Say to Wolsey that although we have entire confidence in him,
and wish to follow his advice, the proposals for a truce suggested
by him seem very difficult. It will be almost impossible to
satisfy anyone if allies and confederates are to be excluded, for
the pope wishes universal peace, the king of France will never
abandon his allies, and for our part, we should still have to
defend Milan and should still be at war with Gelderland, with
the sons of d'Albret, and with Robert la Marck. Nevertheless,
since we understand from the English ambassadors that Wolsey
would agree to a general truce once the Scots have been beaten,
we have sent his letter to the pope with the instructions to the
English ambassador at Rome, and have written to the duke of
Sessa to treat jointly with the English, and not otherwise. These
letters have been taken by our marechal de logis instead of by
Cabanillas, captain of our guard, who has broken his arm and leg.
Point out to Wolsey that the king of France and all his kingdom
are in great difficulty, so that extortionate taxation of the poor
and the ill treatment of Bourbon are likely to lead to a rebellion.
Meanwhile we have made preparations such as we shall describe ;
the grand masters, towns and subjects of these kingdons are well
disposed, and urge us to make use of their services in this war.
Therefore a little enterprise this year may win us more than the
"Great Enterprise" next year, and at much less cost. Delay
obliges us to defend our realms, the Low Countries, Flanders and
Italy, where Milan is in great danger, and consequently Naples
and Sicily are not safe, all at a ruinous cost. We cannot guard
so many frontiers for so long, and maintain so great and so
many armies alone, without profit. If this enterprise is not
undertaken this year, our affairs are in danger of total ruin ; if
it is, more may be accomplished than by an army four times as
great next year. Remind Wolsey that, according to the treaty
of Bruges, the "Great Enterprise" was to take place this year,
and was postponed for a year at the request of Henry and Wolsey,
who said that the postponement was for our benefit, since there
was some doubt whether or not we could be ready. If the delay
was for our benefit it ought not to be turned to our injury, when
we are ready to do the common enemy as much damage as the
"Great Enterprise" could do.
Since Henry and Wolsey have told you at length of the great
military preparations they are making against Scotland, and
against France, and have asked for similar information about
us, you may tell them that we are preparing a powerful army,
with the assistance of the nobles and commons of this kingdom,
to invade France, besiege towns and give or await battle.
Besides this Castilian army, we expect our kingdoms of Aragon,
Valencia and Catalonia to furnish four or five hundred men-at-arms
with light cavalry and infantry on the frontier of Roussillon,
for defensive or offensive warfare. At Cartagena we are holding
the two carracks and the galleon which escorted Don Juan
Manuel and the marquis of Pescara, and with these, and other
ships, we are forming a Mediterranean fleet to be reinforced by
the galleys of Castile, now at Majorca, and by those of Naples
and Sicily now at Genoa, this fleet to act jointly with the Genoese
squadron against the French by land or sea, raiding Provence,
keeping open our communications with Italy, and ensuring the
reinforcement of our army in Lombardy, in case the French
cross the Alps. If the French do not take the offensive, the
fleet will co-operate either in an invasion of Languedoc by our
army of Roussillon or an invasion of Provence by our army of
Lombardy. If the French do invade Italy, and if we reach no
agreement with the Venetians and the Swiss, we shall use the
Spanish infantry with the fleet to reinforce the army of Lombardy,
and shall raise ten or twelve thousand lanzknechts, for the
payment of which we have already sent letters of exchange to
Germany, so that they will be ready to descend into Lombardy
if Prospero Colonna asks for them. We are now sending Prospero
a hundred thousand ducats for Italian affairs. We are increasing
our fleet at San Sebastian to three thousand fighting men as we
agreed. These will keep the sea continually, attacking the
enemy wherever they find them, and proving as useful, we hope,
as if they were in the English Channel. If Henry wishes his
fleet to join them in a descent on Guienne, which he is to conquer,
we hope to give him good assistance.
Although we are only bound by treaty to maintain defensive
garrisons in the Low Countries, nevertheless, to encourage our
subjects to aid us in some profitable exploit against the enemy,
we are sending in a few days, a trustworthy person with letters
of exchange for a hundred thousand ducats on the next fair of
Antwerp, which cannot be manipulated by Parisian financiers.
This money will be spent only for the payment of troops, and
we should be able to raise with it a considerable number of
German infantry, and of cavalry to supplement our ordonnance.
When these troops have exhausted the hundred thousand ducats,
we hope that they will be maintained by our towns in the Low
Countries. This will be more likely if Henry invades France
with an army which may act by itself or jointly with ours as he
prefers. To finance all these activities we have arranged to
raise a million and a half ducats as they are required ; the last
dates for payment are before October first, so that nothing will
be lacking as we have explained more in detail to the English
ambassadors.
Therefore ask Wolsey to help persuade Henry to this enterprise,
since war with Scotland is less important than the war with
France. If Henry cannot go in person, at least he can send a
powerful army with a good commander, for since he is preparing
three such powerful armies, he can, without danger from Scotland,
order that that commanded by Suffolk shall cross the sea in
such force as he judges necessary and fitting to his honour. The
army may be strengthened by German cavalry, which can be
raised in six weeks and can join our gens d'armes d'ordonnance
and our other troops in Flanders, who will assist the English in
some good exploit against the enemy. If the English wish to
act separately, each army will do its best alone. By this means
the French will be unable to assist the Scots, or to raid English
territory, and the king of Denmark will not dare to budge, since
the French, pressed on all sides, will be unable to help others.
Point out to Wolsey that by this means, although the conquest
of France may not be completed, nevertheless we may recover
much territory now held by the French, and advance our
boundaries so that the king of France will be tightly ringed
about, and obliged to agree to whatever conditions of peace we
will grant. Thus we may be relieved of the indemnity, and the
treaty be satisfied by our making peace in France by common
consent, a much more feasible course than to negotiate at present,
without having fought the good war from which a good peace
must come.
In reply to Wolsey's complaint that we have not fulfilled a
single point of what we have promised, you may say that we
cannot agree that we have failed in any except, perhaps, in the
matter of the indemnity. We deferred this payment, relying
on what Wolsey said at Bruges, which was that we should not
be obliged to pay, and that the clause was put in the treaty only
to satisfy certain members of the English council. We had not
thought Wolsey would be so insistent on the letter of this clause,
or so upset by delay, in view of the great affairs in which we
were engaged. Nevertheless, if Henry insists on payment, ask
Wolsey to persuade him to use his own credit to raise the money
in England for at least a year, and we promise to reimburse him
with interest. You may make this offer at once, although the
money is not due until June 20th. If Henry wishes to engage
in this enterprise this summer, however, we are willing he should
anticipate the term. We do not think we have failed in anything
else agreed on by treaty. Each side was supposed to maintain
three thousand men at sea, and in case of need, the two fleets
were to act together, but there is nothing in the treaty about our
navy remaining in the Channel, as you can see by the enclosed
copy. Although we might reasonably say that the failure to
provide Lescano with provisions was not our fault but the
fortunes of war, nevertheless we have always maintained another
fleet around Fuenterrabia, which has done the enemy much more
damage than the English have done, having taken, burned or
sunk more than thirty ships, great and small. According to
treaty, we were to have three thousand Spanish infantry by
land ; we have maintained a much larger number. We have
also had a larger force in Flanders than the English, and are
more nearly ready there than they. If there have been failures
so far, they have been on both sides ; this is no time for
recrimination but for each one to do his best, forgetting past
differences.
We are writing in our own hand to the king and the cardinal,
asking credence for you. In virtue of this credence you will
speak as above, more or less, as your discretion dictates. Try
to persuade Henry that if he ever wishes to have satisfaction
from the French, this is the time. The Scottish enterprise may
safely be delayed. Once the French are brought low, he may
easily settle with the Scots ; while the French are powerful, he
can never be sure of Scotland. In answer to Wolsey's statement
that no help is to be expected from them in Italy or Switzerland,
ask him at least to send his ambassadors to negotiate with the
Swiss, so that it may appear that we are still allies, and ask him
also to consider the great profits that may arise, especially to
England, from weakening the enemy this year, particularly on
account of the Bourbon affair which will be shortly concluded.
To his remark that he wants to see the money in hand before the
"Great Enterprise" is begun, reply that we have already showed
the English ambassadors here the state of our finances. You
may tell Wolsey that he is not well informed about our negotiations
with Venice. It is not that we have been too harsh with
the Venetians, but that they have asked for the restitution of
certain lands conquered by our grandfather, the emperor
Maximilian, which are so important that we shall never cede
them. The Venetians are merely delaying matters in the hope
that the French will again invade Italy.
We are grateful for your efforts to recover the provisions and
artillery lost in the shipwreck, and also for your services in the
redemption of Diego de Vera's carrack. You ask whom you
should address in case Wolsey again falls ill. We are satisfied to
rely on your discretion. The rule in this case, however, is to
deal with the master rather than with the servants, who will
often make themselves seem more important than they are.
We firmly believe that you will speed best by dealing directly
with Henry. You are in a position to know, however, how things
are going at court, and you must conduct yourselves accordingly.
We are informed that Beaurain is coming here, having been
unable to conclude his charge in England. If he has already
left, return the packet addressed to him with its seals unbroken,
without sending it, or speaking of it, anywhere else.
The affair to which this refers has already been so badly
managed that some part of the secret seems to have leaked out
to the king of France, who has spoken so harshly to Bourbon
that the latter has withdrawn from court and retired to his own
estates, accompanied by a number of persons of importance.
Further negotiations in England seem likely to place Bourbon
in great peril, consequently we have decided that the affair must
be arranged here in Spain. Ask Henry and Wolsey to send
powers to their ambassadors to treat with Bourbon and to
conclude all alliances and agreements about the payment of the
troops and anything else that may arise. We hope to have this
affair so well in hand that, by the time Henry's powers arrive
here, it will be possible for his ambassadors to sign definite
agreements.
Valladolid. [9 March, 1523.]
Contemporary draft, with additions and corrections in Gattinara's
hand. French. pp. 16. Calendared in L. & P., III, 1216 from
an official MS. copy in the British Museum.
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22 March.
H. H. u. St. A.
England, f. 2.
|
Charles V to the Ambassadors in England.
We have received three letters from you, that of the 28th of
January by Aymercourt, and others of the 5th and 13th of
February by Beaurain, who has reported to us fully his negotiations
with Henry and Wolsey, and what you told him about our
affairs there. We are grateful for your diligent and faithful
services.
We have read the papal briefs addressed to Henry, to Wolsey
and to you, bishop of Badajoz. Since we have had no further
communication from the pope on this subject and you have not
yet received Wolsey's final decision, we shall say nothing about
it at present, except to note that the conditions proposed by
Wolsey seem unlikely to be accepted.
You may tell Wolsey that we hope he will soon have reasons
to reverse his opinion that we have been too harsh with the
Venetians, for we are on the point of concluding a treaty with
them. When it is concluded, Wolsey will see that the cause of
delay has not been on our side, and that we have conceded more
than was reasonable for the sake of the common cause. We
replied by the last courier to what you wrote about the indemnity
and the pensions to which Henry and Wolsey now attach so
much importance. We said we had deferred paying the
indemnity, relying on what Wolsey said at Bruges, which was
that the clause was inserted only to satisfy certain of the king's
councillors, and that we should not have to pay. We had not
thought that in the midst of these great affairs, the English
would insist on every detail of the treaty, or take the delay amiss.
If Henry wishes immediate payment, however, ask Wolsey to
persuade Henry to raise the money from merchants there on his
credit, for at least a year ; we promise to reimburse them with
costs and interest. As for the pensions, we sent you by the last
courier a letter of credit for 8,500 crowns ; this is all we can
possibly do at present.
The naval force of three thousand men which is asked for is
being got ready with the greatest diligence, for we do not wish to
fail in anything agreed on by treaty, as you may tell the king
and the cardinal.
The most pressing and important matter is to arrange about
the war this summer. In this there should be no delay, as the
season is already well advanced, and as this is the way to oblige
the enemy to an honourable peace or truce, so that Christendom
can be defended against the Turks and Henry and I be satisfied.
Delay is most disadvantageous, and Henry and I should not
consume our revenues uselessly without defending ourselves.
It was for this reason we sent you two powers, one for peace
or truce, the other for war. You will ask Henry to send his
ambassador in Rome similar powers to arrange a truce, as we
wrote you by Francisco Frias. We have already written you of
our plans for war by land and sea this year, and of our intention,
with the help of the nobles, prelates, orders and towns of these
realms, to form an army for the invasion of France, strong
enough to give battle to the French king, and to besiege towns,
and so powerful that we may safely accompany it in person.
Although we are not bound by treaty to spend anything for
the defence of the Low Countries beyond the maintenance of
the necessary garrisons and succour in case of siege, nevertheless,
to encourage our subjects there by showing that we do not intend
to leave them in danger, and to move them to contribute to the
war, not only for defence but for some good exploit on the enemy,
we are sending a large sum of money by letters on the next fair
of Antwerp. These letters will be brought by our maître d'hôtel
Môqueron, who is leaving in a few days with instructions to
distribute this money personally in payment of the troops. We
have also ordered new troops recruited there for the war this
year, provided that Henry, for his part, will land a large army
in time, for we should not fall into the same difficulty as last
year. We hope that our subjects in the Low Countries will give
us all possible aid, and that an adequate English army will be
landed in France, either to join our army in Flanders, or to
operate independently as Henry prefers. For our part we shall
omit nothing which might contribute to success, for we find our
subjects here well disposed, and we know the weakness of the
enemy.
We instructed you in our letters of March 8th to follow
Madame's instructions in everything concerning the war in
Flanders, since she is on the spot and better able to say what
power the Low Countries can raise to co-operate with the English
this year. This year, it should be at the proper season. In our
letters of February 7th we outlined the arrangements for a unified
allied army to consist of 1700 men-at-arms, a thousand genetaires
and eight thousand Spanish and German infantry with artillery
and munitions to be paid by us, and five thousand English
infantry, three thousand German infantry, and three thousand
kegs of powder to be furnished by Henry. We said that, if
Henry preferred, each party might furnish the best army in its
power to attack the enemy, we on the side of Bayonne or
Languedoc, the English in Brittany, Normandy or Guienne or
wherever they preferred. In either case the army should be
ready by May first. If the armies are separate, no stipulation is
to be made as to their size, on the understanding that each of us
will do his best.
Therefore, not to lose more time, we order you that, if your
arrangements about an army in Flanders are still incomplete, or
if Madame writes that she is unable to raise a suitable army to
co-operate with the English, or if the English do not wish to
make war in that quarter, you will then, at once, complete the
arrangements for a joint army, or for separate armies. Do not
be stopped by small details, for if we fail of a truce, we must
take the proper season to make war.
Beaurain has repeated to us your messages, and you may take
this letter as a complete answer. He has also told us of Wolsey's
proposal that we send three hundred men-at-arms and three
hundred infantry by sea to join the English in a descent on
Normandy or Brittany. This does not seem to us feasible at
present. It would take too much time to assemble the necessary
troops and ships, and we think the plans above outlined will do
more harm to the enemy at less cost.
We are sending the bearer of this, the count de Montfort, to
raise a number of lanzknechts in Germany and bring them here.
Môqueron is ordered to have ships ready for them, and to provide
the necessary money, so that there may be no delay. We have
ordered them not to stop anywhere, but to cross the seas at once,
as you may inform Henry and Wolsey, making the necessary
excuses. We intend to delay our expedition until the lanzknechts
arrive.
As we have written you, since Beaurain has returned to Spain
we think it better that negotiations with Bourbon should be
conducted from here. Therefore ask Henry and Wolsey to send
their ambassadors here the necessary powers and instructions to
arrange with Bourbon all alliances and conventions, including
those concerning the payment of his troops. Before these powers
arrive we shall go on with the negotiation, and we have asked
Beaurain to write Bourbon asking him to send someone here
empowered to conclude everything, so that the negotiations may
be carried on secretly and without suspicion. We shall proceed
so diligently in this matter that by the time the king of England's
powers and instructions arrive, everything will be arranged. All
this, of course, must be a complete secret.
Valladolid. 22 March, 1523.
Draft. French. pp. 8.
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